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POLICY EVALUATION REPORT AUGUST 31, 2007

# Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program: Year One Evaluation Report

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# Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) Program: Year One Evaluation Report

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents findings stemming from the first-year evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program, one of several statewide performance incentive programs in Texas. In the fall of 2006, the GEEG program made available non-competitive, three-year grants to 99 schools ranging from $60,000 to $220,000 per year. Grants were distributed to schools that were rated as high performing campuses in addition to having high proportions of economically disadvantaged students. More specifically, this report provides an overview of GEEG programs in 99 schools; the strategies used by schools to reward the performance of teachers and staff; and the apparent impact on schools' organizational dynamics, teachers' attitudes, and teachers' professional practice.

Overall findings about GEEG programs seem to abate the traditional critiques raised against performance incentive programs. Specifically, performance incentive programs appear to be having an encouraging impact on schools' organizational dynamics, teachers' perceptions of performance incentives, and teachers' instructional practice. Nonetheless, it is too soon to conclude that these outcomes are attributable to the inception of GEEG. Additionally, there is still much to be learned about the quality of schools' program designs and the impact of program characteristics on outcomes of teacher behavior, school culture, teacher workforce trends, and student achievement.

The following sections provide an overview of key policy points and questions addressed by this first year-evaluation of GEEG.

## Key Policy Points

This report highlights and expands upon the following key policy points.

- Recently, Texas education policy efforts have focused on improving teaching quality throughout the state, culminating in the creation of the nation's largest statewide performance incentive system.

- The direct evaluation literature on performance incentives is slender; nonetheless, it is sufficiently promising to support extensive policy experiments in combination with careful follow-up evaluations.

- The Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program is the first of several multimillion-dollar statewide programs committed to the development of performance incentives for high-performing educators.

- In many respects, schools participating in the GEEG program were similar to other schools throughout the state, with the exception of being rated as higher performing campuses and serving higher percentages of economically disadvantaged students – two explicit objectives of the program.

- The majority of proposed and distributed teacher awards (i.e., Part 1 funds) were less than the minimum amount of $3,000 recommended by statute.

- While GEEG schools tended to use similar program criteria for the determination of Part 1 teacher awards (i.e., measures of student performance, measures of teacher collaboration), there was greater variability in the specific indicators being used to measure teacher performance.

- Overall, there was a good deal of uniformity among GEEG schools' program designs, especially related to the structure of performance thresholds and the entities (e.g., campus, teacher teams, individual teachers) held accountable for determination of Part 1 teacher awards.

- GEEG schools overwhelmingly used Part 2 funds to distribute additional incentive awards to school personnel who were ineligible for Part 1 awards (i.e., school personnel other than classroom teachers) as opposed to other potential uses such as professional development.

- Year 1 survey findings suggest that most teachers held favorable views of their schools' GEEG programs; moreover, they tended to disagree that the performance incentive programs were deteriorating collaboration among teaching staff.

- During the first year of GEEG, teachers receiving GEEG awards had a greater tendency to use desirable instructional practices than their non-recipient peers; however, some of these differences could be explained by recipients having more years of teaching experience.

## Overview

The chapters of this report address the following questions.

- What is the landscape of public education reform in Texas and what have its implications been for the development of a statewide performance incentive system?

- How does performance incentive policy in Texas fit within the national education policy landscape and how is it framed by existing research literature on teacher pay?

- What were the key components and common characteristics of campus GEEG plans?

- What were schools' experiences with developing, approving, and managing the implementation of their GEEG programs?

- In what ways did teachers believe GEEG programs were impacting the organizational dynamics at their schools?

- Did teachers in GEEG schools adapt their professional practice? If so, in what ways, and did award recipients behave differently than their non-recipient counterparts?

Based upon the findings detailed in this first-year evaluation report, it is advised that policymakers in Texas allow the GEEG program to maintain its course. Not only did the GEEG program appear to have encouraging results during its first year of inception, but the program also provides a unique opportunity to learn about the differential effects of locally designed GEEG programs on teacher quality and student achievement. In fact, second- and third-year evaluation reports will focus further on outcomes of teacher workforce trends, teacher quality, and student achievement.

# CHAPTER 1
# STATE POLICY AND THE ROLE OF EDUCATOR INCENTIVES

This chapter provides an overview of public education reform in the state of Texas. More specifically, the intent of this chapter is to (1) highlight significant policy changes related to teacher quality and (2) situate these policy changes within the broader educational research literature related to teacher effectiveness and performance incentive pay for teachers.

## Key Policy Points

This chapter highlights and expands upon the following key policy points.

- Texas continues to lead the nation in innovative education reforms, including school and district accountability programs and performance incentive pay policy.
- The direct evaluation literature on incentive pay in education is slender; nonetheless, it is sufficiently promising to support extensive policy experiments in combination with careful follow-up evaluations.
- There has been significant growth in the number of performance incentive pay initiatives in the United States public education system over the last decade.

## Overview

This chapter addresses the following questions.

- What is the public education reform landscape in Texas?
- What issues within the Texas public education system are in need of improvement?
- How does research on teacher quality and teacher pay reform inform these issues?

## The Course of Education Reform in Texas

A long-term vision of standards-based accountability and incremental reform has shaped education policy in Texas over the past several decades. The scale of this state reform is enormous. These advances emerged from careful collaboration between state policymakers and business leaders. During the last 10 years alone, Texas has done the following.

- Rewritten the state education code
- Introduced new curriculum standards and assessments
- Aligned instructional materials with state standards
- Constructed an accountability system that holds schools responsible for the performance of both individual students and special populations
- Established a social promotion policy requiring students to meet standards at specific grade levels
- Developed academic initiatives to assist underperforming students
- Crafted new standards for educator preparation and certification
- Designed a new school finance system
- Enhanced local control through a set of new regulatory freedoms and financial incentives

Over the past decade, the performance of Texas public school students has also shown noteworthy advancements, as measured by the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), the only nationally representative assessment of students' academic performance administered by the National Center for Education Statistics of the U.S. Department of Education.[1] In many subject areas, the performance of public school students in Texas continues to grow and, in many grades and subject areas, the achievement gap between student subgroups has narrowed.

Table 1.1 displays public school students' performance on NAEP for both Texas and the nation in math and reading for the years 2000, 2003, and 2005.[2] The table presents the average scale scores achieved in each subject area for each year the assessment was administered. Possible scores range from 0 to 500 in math and reading. In almost all the tested areas, Texas public school students had higher scale scores than the average public school student. For example, in 4th-grade math, Texas students performed above the national average, while also improving over time. The one exception is 8th-grade reading, in which the average student in the U.S. public education system scored higher than those in Texas; additionally, these scores decreased from 2002 to 2005 in Texas.

[1] Two primary components of NAEP are the National NAEP assessment and State NAEP. The former provides nationally representative achievement results for students in Grades 4, 8, and 12 in eight subject areas, including math, reading, and science, among others. The State NAEP provides achievement results that are representative at the state level. The assessment is administered to students in Grades 4 and 8 in the subject areas of math, reading, science, and writing.

[2] NAEP assessments in 4th- and 8th-grade reading were not given in the year 2000, but rather in 2002.

**Table 1.1: Texas, Nation Scale Scores on NAEP, 2000–2005**

| 4th Grade Math | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | **2000** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **Nation (Public)** | 224 | 234 | 237 |
| **Texas** | 231 | 237 | 242 |
| **8th Grade Math** | | | |
| | **2000** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **Nation (Public)** | 272 | 276 | 278 |
| **Texas** | 273 | 277 | 281 |
| **4th Grade Reading** | | | |
| | **2002** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **Nation (Public)** | 217 | 216 | 217 |
| **Texas** | 217 | 215 | 219 |
| **8th Grade Reading** | | | |
| | **2002** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **Nation (Public)** | 263 | 261 | 260 |
| **Texas** | 262 | 259 | 258 |

*Source:* National Assessment of Educational Progress, National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education. NAEP Data Explorer, from http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/nde/criteria.asp

These same patterns hold true when looking at the achievement levels of all students in math and reading from 2000 to 2005. For example, as seen in Figure 1.1, the percentage of students scoring at proficient and advanced on 4th-grade math increased. Not only did the percentage of Texas students scoring proficient increase by 10%, but the percentage of those scoring advanced increased by 3%. Moreover, the percentage of students in Texas scoring at or above proficiency always surpassed their public school counterparts nationwide.

Nonetheless, the majority of Texas students – as well as their peers nationwide – continually performed at or below basic. Basic performance denotes only partial mastery of content knowledge in a given subject area assessment. While the percentage of Texas students performing at or below basic decreased from 2000 (over 75%) to 2005 (60%), the majority of the state's students still exhibited only partial mastery on the math assessment.

**Figure 1.1: Texas, Nation Achievement Levels on 4th Grade**




*Source:* National Assessment of Educational Progress, National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education. NAEP Data Explorer, from http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreport card/nde/criteria.asp

Improvements were not so evident for reading performance, particularly in the 8th grade. As seen in Figure 1.2, Texas students slightly underperformed their national counterparts in all testing years, and the percentage scoring at or above proficiency actually decreased from 2002 to 2005, from 30% to 26%.

**Figure 1.2: Texas, Nation Achievement Levels on 8th-Grade Reading, 2002–2005**




*Source:* National Assessment of Educational Progress, National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education. NAEP Data Explorer, from http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreport card/nde/criteria.asp

Further analyses of NAEP results reveal that positive achievement trends on NAEP have been experienced by most student subgroups, including those that are considered historically underperforming (i.e., economically disadvantaged and those from racial minority groups). The positive performance trends of these student subgroups from 2000 to 2005 tended to be greater in

math than in reading. Additionally, the achievement gap between historically underperforming subgroups and their higher performing peers was almost always smaller in Texas when compared to national averages.

For example, in 4th-grade math, the scale scores of economically disadvantaged students improved from an average score of 222 in 2000 to an average score of 233 in 2005. Additionally, while the achievement gap between economically disadvantaged students and their peers remained consistent between 2000 and 2005 (19 versus 20) in Texas, the gap nationwide was higher – 27 in 2000 and 23 in 2005. Improvements were not as evident in 4th-grade reading among economically disadvantaged students in Texas, who had an average score of 210 in 2002 and 208 in 2005. However, Texas still had a smaller achievement gap between economically disadvantaged students and their peers than their counterparts nationwide.

Appendix A provides a number of tables that further detail the NAEP achievement trends among various student subgroups in Texas and nationwide. It compares the performance of traditionally underperforming subgroups in Texas to that of their national counterparts, and presents the achievement gaps both in Texas and nationwide from 2000 to 2005. Table 1 in Appendix A compares performance of students considered economically disadvantaged (i.e., eligible for free and reduced price lunch) to those who are not. Similarly, Table 2 shows results for students from various racial/ethnic groups: White, Black, and Hispanic.

Although there has been considerable student success in elementary and middle-school grades, academic performance among high-school students has remained stagnant. According to a Texas High School Project report (2006), the majority of students leave Texas public schools unprepared for skilled employment, vocational training, or higher education. While 66% of Texas public school graduates indicate interest in postsecondary education by taking tests of postsecondary readiness, few demonstrate the academic readiness necessary to succeed. For example, although overall Texas ACT scores for English exceeded that of the college readiness benchmark in 2007 (19.5 v. 18), such was not the case for math (20.8 v. 22), reading (20.6 v. 21), and science (20.4 v. 24).

The academic performance of students in Texas provides reasons for encouragement, yet there is room for improvement throughout the entire K-12 system of public education. At the current rate of population growth and educational attainment, the Center for Demographic and Socioeconomic Research and Education (2002) predicts a 60% increase in the number of Texans without a high-school diploma, a 29% decrease in the number of Texans with a bachelor's degree, a 13% decrease in average household income, and a 40% increase in poverty.

In order to continue making strides in student performance, Texas is implementing state policies that target teacher quality and local innovation. Texas has commenced such efforts with a series of recently initiated statewide performance incentive systems.

The remaining sections of this chapter provide an overview of the current research literature on performance incentive pay programs, including a discussion of the impetus for such pay policy and the landscape of performance incentive programs nationwide. It provides a context for further discussions of Texas performance incentive programs, as detailed in Chapter 2.

# The Role of Educator Incentives in Public Education

## Focus on Student Success

One of the primary challenges in improving student achievement and closing the achievement gap is the fact that economically disadvantaged students generally require more academic instruction and more effective teachers than are required by non-economically disadvantaged students. Research indicates that underachieving students benefit from effective teachers more than students of average or high ability (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2003). Conversely, ineffective teachers exert an adverse impact on achievement for all students, but most particularly for underachieving students (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006).

Despite the importance of assigning the most effective teachers to the most at-risk students, several studies indicate that these students are least likely to be instructed by effective teachers (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, 2006; Peske & Haycock, 2006). State reports, furnished in compliance with the No Child Left Behind Act, confirm the disproportionate assignment of less experienced, less qualified teachers to classrooms and schools with large concentrations of economically disadvantaged students. Student performance in Texas public schools is challenged by a lack of qualified teachers, according to the state's most recent compliance report for No Child Left Behind. Like other states, Texas has a significant proportion of teachers who do not meet the highly qualified NCLB standards in high poverty/minority schools, although this number is relatively low compared to other states (Texas Education Agency, 2006).

## Teacher Effectiveness

Research suggests the most effective way to improve student achievement is by enhancing teacher quality. Over the past decade, scientific studies using unique longitudinal databases provide compelling evidence that teacher quality is the single most important factor in a child's education. This evidence challenges prevailing assumptions about teaching and learning, particularly the belief that student characteristics have greater influence over educational outcomes than teachers and schools.[3]

A number of research studies conclude that increasing teacher effectiveness is very promising as a mechanism for improving student performance, outweighing the impact of other reforms. For example, Leigh and Mead (2005) discovered that switching from an average to a highly effective teacher can provide twice the academic benefit for students as the effect of a 10% reduction in class size. Moreover, research found that assigning students to effective teachers results in a full year of additional academic growth, over and beyond expected annual gains (Hanushek & Rivkin, 2003).

While researchers have been able to demonstrate the impact of individual teachers on students, they have been unable to identify a significant relationship between teacher quality and qualifications such as highest degree held, certification, licensing scores, and experience (Ballou & Podgursky, 1997; Rivkin, Hanushek, & Kain, 2005). The inability to link teacher qualifications to teacher quality leaves

[3] See, for example, Aaronson, Barrow, and Sanders, 2003; Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, and Loeb, 2006; Hanushek, Kain, O'Brien, and Rivkin, 2005; Kane, Rockoff, and Staiger, 2004; Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain, 1998; Wright, Horn, and Sanders, 1997.

student achievement as the only way to identify an effective teacher. As noted by researchers Ballou and Podgursky (1997), "The surest sign that schools have been hiring more effective teachers would be improvement in student achievement."

## The Roots of Performance Incentive Programs

Performance incentive programs are based on the theory that incentives furnish schools with the tools to identify and retain high-quality teachers, and help teachers focus on the instructional changes required to help students make sizeable academic gains (changes that involve different ways of teaching). Incentive programs offer schools a way to make teacher salaries more comparable to and competitive with salaries earned by private sector professionals.

Salary schedules for teachers are a nearly universal feature of American K-12 public school districts. Data from national surveys show that close to 100% of traditional public school teachers are employed in school districts that make use of salary schedules in pay setting (Podgursky, 2007). Thus, roughly 3.1 million public school teachers from kindergarten through secondary level are paid largely on the basis of years of experience and education level – two variables weakly correlated, at best, with student outcomes (Hanushek, 2003).

In contrast to how most public school teachers are paid today, compensation in the private sector is generally related to an individual's performance on the job and characteristics of the job (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). In a survey of 1,681 firms, Hein (1996) found that 61% employed variable, performance-related compensation systems. A leading compensation textbook reports that over three-fourths of exempt (non-hourly) employees in large firms are covered by merit pay systems (Milkovich & Newman, 2005).

Pay determination practices also vary between K-12 sectors. Examining early versions of the Schools and Staffing Survey, Ballou and Podgursky (1997) and Ballou (2001) found that private school teachers were much more likely than their traditional public school counterparts to be rewarded for teaching performance, despite the fact that the majority of private schools reported relying on a salary schedule for teacher pay.

Since first implemented in 1921 in Denver, Colorado, and Des Moines, Iowa, the single salary schedule has attracted criticism. Most prominent among these critiques is that the schedule standardizes remuneration, depriving public school managers of authority to adjust an individual teacher's pay to reflect both performance and labor market realities. Numerous teacher compensation reform models have been proposed as alternatives, many under the banner of performance-related pay. The two most prominent types of reform programs have been (1) merit-based pay and (2) knowledge- and skill-based pay.

**Merit-Based Pay.** Although merit-based pay programs date back to Great Britain in the early 1700s, and somewhat similar ideas formed around the notion of performance contracting in the late 1960s (Stucker & Hall, 1971), it was not until the release of the *A Nation at Risk* report in 1983 that a significant number of public school districts in the United States began considering merit-based pay as an alternative or supplement to the single salary schedule.

Merit-based pay rewards individual teachers, groups of teachers, or schools on any number of factors, including student performance, classroom observations, and teacher portfolios. Merit-based

pay is a reward system that hinges on student outcomes attributed to a particular teacher or group of teachers rather than on "inputs" such as skills or knowledge. A report released by the Progressive Policy Institute in 2002 classified school-based performance awards as the most common type of merit-based pay programs operational in American K-12 public schools, but noted that rewards can also be distributed to specific grade levels, departmental units, or combinations thereof (Hassel, 2002).

**Knowledge- and Skill-Based Pay.** Since the 1990s, knowledge- and skill-based pay has garnered significant attention as an alternative strategy for compensating teachers (Odden & Kelley, 1996). This approach, which has some analogues in the private sector, represents a policy compromise between proponents and opponents of performance-related compensation in education.

Knowledge- and skill-based pay programs, such as those designed by the Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) at the University of Wisconsin, reward teachers for acquisition of new skills and knowledge presumably related to better instruction. Salary increases are tied to external evaluators and assessments (i.e., the Praxis III and National Board for Professional Teaching Standards) that gauge the degree to which an individual teacher has reached specified levels of "competency" (Odden & Kelley, 1996).

Although proponents argue that these strategically focused rewards can broaden and deepen teachers' content knowledge of core teaching areas and facilitate attainment of classroom management and curriculum development skills (Odden & Kelley, 1996), evidence suggests that knowledge and skills being rewarded in this "input-based" pay system have a negligible impact on student outcomes (Ballou & Podgursky, 2001; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2004).

## The National Landscape of Performance Incentives in U.S. Public Education

NCLB-induced state accountability systems, coupled with the poor relative performance of U.S. students on international math and science tests, have stimulated interest in the design and implementation of performance-related pay policy. Many districts, and even entire states such as Texas, are exploring performance-related pay to improve administrator and teacher productivity and recruit more qualified candidates. By all accounts, interest in performance-related pay programs is growing, as is the number of programs under development and being implemented.

According to the Schools and Staffing Survey, administered by the National Center for Education Statistics, during the 2003-04 school year:[4]

- 24% of the nation's districts provided bonuses to teachers for professional development.
- 18.4% awarded bonuses for attaining National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) certification.
- 11.9% paid incentives to recruit or retain teachers in shortage areas, while 4.6% paid incentives to work in less desirable locations.
- 7.9% paid incentives for excellence in teaching.

[4] The Schools and Staffing Survey is a large, nationally representative survey of teachers, schools, and school districts conducted at regular intervals by the National Center for Education Statistics, the data-gathering arm of the U.S. Department of Education.

The most widely known performance-related salary plan developed by a school district is Denver Public Schools' Professional Compensation System for Teachers (ProComp). In 1999, the Denver Classroom Teachers Association and the Denver Public Schools reached agreement on an alternative teacher pay plan that linked pay to student achievement and professional evaluations. Following refinement of the pilot model by teachers, principals, administrators, and community members, ProComp was adopted in spring 2004 by the Board of Education and members of the Denver Classroom Teachers Association (Community Training and Assistance Center, 2004). The plan offers bonuses to individual teachers for such criteria as improving student achievement, completing professional development, and earning advanced degrees; and it provides all teachers with the opportunity to augment earnings.

ProComp's position in Denver Public Schools' operational structure was recently strengthened. First, Denver voters approved a November 2005 ballot initiative to pay an additional $25 million in taxes to fund a scale-up of ProComp. Furthermore, Denver Public Schools received a $22.67-million, five-year Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) award from the U.S. Department of Education (USDE).[5] TIF award funds will be used to expand ProComp to nearly 90 percent of Denver's 150 K-12 public schools. Now completing the first of nine voter-approved years, ProComp has evolved from a four-year pilot program in 16 schools into one of the nation's most widely known performance-related pay programs.

In July 2005, the Minnesota State Legislature approved Q-Comp, a performance-related pay program for teachers. Q-Comp incorporates both traditional career ladders and professional development for teachers, advancing existing state standards by compensating teachers according to state-approved measures of student achievement. Under Q-Comp guidelines, 60% of any compensation increase must be based on district professional standards and on classroom-level student achievement gains. Q-Comp presently operates in only 22 of 348 regular school districts across the state; however, in the next two years 134 school districts will have indicated intent to submit a Q-Comp proposal to the state. Districts that are approved by the state department of education can be awarded up to $260 more per student to support implementation and sustenance of their performance-based compensation plan.

Also widely recognized is the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP), a performance-related comprehensive school reform model developed in 1999 by the Milken Family Foundation. The program is designed to increase the number of highly qualified teachers, improve instructional effectiveness, and enhance student achievement. TAP currently operates in more than 125 schools in 9 states and 50 districts, with another 10 states presently pursuing program implementation in routinely low-performing schools.[6]

In 2006, Congress appropriated $99 million per annum for the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF). TIF funds are geared to school districts, charter schools, and states on a competitive basis to fund development and implementation of principal and teacher performance-related pay programs. Although the USDE estimated TIF dollars would fund an approximate 10 to 12 performance-related compensation projects with a per-project award size of $8 million per year, a total of 16

[5] A more thorough discussion of the Teacher Incentive Fund can be found later in this section of the chapter.
[6] These numbers are anticipated to grow, as TAP was a principal partner in three federally funded Teacher Incentive Fund awards totaling an approximate $67 million in funding over five years.

awards were granted in fall 2006; thus, expending less than half of the $99 million appropriation.[7] In early 2007, the USDE awarded another 18 TIF grantees totaling $236.9 million. In 2006, both Dallas ISD and Houston ISD received TIF grant awards totaling $22.3 million and $11.8 million, respectively, over the next five years. Additionally, in 2007, The School of Excellence in Education in San Antonio was awarded $3.4 million and the University of Texas received $25.5 million over the next five years.

## The Research on Performance Incentives

Performance-based pay and incentives are relatively new in public education, although their use is growing. Newness of these efforts means there is limited research, particularly little scientific research, examining the impact of introducing performance-based pay practices into education. Most of this research examines the impact of performance incentives awarded to groups of teachers or to schools, with little research devoted to individualized incentives.

### A Review of Empirical Research on Performance Incentives

Despite limitations, there are a number of scientific studies that offer sound information about the use of performance incentives in public education. This section provides an overview of quantitative studies about the causal effect of teacher incentive programs on measures of student achievement. This overview is supplemented by Table 1.2, which provides a more detailed description of programs studied and their outcomes.

[7] As part of the United States Department of Education's (USDE) Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-149), the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) is a direct discretionary Federal grant program. USDE plans to distribute the remaining $43 million of Year 1 appropriations in summer 2007 through a second grant competition already underway. However, strong opposition from the National Education Association coupled with a joint funding resolution in the House of Representatives asking for a reduction of TIF appropriations to $200,000 per year has some questioning whether TIF will be reauthorized in 2008.

**Table 1.2: Quantitative Studies of the Causal Effect of Teacher Incentive Programs on Measures of Student Achievement**

| Study | Sample | Time Span of Study | Type of Teacher Incentive | Size of Incentive (per teacher) | Outcome Variable | Results |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Muralidaran and Sundararaman (2006) | 500 rural Indian primary schools, randomly assigned: 100 individual incentive, 100 school incentive, 200 extra resource, 100 control | 2004-2005 | Individual and school-wide | Average 4% group, 5% individual | Math and language, various primary grades | Positive |
| Glewwe et al. (2004) | 100 primary schools, rural Kenya, 50 randomly chosen for program | 1997-1999 | School-wide | Up to 43 percent of monthly salary | Grade 4, 8 test scores | Mixed |
| Lavy (2002) | Israel, high schools | 1993-1995 to 1996-1997 | School-wide (tournament) | $200 - $715 | Test scores, pass rates, dropout rates, course-taking | Positive |
| Lavy (2004) | Israel, high schools | 1999-2001 | Individual (tournament) | $1,750 - $7,500+[8] | Pass rates and test scores | Positive |
| Figlio and Kenny (2007) | NELS-88 matched to FK survey or 1993-94 SASS, 12th-grade public and private schools | 1993 | Individual | Varied within sample | 12th grade, composite reading, math, science, and history score | Positive |
| Winters, Ritter, Barnett, and Greene (2006) | 2 treatment and 3 control elementary schools in Little Rock, Arkansas | 2002-2003 to 2005-2006 | Individual | $1,800 - $8,600 | Grade 4, 5 math test scores | Positive |
| Atkinson et al. (2004) | UK high schools | 1997-2002 | Individual | > 9% in salary base | English, science, math assessments | Positive |
| Ladd (1999) Clotfelter and Ladd (1996) | Dallas Grade 7 schools relative to other Texas urban districts[9] | 1991-1995 | School-wide (tournament) | $1,000 | Math and reading test scores, dropout rates | Positive |
| Eberts et al. (2002) | 2 MI alternative high schools (1 treatment, 1 control) | 1994-1995 to 1998-1999 | Individual | Up to 20 percent of base pay | Course completion rates, pass rates, daily attendance, GPA | Mixed |

*Source:* Podgursky, M. and Springer, M.G. (2007). Teacher Performance Pay: A Review. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26(4).

8. These are winnings per class. However, a teacher could enter multiple classes.

9. Incentive applied to all schools but data limitations only permitted examination of grade 7 effects.

The two most rigorous evaluations to date come from abroad. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2006) report first-year results from a World Bank-sponsored experiment on performance pay in rural Indian schools. This is a first-year report on a project that is slated to run until 2011. The researchers randomly sampled 500 rural schools in a large Indian state (Andhra Pradesh) and assigned them to one of four treatment groups or a control group, with each group comprising 100 schools. One of the treatment groups had an individual teacher pay bonus system tied to student test score gains and another had a school-wide bonus tied to test score gains. The average bonus payments in either incentive scheme were small relative to base pay (4-5%), but the maximum possible payment amounted to a substantial share of pay (roughly 14 and 29% of pay for group and individual, respectively). The two other treatment groups were provided additional resources (teacher aides or an extra block grant), and a control group received no additional resources.

Muralidharan and Sundararaman found positive program treatment effects in math and languages relative to the control group. They found no evidence of adverse effects of the program on other test scores or teacher morale, and no significant difference in program effects between the group and individual incentive schools. Since the researchers attempted beforehand to hold incremental spending in the different treatment groups the same, another interesting finding is that the incentive schemes yielded test score gains exceeding those of the added-resource treatments. Thus, the incentive schemes were not only found to be effective, but cost-efficient relative to added resource schemes. (This finding is replicated in Lavy's Israel studies discussed below.)

Lavy has undertaken careful studies of performance "tournaments" in Israel.[10] In both of these studies, the program was designed to raise passing rates on high-school exit exams in low socioeconomic high schools in Israel. Although schools were not randomly assigned to a control or treatment condition, both programs were implemented using three formal assignment rules (e.g., grade range, past performance, and matriculation rate), permitting for a more rigorous evaluation design[11]. The Israeli Teacher-Incentive Experiment was also carefully designed to minimize gaming or other opportunistic behavior on the part of teachers and school administrators (i.e., performance measures based on the size of the graduating cohort in order to discourage schools from encouraging transfer or dropout of poor students, or by placing poor students in non-matriculation tracks).

Lavy's (2002) first study considered a tournament in which a selected group of low-performing high schools competed on the basis of school-wide performance. The top third of schools as determined by their year-to-year improvement in test scores were given awards ranging in size from $13,250 to $105,000. Teacher bonuses ranged from about $250 to $1,000, and were distributed equally to all teachers in the "winning" schools. Lavy found a positive effect on participating schools relative to a non-participating comparison group of low-performing schools. He also concluded that endowing schools with additional resources (i.e., 25% of school awards had to go to capital improvements) contributed to increased student performance.

The second study examined an individual teacher bonus program, also run as a tournament (Lavy, 2004). Essentially, teacher participants were ranked on the basis of value-added contributions to student achievement on a variety of exit exams, and bonuses were given to top-performing teachers.

[10] Tournaments award prizes not on the basis of an absolute standard but on the basis of relative performance.
[11] Lavy used a regression discontinuity design in his studies of the effects of incentive pay in Israel. This design allows for more precise measurements of effects of an intervention before and after it is implemented.

The program included 629 teachers, of whom 302 won awards. The bonuses were substantial, as large as $7,500 per class on an average base pay of $25,000. Results indicate a positive effect in that the performance of participating teachers (i.e., both bonus recipients and non-recipients) rose relative to a comparison group of teachers who did not participate in the incentive program.

Lavy (2004) also investigated whether the program exhibited the type of negative spillover consequences often discussed in the research literature. For example, test scores in other non-tournament subjects did not fall. In addition, and consistent with the teacher value-added literature, teacher characteristics such as experience or certification could not predict the winners. Another interesting feature of this study is that Lavy compared the cost-effectiveness of the individual bonus scheme with that of group bonuses or another program providing additional educational resources, aside from pay, to traditionally low-achieving schools. He found that the cost per unit gain in the individual teacher incentive program dominated that in the group incentive or added resource programs.

The studies considered thus far evaluated specific incentive interventions. Figlio and Kenny (2007) take a different approach and analyze data from a national sample of U.S. K-12 schools in an attempt to estimate the effect of incentive pay by comparing the academic performance of schools with various types of incentive programs to those without. Merging data from the National Educational Longitudinal Survey of 1988, their own survey on incentive pay (Survey of School Teacher Personnel Practice), and the 1993-94 Schools and Staffing Survey, they examine the natural variation in the use of incentive-based pay among both public and private schools. Variation in incentive programs enabled construction of a school-level measure of the strength of the teacher incentive "dosage" reflecting not only the existence of a performance-based pay scheme but also its pecuniary consequences. Figlio and Kenny concluded that the effects of even modest doses of incentive pay are statistically significant in public and private schools, as is the effect of a high level of implementation of incentives relative to no incentive program. In substantive terms, an incentive pay program's impact is comparable to an approximate 33% decrease in days absent for the average student and an increase in students' maternal education of three years.

While the authors creatively linked multiple national data systems with their own survey on incentive pay, there are methodological concerns that warrant mention. First, there was an eight-year lag between student test scores reported in NELS and the Figlio and Kenny survey, thus making sample attrition a significant concern. If differential sample attrition took place, this makes it difficult to interpret the reason for differences in test scores between the treatment and comparison conditions. Second, while the authors were able to increase the number of schools satisfactorily responding to their survey by matching within-district responses across two or more schools, the response rate was still very low (approx. 40%). Finally, there are challenges in assuring that the incentive pay programs were in place at the time of the NELS testing. In spite of these measurement problems, which might be expected to bias their estimates of the treatment effect toward zero (errors in measurement of the treatment variable), Figlio and Kenny add crucial insight into the relationship between individual teacher performance incentives and student achievement.

Winters, Ritter, Barnett, and Green (2007) conducted a small-scale, but rigorous evaluation of the first two schools participating in the Little Rock, Arkansas, Achievement Challenge Pilot Project (ACPP). Their evaluation examines the effect of ACPP on student proficiency in math compared to three other elementary schools with similar demographic and baseline achievement characteristics. ACPP ties performance bonuses to individual student fall-to-spring gains on a standardized student

achievement test, ranging from $50 per student (0-4% gain) up to $400 per student (15% gain). In practice, this yielded bonus payouts ranging from $1,200 up to $9,200 per teacher per year.

An attractive feature of the study is that the student gain score outcomes are estimated with a different assessment from that used to determine the bonuses (i.e., the students took two different standardized spring assessments). Use of an alternative test reduces the potential bias caused by teachers narrowly "teaching to the test" used for the bonus payout. Winters et al.'s estimates find a statistically significant math gain for every year a student spent in an ACPP school. The ACPP bonus system, unlike many of the studies considered in this review, remains in place and has since expanded to five elementary schools during the 2006-07 school year.

Although the direct evaluation literature on incentive plans is slender, it seems to indicate that performance incentives can exert a strong impact on teacher and student outcomes, both positive and negative.

Despite the limitations of the extant body of research on incentive pay and its impact in public education, the literature is sufficient enough – and promising enough – to support extensive policy experiments in combination with careful follow-up evaluations. In designing incentives to improve student achievement, it is essential to target performance incentives for academically successful schools, an approach that seems contrary to current thinking that low-performing schools often require additional funding to underwrite the costs of educating hard-to-educate students. However, it must be recognized that performance incentives and compensatory funding are two very different types of funding and intended to serve two very different purposes. Providing incentives to low-performing schools would likely incentivize low performance and not encourage changes necessary to increase student achievement (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).

## Chapter Summary

This chapter provides an introduction to the public education reform landscape in the state of Texas and how it has created an impetus for recent efforts to implement teacher compensation reform. Moreover, it discusses the current research literature on performance incentive pay programs, including a discussion of the rationale for such pay policy and the landscape of performance incentive programs nationwide.

As will be discussed in Chapter 2, Educator Incentive Pay in Texas, state policymakers have recently created a statewide system of performance incentive programs. These state initiatives surpass the size of any other statewide program in the nation. Further, they provide an optimal context for the conduct of evaluation initiatives that seek to uncover the impact of such policy on student achievement and teacher quality.

# CHAPTER 2
# EDUCATOR INCENTIVE PAY IN TEXAS

This chapter provides an overview of performance incentive pay programs currently operating in Texas, including a more detailed discussion of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program, which is the focus of this evaluation report. It concludes with a brief overview of the evaluation of GEEG being conducted by the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) at Vanderbilt University. This evaluation intends to uncover the nature of GEEG performance incentive programs operating in public schools throughout the state, and the impact those programs are having on teaching and learning.

## Key Policy Points

This chapter highlights and expands upon the following key policy points.

- Texas operates the single largest performance incentive pay program in the U.S. public education system.
- Many school districts across Texas have implemented performance incentive programs, including locally developed differentiated pay and the state-funded Governor's Educator Excellence Award Programs (GEEAP).
- In many respects, schools participating in the GEEG program were similar to other schools throughout the state, with the exception of being rated as higher performing campuses and serving higher percentages of economically disadvantaged students – two explicit objectives of the program.
- The natural variation of existing performance incentive programs in Texas provides a unique opportunity to learn more about the impact of various program types.
- Texas' willingness to partner with NCPI will provide for a rigorous evaluation of GEEG's impact on teaching and learning, findings of which will inform future incentive systems both in Texas and nationwide.

## Overview

This chapter addresses the following questions.

- What is the incentive pay reform landscape in Texas and how does it fit within the context of teacher pay reform in the United States?
- What were the characteristics of schools and teachers participating in the GEEG program during its first year of inception, and how did they compare with other schools and teachers throughout the state?
- What evaluation initiatives are underway to learn more about the nature and impact of the GEEG program?

## Compensation Reform in Texas

School districts in Texas, as in other states, have been experimenting with differentiated pay and performance incentives to improve recruitment and retention by making teacher salaries more responsive to the labor market. Differentiated pay and performance incentives offer districts a way to supplement the state's single salary schedule, the statutory requirement that minimum teacher salaries be based on years of employment.[12] Texas public school districts do have the ability to develop alternatives to the state's salary schedule; they are permitted to pay teachers above, but not below, salary steps.

As a result, salaries of Texas teachers are not entirely linked to the state schedule. Salary incentives and differentiated pay are becoming more prevalent. A recent salary survey indicates that 53% of responding districts paid performance incentives to teachers during the 2005-06 school year (Texas Association of School Boards and Texas Association of School Administrators, 2006). Incentives were paid for work in shortage areas, acquiring advanced qualifications, serving as mentors, improving attendance, retention, and raising student achievement.

Salary incentives that were based on performance outcomes, however, occupied a relatively small part of the salary universe in Texas. Only about 12% of school districts used performance-based pay plans; and of these, most were based on campus, rather than individual, performance and focused on teacher attendance rather than student outcomes. This tendency is noteworthy during an era of accountability in which so much emphasis is placed on the importance of student achievement, an emphasis that has been all the more engrained in the public education system by the No Child Left Behind Act.

Although improving student performance has not occupied a direct role in most of the locally developed performance plans created by Texas school districts, there have been exceptions meriting attention (Patterson, 2005).

- Dallas ISD established performance pay in 1990, awarding campus bonuses on the basis of test score gains, student attendance, grade-to-grade promotion, dropout rates, enrollment in advanced courses, and scores on tests of postsecondary readiness.
- Aldine ISD introduced performance pay in 1995 on the basis of the percentage of students passing state assessments, the percentage of students passing state assessments at specific achievement levels, and student attendance.
- In February 2006, Houston ISD became the nation's largest school district with a performance pay plan for teachers, offering teachers up to $3,000 additional pay for student achievement on state and national assessments.

Information on the national incidence of performance pay, and how Texas compares, can be gleaned from the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS), a nationally representative survey of teachers,

[12] "Differentiated pay" involves variation in teacher compensation beyond the single salary schedule that tends to be standardized for all employees, such as knowledge- or skill-based pay or for attaining given credentials. "Performance incentives" is a term used to describe a pay scheme that offers teachers the chance to receive a bonus award for attaining established performance outcomes (e.g., student achievement).

schools, and school districts conducted at regular intervals by the National Center for Education Statistics.[13] The two most recent waves of SASS are used for these analyses – 1999-00 and 2003-04.[14] Survey items concerning performance pay did appear on earlier waves of SASS, however, the questions are not directly comparable to those in the most recent surveys.

Figure 2.1 presents data on a rather broad-based question asking teachers about supplemental pay. In the SASS teacher survey, respondents were asked if they receive supplemental compensation for various reasons. One question focused on performance-based bonuses and other state supplements which are in addition to base salary. Nationally, the percentage of teachers reporting such supplements rose only slightly between the 1999-00 and 2003-04 school years, but the difference was not statistically significant. The percentage of Texas teachers reporting such bonuses, however, was significantly higher than the national average, and increased between 1999-00 and 2003-04 by 14.8%. By 2003-04, nearly one-quarter of Texas public school teachers surveyed reported merit and other state supplemental compensation.

**Figure 2.1: Percentage of Teachers Reporting Bonus Payments in Total Compensation, Texas and U.S. Public Schools (Teachers in Charter Schools Excluded)**




*Source*: National Center for Education Statistics. Schools and Staffing Survey (1999-00, 2003-04). "During the current school year, have you earned income from other school sources, such as merit pay bonuses, state supplements, etc?"

Table 2.1 reports results of the SASS district survey that can provide more insight into the nature of these bonus payments. Several questions were asked about districts' use of pay incentives to reward

[13] The National Center for Education Statistics is the data-gathering arm of the U.S. Department of Education.
[14] The 1999-00 and 2003-04 SASS survey included roughly 5,400 school districts, 10,000 public schools, and 53,000 public school teachers. For details on the SASS programs, see http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sass/ .

certain teacher activities, including (1) National Board certification, (2) excellence in teaching, (3) completion of in-service professional development, (4) teaching in a less desirable location, and (5) teaching in a shortage field.

Nationally, the percentage of districts reporting that they rewarded such activities increased for four of five activities between the 1999-00 and 2003-04 school years. The only activity not registering an increase was in-service professional development.

**Table 2.1: Percentage of School Districts Using Types of Teacher Performance Pay**

| Types of Teacher Performance Pay | U.S. Public Schools | | Texas Public Schools | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1999-00 | 2003-04 | 1999-00 | 2003-04 |
| National Board Certification | 8.3% (.47) | 18.4% (.73) | 1.8% (.9) | 4.3% (2.5) |
| Excellence in teaching | 5.5% (.41) | 7.9% (.98) | 7.3% (1.8) | 9.9% (2.8) |
| Completion of in-service professional development | 26.4% (.91) | 24.2% (.99) | 5.9% (1.6) | 21.1% (12.8) |
| Teaching in a less desirable location | 3.6% (.33) | 4.6% (.38) | 8.1% (1.8) | 9.1% (2.4) |
| Teaching in a shortage field | 10.4% (.54) | 11.9% (.65) | 30.7% (3.8) | 37.7% (3.9) |

*Note:* Standard errors are provided in parentheses.
*Source*: National Center for Education Statistics. Schools and Staffing Survey (1999-00, 2003-04).

The right two columns of the table report results for a sample of Texas school districts (282 districts in 1999-00; 233 districts in 2003-04). Texas school districts were considerably less likely to reward National Board certification in both years, and less likely to reward completion of in-service professional development, especially in 1999-00; however, there was a noticeable increase (15.2%) in rewards for professional development between 1999-00 and 2003-04. This could be related to the establishment of stipends in Texas for teacher participation in Reading Academies (1999-03), Math Academies (2001-02), in addition to other NCLB training activities. The state's school districts were consistently more likely to reward excellent teaching, teaching in a hard-to-staff school, and teaching in a shortage field – the latter perhaps being attributed to the greater need in Texas to serve students speaking English as a second language or providing bilingual education services.[15]

## A Statewide Framework for Performance Incentives

While performance incentives earned increasing prominence in local school district policy over the past decade in Texas, incentives were not established by state policy until 2004, when Governor Perry outlined a plan for financial incentives to reward schools and teachers demonstrating high

[15] The difference between Texas and U.S. public schools in rewarding excellent teaching is not statistically significant.

levels of improvement in student performance (House Research Organization, 2004). This plan was realized in November 2005 when an executive order was issued to create the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program – a $10-million, three-year non-competitive grant that provides financial incentives for teachers who improve student achievement at high performing campuses serving high proportions of economically disadvantaged students.

In June of 2006, Governor Perry and the 79th Texas Legislature crafted the Governor's Educator Excellence Award Program (GEEAP), creating the single largest performance incentive pay program in the United States public education system. In addition to GEEG, GEEAP includes Texas Educator Excellence Grants (TEEG) and a district-level grant program, District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE). If fully funded, by State Fiscal Year 2009 GEEAP is estimated to provide approximately $245 million per annum to public schools in Texas.[16]

In the fall of 2006, the GEEG program made available funds ranging from $60,000 to $220,000 per year to 99 schools. Funds were distributed in the form of non-competitive grants to schools that were in the top third of Texas schools (in 2004-05) in terms of percentage of economically disadvantaged students and either carried a performance rating of Exemplary or Recognized, or were in the top quartile on the Texas Education Agency's (TEA) Comparable Improvement measure.[17]

The TEEG program is state-funded at approximately $100 million per year. Eligibility criteria (as determined by performance in the 2004-05 school year) and program requirements are similar to those of the GEEG program. However, schools must be in the top half of Texas schools in terms of percentage of economically disadvantaged students. Grant amounts range from $40,000 to $295,000 per year. Additionally, eligibility for TEEG is determined on an annual basis, resulting in a new set of participating schools each cycle; this differs from GEEG, which provides school grants on a three-year term. For Cycle 1, encompassing the 2006-07 school year, 1,163 campuses were eligible for TEEG grants.

Both the GEEG and TEEG programs separate funding into Part 1 and Part 2 funds, with the former intended to reward classroom teachers based upon objective measures of student performance and the latter on a variety of incentives for other school personnel and professional growth activities. Part 1 funds represent 75% of a school's total grant and Part 2 represents the other 25% of grant money.

The district-level program, DATE, will be funded at approximately $145 million annually with state funds provided through the Texas Educator Excellence Fund. All districts in the state will be eligible for funding. Districts may apply for funds for all campuses or for selected campuses. Districts are required to use at least 60% of funds to directly reward classroom teachers based on improvements

[16] The 79th Texas Legislature appropriated $100 million for 2006-07 to fund the Texas Educator Excellence Grant program. In 2007, the 80th Texas Legislature appropriated $97.5 million for 2007-08 for Year 2 of the TEEG program, and $245.3 million for 2008-09 TEEG Year 3 and District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE) programs.

[17] Comparable Improvement (CI) is a measure that calculates how student performance on the TAKS mathematics and reading/English language arts (ELA) tests has changed (or grown) from one year to the next, and compares the change to that of the 40 schools that are demographically most similar to the target school. CI is calculated separately for reading/ELA and mathematics, based on individual student *Texas Growth Index* (TGI) values. The student-level TGI values are aggregated to the campus level to create an average TGI for each campus.

in student achievement. Remaining funds may be used (1) as stipends for mentors or teacher coaches, teachers certified in hard-to-staff subjects, or teachers who hold post-baccalaureate degrees; (2) as awards to principals based on improvements in student achievement; (3) to implement components of the Teacher Advancement Program; or (4) as additional incentive awards.

During the 2007 legislative session, funding for the TEEG program was up for contentious debate. Funding was preserved, however, and secured the unique policy landscape in Texas: one that provides the opportunity to study the impact of locally designed performance incentive programs on teacher quality and student achievement, the results of which can offer tremendous insight for U.S. education policy.

## Overview of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grants

Schools participating in GEEG received three-year grants beginning in August 2006 and will be funded through the 2008-09 school year. GEEG has three principal objectives. First, GEEG is designed to provide financial incentives to educators who demonstrate improved levels of student academic performance. Second, GEEG is designed to create additional opportunities for educators to improve their instructional abilities through the use of research-based instructional strategies. Third, GEEG incentives intend to keep high-performing teachers in Texas' neediest schools.

### Guidelines for GEEG School Programs

With three years of funding – $10 million per year, beginning in the 2006-07 school year – GEEG represents a significant state commitment. The program is limited to 99 schools in an effort to make sufficiently large incentive awards available. It provides three-year campus grants with annual awards ranging from $60,000 to $220,000, based upon student enrollment at the school level. GEEG intends for incentives to reward schools for their students' academic performance by targeting schools with high campus ratings or those who perform within the top quartile of Comparable Improvement (see footnote 17 for further explanation).

Participation in GEEG is voluntary for districts, schools, and teachers; schools must elect to establish a performance incentive program. Incentive plans are locally developed and endorsed; a school's plan must be created and supported by a campus-based committee with significant teacher engagement, and the plan must be approved by both the district and local school board trustees.

Guidelines developed by the Texas Education Agency require that schools devote at least 75% (Part 1) of each campus grant to classroom teachers.[18] School incentive plans must determine teacher eligibility for awards based on measures of improved student achievement and effective collaboration with teacher colleagues. Measures of these criteria must be objective and quantifiable to evaluate teachers for incentives. State guidelines identify two other, optional criteria that schools may use as the basis for awarding teacher incentives. The first is teachers' ongoing initiative,

[18] For the purposes of GEEG, "classroom teacher" is defined as an educator who is employed by a school district and who, not less than an average of four hours a day, teaches in an academic instructional setting or a career and technology instructional setting. The term does not include a teacher's aide or full-time administrator.

commitment, and professionalism in activities that have a direct impact on student achievement. Second is assignment to a subject area in an established teacher shortage area.

The statute requires that the remaining Part 2 funds, no greater than 25% of each grant award, be devoted to providing additional incentives for principals, assistant principals, and/or other school staff (e.g., teacher aides, counselors, librarians, nurses); professional development activities; signing bonuses; teacher mentoring programs; new teacher induction programs; funding for feeder campuses; or any other program that directly contributes to improving student achievement.

## Characteristics of GEEG Schools and Teachers

This section provides an overview of prominent characteristics of schools participating in the GEEG program and compares them to the characteristics of schools participating in the larger statewide performance incentive program (TEEG), as well as to all other public schools throughout the state. This discussion highlights enrollment information, the percentage of economically disadvantaged students in schools, accountability ratings for schools, and the characteristics of teachers within the schools.

Overall, these analyses offer a better understanding of how GEEG schools and their teachers are nested within the greater Texas public school landscape. Moreover, the findings provide key contextual information that is often associated with outcomes such as teacher quality, workforce trends, and student achievement, all of which will be the focus of evaluation initiatives to come.

**Enrollment.** The distribution of GEEG schools' by grade type (i.e., elementary, middle school, high school) was proportionate to statewide percentages; as was the intention of the school selection process. During the 2005-06 school year, the 99 GEEG schools represented 1.3% of all public elementary and secondary schools in the state. Overall, the average GEEG school, across all grade types, enrolled approximately 595 students. Middle schools served a greater number of students (834) on average than elementary (543), high (564), and other schools (256).[19]

Among the various grade types the following enrollment findings emerged in GEEG schools.

- More than one of every two schools in the program enrolled elementary students (52%).
- One of every five schools served middle-school students (21%).
- Similarly, 21% of GEEG schools enrolled high-school students.
- Only 5% of GEEG schools served a wide range of students across other grade configurations.

The distribution of schools in the TEEG program during the first cycle of implementation also exhibits considerable variation by school type and enrollment. There were 1,162 TEEG schools in Cycle 1 of the program, representing 15% of all public elementary and secondary schools in the state. Overall, the average Cycle 1 TEEG school, across all grade types, served approximately 442 students during the 2005-06 school year. High schools had a greater number of students (763) on average than elementary (559), middle (599), and other schools (263); but they also displayed the greatest variation in student enrollment.

[19] "Other schools" denotes non-traditional grade configurations, such as K-8, K-12, 6-12, etc.

Among the various grade types, the following enrollment findings emerged in TEEG schools.

- More than 50% of the schools enrolled elementary students.
- Nearly one in five served middle-school students (18%).
- Similarly, 19% of TEEG schools served high-school students.
- Only 5% served students in other grade configurations.

Patterns in both GEEG and TEEG schools closely mirror the distribution of student enrollment by grade type in the remaining 6,479 public schools throughout Texas. Overall, the average school – excluding those in GEEG and TEEG programs – served approximately 580 students during the 2005-06 school year. Similar to TEEG schools, high schools enrolled the greatest number of students (792) on average than elementary (528), middle (630), and other schools (164), and also displayed the greatest variation in student enrollment.

Among the various grade types, the following enrollment findings emerged in other public schools in Texas.

- Over half (54%) enrolled elementary students.
- Twenty percent enrolled middle-school students.
- Another 20% served high-school students.
- Only 6% served students in other grade configurations.

**Economically Disadvantaged Population.** There is a relatively higher share of schools with economically disadvantaged students in the GEEG program compared to the rest of the state. This stems from the intention of the program to target schools in the top third of schools with high percentages of economically disadvantaged students. Figure 2.2 below shows results from the 2005-06 school year, displaying a frequency distribution with three categories of schools corresponding to the GEEG program, TEEG program (Cycle 1 campuses), and schools in the rest of the state. The horizontal axis shows the percentage of economically disadvantaged students in a school across various intervals, ranging from zero to 100. The vertical axis shows the percentage of schools falling within each of those intervals. For example, the rightmost set of bars shows the percentage of schools with more than 95 percent and less than or equal to 100 percent economically disadvantaged students.

**Figure 2.2: Percentages of Economically Disadvantaged Students by School Program Type**




*Source*: Data from the 2005-06 Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS), Texas Education Agency.

There was a strong concentration of schools with economically disadvantaged pupils in the program. Only three GEEG schools had less than 75% of their total student enrollment classified as economically disadvantaged during the 2005-06 school year. Nearly 40% of the schools in the program had more than 95% of their total student enrollment classified in an economically disadvantaged status (39.4%).

As with GEEG, TEEG Cycle 1 schools had high concentrations of economically disadvantaged students. During the 2005-06 school year, 71% of schools had more than 75% of their total enrollments classified as economically disadvantaged. Additionally, nearly one-third of the TEEG schools had more than 90% economically disadvantaged students, and more than one in nine of the TEEG schools had more than 95% economically disadvantaged students.

Compared to schools in the performance incentive programs, schools in the rest of the state had limited variation in percentage share of students across the economically disadvantaged intervals. Consequently, substantially fewer schools had high percentages of students classified as economically disadvantaged. Only 11% of schools had more than 90% of their total student enrollment classified as economically disadvantaged.

**Accountability Ratings.** Compared with the rest of the state, GEEG schools had a relatively greater share of campuses with the highest possible ratings in the state accountability system. Again, this stems from the way in which schools were chosen to receive GEEG grants; the selection criteria developed by statute targets schools rated as Exemplary or Recognized, or falling within the top quartile for Comparable Improvement, as explained previously.

Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 show a percentage distribution across five sets of accountability ratings with three separate columns corresponding to different school years (2004-05, 2005-06, and 2006-07). The vertical axis shows the percentage of schools within one of the five accountability ratings: Exemplary, Recognized, Acceptable, Academically Unacceptable, and Not Rated.[20] The sum of all the accountability ratings within each column totals 100%.

All of the schools participating in the GEEG program received an accountability rating of Acceptable or better in 2004-05, the academic year for which eligibility was determined. Fourteen of the 99 GEEG schools were deemed Exemplary. In 2005-06, most GEEG schools continued to be Acceptable or better. Two campuses slipped into the Academically Unacceptable category, but the number of Recognized and Exemplary campuses increased; 55% of the GEEG schools were Recognized or Exemplary in 2005-06. In 2006-07, the preliminary accountability ratings indicated that most GEEG schools remained Acceptable or better, although three schools were deemed Academically Unacceptable and six were not rated. The number of Exemplary and Recognized campuses dropped. It should be noted that a smaller share of Recognized campuses in 2006-07 was observed throughout the state, and may reflect the increasingly high standards used to identify high-performing schools.

[20] A common reason for a school to be not rated is when there is a question about the validity of their test scores or other data.

**Figure 2.3: GEEG Accountability Ratings, 2004-05 to 2006-07**




*Source:* Data from the 2005-06 Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS), Texas Education Agency.

A similar pattern emerged among schools in the first cycle of the TEEG program. All of the schools participating in the TEEG program received an accountability rating of Acceptable or better in 2004-05. Less than 2% of the TEEG schools were deemed Exemplary, while 63% of the TEEG schools were deemed Acceptable. The participating schools in the program most commonly received a state accountability rating of Acceptable for 2005-06 (49%).

The number of TEEG Cycle 1 campuses rated as Recognized and Exemplary increased between 2004-05 and 2005-06, but so did the number of Academically Unacceptable schools. Forty-one percent of schools received a Recognized rating and only 5% earned an Exemplary rating. Fifty schools (4%) performed at Academically Unacceptable levels during 2005-06, and only five (0.4%) were not rated by the state (0.4%).

In 2006-07, the share of Acceptable, Academically Unacceptable, and Exemplary campuses increased slightly, while the share of non-rated campuses increased sharply and the share of Recognized campuses declined.

**Figure 2.4: TEEG Accountability Ratings, 2004-05 to 2006-07**




*Source:* Data from the 2005-06 Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS), Texas Education Agency.

There was a relatively lower share of schools with the highest accountability ratings in the rest of the state, as would be expected when considering the criteria used to select schools to receive GEEG and TEEG grants. During the 2004-05 school year, whereas 37% of TEEG schools and 48% of GEEG schools were Recognized or Exemplary, only 27% of the remaining schools in the state were so classified.

In 2005-06, nearly half of the other public schools were classified as Acceptable. Thirty-six percent of schools earned a Recognized rating and 8% earned an Exemplary rating. Only 4% performed at Academically Unacceptable levels, and another 8% were not rated by the state. In 2006-07, the share of Recognized campuses fell while the share of Acceptable and Exemplary campuses increased slightly.

**Figure 2.5: Other Public Schools Accountability Ratings, 2004-05 to 2006-07**




*Source:* Data from the 2005-06 Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS), Texas Education Agency.

**Teacher Characteristics.** The profile of a classroom teacher in a school can be considered along several dimensions, including gender, level of education, race/ethnicity, and years of experience. The frequency distribution of teachers in GEEG, TEEG, and other public schools across each of these dimensions is detailed in Table 2.2 below.

**Table 2.2: Distribution of Teacher Characteristics by School Type, 2006-07**

| Teacher Characteristics | GEEG School Teachers | TEEG School Teachers | Other Public School Teachers in Texas |
|---|---|---|---|
| Male | 29.9% | 24.7% | 22.4% |
| Bachelor's degree | 79.3% | 77.9% | 77.2% |
| Master's degree | 19.2% | 20.6% | 21.5% |
| Doctorate (Ph.D.) | 0.6% | 0.5% | 0.5% |
| Hispanic | 60.0% | 37.8% | 17.0% |
| Black | 12.8% | 13.5% | 8.5% |
| Asian | 2.7% | 1.5% | 1.1% |
| American Indian | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.3% |
| Years of experience | 11.1 years | 11.0 years | 11.5 years |
| New district hires | 13.6% | 17.7% | 18.6% |

*Source*: Data from the 2006-07 Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS), Texas Education Agency.

During the 2005-06 school year, there were 3,986 teachers in all GEEG schools. Overall, 30% of GEEG teachers were male and nearly 80% had a bachelor's degree as their highest level of education. An additional 19% held a master's degree, while less than 1% held a doctorate. When

looking at teachers' representation among racial minority groups, 60% were Hispanic, 13% were Black and 3% were Asian. The average teacher in a GEEG school had 11 years of experience in the profession, while 14% were newly hired by their respective districts.

TEEG classroom teachers had, on average, a very similar profile with the exception of their representation among racial minority groups. Overall, 25% were male and 78% held a bachelor's degree. An additional 21% held a master's degree and less than 1% had earned a doctorate. Among racial minority groups, only 38% were Hispanic – noticeably lower than the 60% of GEEG teachers. An additional 13% were Black and 2% were Asian. Similar to GEEG teachers, the average TEEG teacher had 11 years of experience in the profession, while 18% were new hires in their respective districts.

Interestingly, teachers in the rest of the state's schools again mirrored the characteristics of GEEG and TEEG teachers, with the exception that fewer teachers identified their race/ethnicity as Hispanic or Black. This stems from the fact that, with higher proportions of disadvantaged populations, GEEG and TEEG schools tend to be in urban settings or in southern regions of Texas.

## Evaluation of the GEEG Program

A key contribution of the GEEG program to education policy is the conduct of an evaluation of its implementation and impact on student achievement and teacher quality. Detailed analyses of schools' performance incentive plans and their impact will be conducted by independent researchers with the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) at Vanderbilt University. The resulting findings will equip policymakers with a better understanding of GEEG's effectiveness and the modifications needed, if any, to maximize outcomes for teacher quality and student achievement.

The three-year evaluation of GEEG includes the following five objectives.

- A descriptive analysis of the design and implementation of GEEG by participating schools, including descriptions of models and approaches used in distributing incentive awards to classroom teachers
- Detailed information regarding the distribution of incentive awards to classroom teachers, including the measures used by campuses in determining the amounts of incentive awards to be distributed
- A comprehensive, quantitative analysis of the impact of GEEG at participating schools, including the impact on key outcomes such as student achievement, teacher workforce trends, teacher behavior, and schools' organizational dynamics
- A comprehensive, quantitative analysis of the potential impact of GEEG compared to other, non-participating schools
- A detailed statistical analysis of the factors and characteristics associated with successful GEEG programs

In pursuit of these five objectives, the evaluation employs the following strategies.

- Annual review of GEEG schools' performance incentive models, including analyses of program applications and progress reports to gauge any modifications to programs upon implementation
- Annual review of award amounts distributed to teachers in GEEG schools to understand the extent of the programs' impact on teacher salary
- Annual surveys of GEEG teachers to understand how schools' programs impact teacher behavior and organizational dynamics
- Annual analyses of teacher workforce trends to understand the impact of GEEG on teacher mobility, retention, and attrition
- Annual analyses of student achievement gains in GEEG and non-GEEG schools

## Chapter Summary

This chapter provides an overview of performance incentive pay and its current role in both the national and Texas public education landscape. Performance incentive programs are becoming increasingly popular and have taken root in several large districts nationwide. Texas has implemented the largest statewide incentive program in the nation. With $10 million appropriated per annum from state funds, GEEG is the first of three statewide incentive programs and has already been implemented in 99 schools throughout Texas.

With such landmark incentive programs in motion, the Texas Education Agency has contracted with the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI), an independent evaluator, to monitor the impact of incentive pay on student learning and teacher quality. The following chapters provide an overview of findings from the first-year evaluation of the GEEG program, including:

- An overview of key characteristics of GEEG schools' performance incentive plans
- An overview of first-year program implementation experiences
- An overview of teachers' initial attitudes toward and reactions to GEEG plans

# CHAPTER 3
# PART 1 FUNDING TO REWARD CLASSROOM TEACHERS

This chapter provides an overview of common features of GEEG schools' programs and introduces an *Intensity of Incentive* index that can be used to classify schools' performance incentive programs. Evaluators conducted a detailed analysis of schools' three-year GEEG programs as described in their submitted applications to the Texas Education Agency in the fall of 2006. A systematic analysis of all 99 GEEG program applications revealed schools' intended uses of Part 1 program funding, including the size of teacher awards, the criteria by which awards were decided, and the strategies by which awards were distributed.[21] Using these components, evaluators then developed an index scoring system to begin consideration of the strength of each GEEG program.

## Key Policy Points

This chapter highlights and expands upon the following key policy points.

- The most frequently used performance incentive design in GEEG schools distributed teacher awards based upon criteria of student performance and teacher collaboration (i.e., the two required criteria by statute for GEEG programs).
- The majority of proposed and distributed teacher award amounts were less than the minimum of $3,000 recommended by statute.
- GEEG schools tended to use a variety of indicators to measure teacher performance along various program criteria.
- Overall, there was noticeable uniformity among GEEG schools' program designs, especially related to the structure of performance thresholds and the entities held accountable for the determination of awards.
- It appears that the majority of GEEG schools implemented their performance incentive plans for Part 1 funding as originally stated in the applications.

## Overview

This chapter addresses the following questions.

- How did schools use Part 1 funding to distribute bonus awards to classroom teachers?
- What GEEG program characteristics will be most relevant for developing an *Intensity of Incentive* index?
- During the first year of GEEG, did schools implement Part 1 funding plans as originally stated in their applications?

[21] The focus on Part 1 funding results from the nature of the GEEG funding distribution timeline. Schools received funding for Part 1 funds in the fall of 2006, while Part 2 funds were not distributed until later in the 2006-07 school year. Consequently, program applications submitted in the fall of 2006 contained more details on how schools intended to use Part 1 funds. Information on the use of Part 2 funds was collected via an online progress report administered to each GEEG school. Results of those analyses can be found in Chapter 4.

# Review of GEEG Program Applications

This chapter provides an overview of common features of GEEG schools' performance incentive programs, with particular attention to their use of Part 1 funds to reward classroom teachers. Evaluators conducted a detailed analysis of schools' proposed three-year GEEG programs as described in their submitted applications to the Texas Education Agency. A systematic analysis of 99 GEEG program applications revealed schools' intended uses of Part 1 program funding, including the size of teacher awards, the criteria by which awards were determined, and the strategies by which awards were distributed.

Evaluators also initiated the development of an *Intensity of Incentive* index to consider the strength of schools' performance incentive programs. The development of this index is anchored in the existing research literature suggesting program components that might elicit desired responses (i.e., improved teacher quality and, ultimately, student achievement). Over time, evaluators will be able to study the fidelity of this index by analyzing how well key GEEG program characteristics are associated with desired outcomes for teaching and student achievement.

## Methodology for Reviewing GEEG Applications

In order to analyze schools' GEEG programs, evaluators first developed a detailed taxonomy to code key features of program applications. Appendix B provides a detailed description of key taxonomy components. With a focus on Part 1 funding, this taxonomy allowed evaluators to identify key characteristics of each program, including:

- Amount of total campus grant
- Proposed minimum and maximum amounts for individual teacher awards
- Indicators used to measure teacher performance on the four Part 1 criteria
- Strategies used to distribute teacher awards

During the 2006-07 school year, evaluators used this taxonomy to analyze the 99 GEEG applications. Two evaluators coded the key program components within each of the applications, and subsequently reviewed a random sample of each other's application findings to ensure inter-rater reliability. A third evaluator adjudicated any unresolved discrepancies. These findings were then transferred into a statistical software package (SPSS) to examine GEEG program characteristics among the 99 schools.

This systematic approach for reviewing applications enhanced the validity of findings presented in the remaining sections of this chapter. However, it should be noted that information provided in GEEG applications may not have been an exhaustive explanation of schools' actual GEEG programs. When applications were unclear regarding a given program component, evaluators conducted follow-up calls with school principals/site coordinators to seek clarification. Using the applications and follow-up calls as the primary sources of information, evaluators were able to code all 54 taxonomy fields for Year 1 plans in 82.8% (82) of GEEG school applications. Of the 17 remaining applications for which exhaustive information was not available, 12 were missing information for three or fewer taxonomy fields.

It should be noted that implementation of GEEG programs at schools may vary from the stated plans in program applications. Such discrepancies could not be determined in the course of coding program applications; however, the administration of an annual progress report, as described in Chapter 4 of this report, provides insight into the way(s) that GEEG programs may have changed upon implementation, if at all.

## Overview of Funding Information

### GEEG Program Guidelines

GEEG guidelines distinguish between two program components – Part 1 and Part 2 funding. Part 1 funding represents at least 75% of a school's total GEEG grant, which can range between $60,000 and $220,000 depending upon the size of the school's student enrollment. Part 1 funds are earmarked for classroom teachers at GEEG schools. Teacher awards are determined by four broad criteria, two of which are required, while the other two are optional. Schools must use quantifiable, objective measures of student performance (Criterion 1) and teacher collaboration (Criterion 2). Schools can also determine teacher award amounts using measures of teacher commitment and initiative (Criterion 3), as well as placement in hard-to-staff areas (Criterion 4).[22]

During the first year of distributing GEEG teacher awards (2006-07), award amounts were determined retroactively using teacher performance during the previous school year (2005-06) as the baseline – a year in which GEEG was not yet established. Accordingly, the 2005-06 school year is considered Year 1 of GEEG.

In Years 2 and 3 of the program (2006-07 and 2007-08), GEEG plans will have already been in place by the beginning of the school year, allowing teachers to work toward the set award criteria in their schools. Thus, teacher awards will be distributed in the school years following each GEEG program year (i.e., awards for teacher performance in 2006-07 will be distributed in 2007-08; awards for teacher performance in 2007-08 will be distributed in 2008-09). This timeline provides schools the opportunity to analyze teachers' performance for an entire school year. It also establishes a dynamic during the final two years of GEEG in which awards serve more as incentives rather than as retroactive awards, as in the first year of GEEG.

In the fall of 2006, the GEEG program made funds available to qualifying schools. These funds were distributed in the form of non-competitive grants to the 99 schools that were in the top third of Texas schools (in 2004-05) in terms of percentage of economically disadvantaged students and either (1) carried a performance rating of Exemplary or Recognized, or (2) were in the top quartile on TEA's Comparable Improvement measure.

[22] Designated teacher shortage areas are identified using the Texas Education Agency's 2006-07 proposal for the state-developed alternate methodology as specified in 34 CFR §682.210(q)(7). This methodology is based on surveys of school personnel administrators and private non-profit school administrators. Using this methodology, shortage areas identified for the 2006-07 school year are mathematics, science, foreign language, special education, bilingual education, technology applications, and English as a Second Language.

Qualifying schools earned various grant amounts based on the size of the student population at each campus. The following seven distribution categories were created based on campus size.

- Campuses with 1-449 students received grants of $60,000.
- Campuses with 450-599 students received grants of $90,000.
- Campuses with 600-699 students received grants of $100,000.
- Campuses with 700-999 students received grants of $135,000.
- Campuses with 1,000-1,399 students received grants of $180,000.
- Campuses with 1,400-1,799 students received grants of $210,000.
- Campuses with 1,800 or more students received grants of $220,000.

Table 3.1 provides a breakdown of the total grant amounts at the 99 GEEG schools included in this analysis. Over half (59) of the campuses received either $60,000 or $90,000, while 23 received $135,000. Only four schools received over $180,000.

**Table 3.1: Distribution of Campus Award Amounts**

| Campus size | Campus Award Amount | Number of Campus Recipients | Percent of Campus Recipients |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1-499 students | $60,000 | 45 | 45.5% |
| 450-599 students | $90,000 | 14 | 14.1% |
| 600-699 students | $100,000 | 3 | 3.0% |
| 700-999 students | $135,000 | 23 | 23.2% |
| 1,000-1,399 students | $180,000 | 10 | 10.1% |
| 1,400-1,799 students | $210,000 | 2 | 2.0% |
| 1,800 or more students | $220,000 | 2 | 2.0% |

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

## Part 1 Teacher Bonus Awards

Proposed awards for teachers varied considerably between campuses. GEEG guidelines recommended awards ranging from a minimum of $3,000 to a maximum of $10,000 per teacher. These teacher awards are distributed one time per GEEG program year in addition to a teacher's annual salary. The distribution of Part 1 awards to teachers for Year 1, as proposed in the 99 GEEG applications, are further detailed in Table 3.2. Overall, schools anticipated paying teacher awards ranging from $100 to $10,937. The average minimum award was $2,897 and the average maximum award was $3,726, creating a limited distinction between minimum and maximum award amounts. Additionally, 75 schools (75.8%) planned to use minimum awards below the recommended $3,000. Forty-four schools (44.4%) planned to use maximum awards of less than $3,000.

**Table 3.2: Distribution of Proposed Part 1 Awards for Teachers**

| Minimum Award Amounts | GEEG Schools | | Maximum Award Amounts | GEEG Schools | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number | Percent | | Number | Percent |
| Missing/Invalid | 5 | 5.1% | Missing/Invalid | 4 | 4.0% |
| $0 to $999 | 17 | 17.2% | $0 to $999 | 1 | 1.0% |
| $1,000 to $1,999 | 41 | 41.4% | $1,000 to $1,999 | 7 | 7.1% |
| $2,000 to $2,999 | 17 | 17.2% | $2,000 to $2,999 | 36 | 36.4% |
| $3,000 to $3,999 | 7 | 7.1% | $3,000 to $3,999 | 18 | 18.2% |
| $4,000 to $4,999 | 5 | 5.1% | $4,000 to $4,999 | 11 | 11.1% |
| $5,000 to $5,999 | 3 | 3.0% | $5,000 to $5,999 | 12 | 12.1% |
| $6,000 to $6,999 | 1 | 1.0% | $6,000 to $6,999 | 2 | 2.0% |
| $7,000 to $7,999 | 2 | 2.0% | $7,000 to $7,999 | 6 | 6.1% |
| $8,000 to $8,999 | 0 | 0.0% | $8,000 to $8,999 | 0 | 0.0% |
| $9,000 to $9,999 | 1 | 1.0% | $9,000 to $9,999 | 1 | 1.0% |
| $10,000 or more | 0 | 0.0% | $10,000 or more | 1 | 1.0% |

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

Figure 3.1 reveals that there was a noticeable tendency for GEEG schools to propose distribution of minimum awards within the range of $1,000 to $1,999, and maximum awards within the range of $2,000 to $2,999 – 41.4% and 36.4% respectively. Outside of those ranges, proposed teacher awards took on slightly more variability, while still clustering around the most frequently reported minimum and maximum amounts. Minimum awards ranged from $100 to $9,000, with maximum awards ranging from $654 to $10,937.

**Figure 3.1: Distribution of Individual Teacher Award Amounts**




*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

## Overview of GEEG Program Criteria

GEEG guidelines require that schools use at least two of four pre-determined criteria when devising a plan for distributing Part 1 teacher awards. All participating schools are required to incorporate Criterion 1 and Criterion 2 into their plans, which focus on student performance and teacher collaboration, respectively. They also have the option of including Criterion 3 and/or Criterion 4. Criterion 3 is a measure of teacher initiative and commitment, while Criterion 4 focuses on rewarding teachers in hard-to-staff areas. Each criterion can provide various pathways for teachers to receive Part 1 awards.

Table 3.3 presents the criteria used by schools during the first year of GEEG. Forty-five schools (45.5%) developed plans that incorporated only the required criteria – student performance and teacher collaboration. Another 39 schools (39.4%) used the optional Criterion 3 (teacher initiative and commitment) in addition to required criteria. The other fifteen schools used some other combination of the four possible criteria.

**Table 3.3: GEEG Criteria for Teacher Awards Used in Year 1**

| GEEG Criteria for Teacher Awards | Number of Schools | Percent of Schools |
|---|---|---|
| Criterion 1: Student Performance + Criterion 2: Teacher Collaboration | 45 | 45.5% |
| Criterion 1: Student Performance + Criterion 2: Teacher Collaboration + Criterion 3: Teacher Initiative & Commitment | 39 | 39.4% |
| Criterion 1: Student Performance + Criterion 2: Teacher Collaboration + Criterion 4: Hard-to-Staff Areas | 1 | 1.0% |
| Criterion 1: Student Performance + Criterion 2: Teacher Collaboration + Criterion 3: Teacher Initiative & Commitment + Criterion 4: Hard-to-Staff Areas | 14 | 14.1% |

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

Schools were given the option of creating incentive plans that could change from Year 1 to the subsequent years of the program. Schools were given this option since first-year teacher awards were retroactive. In Years 2 and 3, teacher awards will be based on performance in school years in which GEEG plans have already been implemented, thereby allowing teachers to work toward established criteria.

Our review of GEEG applications indicated that 64 schools – nearly two-thirds (64.6%) – intended to use the same plan over all three program years. The other 35 schools (35.4%) planned to change their Year 1 GEEG program for the latter two program years (2007-08, 2008-09).

In reviewing how schools intended to adapt their plans from the first year to subsequent years, we identified the following trends. Twenty schools (57.1% of the 35 schools) intended to use the same

criteria for distributing teacher awards in all three years, but they decided to modify the ways in which those criteria are used to determine teacher awards. The other fifteen (42.9% of the 35 schools) intended to use different combinations of criteria, the most common adaptation – used by nine of these schools – being a transition from using Criteria 1 and 2 in Year 1 to the use of Criteria 1, 2, and 3 in both subsequent years.

We identified the following plans among the 35 schools for the final two years of the GEEG program. Overall, the distribution of GEEG criteria planned for Years 2 and 3 closely mirrors the Year 1 criteria used by GEEG schools, as shown in Table 3.3.

- 16 schools (45.7%) planned to use Criteria 1 and 2 only.
- 13 schools (37.1%) planned to use Criteria 1, 2, and 3.
- 1 school (2.9%) planned to use Criteria 1, 2, and 4.
- 5 schools (14.3%) planned to use all four criteria.

The analyses for this chapter focus on Year 1 plans at GEEG schools, recognizing that most schools indicated intentions to use the same plan over the entirety of the GEEG program. Future initiatives will review school plans in subsequent years to determine how they may adapt over time. It is important that evaluators stay apprised of the nature of schools' performance incentive programs, as those characteristics will be highly relevant for later analyses of teacher quality and student achievement outcomes.

The remainder of this chapter offers a more detailed analysis of each school's use of Part 1 funds during the first year of GEEG. The taxonomy used to code these applications provides a framework for analyzing the ways in which each criterion was used to determine the distribution of Part 1 teacher awards. More specifically, for each GEEG criterion, evaluators identified the following program characteristics. [23]

- Indicators used to measure each criterion
- Structure of performance-level benchmarks (i.e., one-level versus tiered performance thresholds)
- Expectations of performance-level benchmarks over time
- Unit of accountability (i.e., which entity is being held accountable for performance)
- Method for distributing teacher awards

The focus of the following sections is on the program characteristics considered key to the emerging *Intensity of Incentive* index. However, a thorough explanation of all elements of the GEEG taxonomy can be found in Appendix C, which details the frequency by which each program component occurs in all 99 GEEG campuses. These findings offer a comprehensive review of the designs employed by GEEG schools to distribute performance incentives to teachers during the 2006-07 school year.

[23] For further details on each component of the coding scheme, see Appendix B: Glossary of Taxonomy Components.

## Focus on Students' Academic Performance

GEEG guidelines require that the distribution of Part 1 awards to full-time teachers be based upon teachers' contribution to student performance. Criterion 1 must use objective measures, such as local benchmarking systems, portfolio assessment, end-of-course testing, and value-added assessment to assess teachers' performance in improving student achievement. In developing their plans, schools could choose from various indicators of student achievement and performance, including campus-wide ratings of academic performance, results on standardized student assessments, and other non-academic indicators related to student performance (e.g., student attendance, dropout rate, etc.).

In addition to Criterion 1, GEEG guidelines also emphasize the importance of considering student achievement when developing measures of other program criteria. For example, indicators of Criterion 2 (teacher collaboration) and Criterion 3 (teacher initiative and commitment) are supposed to capture teacher behaviors that contribute to improving overall student achievement at the school. Examples of such appropriate indicators, as specified in GEEG guidelines, include "working with students outside of assigned class hours, creating programs to engage parents, and taking initiative to personalize [students'] learning environment."

Analyses of GEEG applications do not afford an appropriate means to evaluate how well indicators for teacher behaviors (i.e., Criteria 2 and 3) are aligned with improvements in student achievement. The primary reason for this is that descriptions of indicators used were not detailed enough to grant evaluators the opportunity to critique strategies against empirical literature that speaks to important strategies for effective instructional practice. For example, schools often cited the requirement that teachers take part in professional development. Rarely did applications specify the nature of such professional development activities, which would be imperative for a fair critique of schools' plans.

Applications did more clearly identify indicators being used to measure student performance for Criterion 1 awards. Accordingly, evaluators more heavily relied upon this information to determine the extent to which a program design focused on student academic performance.

### Criterion 1: Indicators of Student Achievement

GEEG schools tended to use a number of student performance measures for Criterion 1, including campus performance, state and local assessments of student academic performance, and non-academic indicators. As detailed in Table 3.4 below, evaluators coded GEEG applications and identified the frequency with which each indicator was used to determine awards for teachers.

**Table 3.4: Types & Frequency of Criterion 1 Student Performance Indicators**

| Type of Student Performance Measure | Number of Schools | Percent of Schools |
|---|---|---|
| TEA Campus Rating | 45 | 45.5% |
| Exemplary | 21 | 21.2% |
| Recognized | 28 | 28.3% |
| Acceptable | 23 | 23.2% |
| Comparable Improvement | 5 | 5.1% |
| Quartile 1 | 5 | 5.1% |
| Adequate Yearly Progress | 6 | 6.1% |
| Student Assessments | 80 | 80.8% |
| TAKS | 78 | 78.8% |
| SDAA | 37 | 37.4% |
| TPRI | 16 | 16.2% |
| Formative/benchmark tests | 23 | 23.2% |
| End-of-year/course tests | 3 | 3.0% |
| Student portfolios | 2 | 2.0% |
| Other | 37 | 37.4% |
| Other (Non-academic) Indicators | 20 | 20.2% |
| Student attendance | 7 | 7.1% |
| Drop-out rate | 5 | 5.1% |
| Teacher attendance† | 6 | 6.1% |
| Other | 16 | 16.2% |
| Not applicable | 0 | 0.0% |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0% |

† Teacher attendance, used by six (6.1%) of schools, is not an indicator of student performance.

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

**Campus Performance.** One option used by schools for distributing Criterion 1 awards was to base the teacher awards on overall campus performance. That is, if the campus achieved a required performance threshold, all teachers eligible for Part 1 (i.e., full-time teachers) would receive the award amount associated with Criterion 1.

Overall, 52 schools (52.5%) included some measure of campus performance (e.g., TEA Campus Rating, Comparable Improvement, AYP) for Criterion 1. Of those, the following trends emerged.

- 15 schools (15.2%) used campus performance as the sole measure of this criterion.
- 26 schools (26.3%) used campus performance measures along with student assessment measures.
- The remaining 11 schools used other combinations of measures – eight (8.1%) used campus performance, student assessment, and other non-academic measures in concert, while the other three (3.0%) used a campus performance measure only in combination with non-academic measures of student performance.

Forty-five schools (45.5%) measured campus performance using state-assigned campus ratings of Exemplary, Recognized, and/or Acceptable, making these the most commonly used measures of campus-wide performance.[24] Of those 45 schools, 11 distributed awards if the campus achieved only an Acceptable rating; 12 did so for achieving a rating of Recognized; and five used Exemplary as the sole campus rating. The other 17 schools used combinations of the TEA rating scale, for example, distributing one award amount to teachers if a school achieved an Acceptable rating and a higher amount if it achieved Recognized.

Schools also used – but less frequently – campus measures of Comparable Improvement for determining awards. Five schools (5.1%) distributed awards if campus performance placed them in the top quartile among comparable schools.

**Student Assessments.** Student performance was also measured using a variety of standardized test score results. Common student assessment measures included Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS), State-Developed Alternative Assessment (SDAA), and Texas Primary Reading Inventory (TPRI) scores. Schools also used results of local assessments, such as formative/benchmark assessments, student portfolios, and end-of-course assessments.

As displayed previously in Table 3.4, 80 schools (80.8%) used student assessment measures for distributing Criterion 1 awards. Thirty-seven schools – nearly half of the 80 using student assessments – used only student assessment measures for determining Criterion 1 awards; that is, they did not employ other indicators of student performance such as campus ratings. The remaining 43 GEEG schools used student assessment measures in combination with other indicators of Criterion 1. For example, 26 used both student assessments and campus ratings to measure student performance, while nine schools used student assessments and a non-academic measure of student performance (e.g., student attendance, graduation rate). Yet another eight schools used all three strategies for measuring student performance: student assessments, campus performance, and non-academic measures.

## Units of Analysis

Evaluators also identified the levels at which student assessment results would be analyzed, that is, the units of analysis. By identifying the unit(s) of analysis, evaluators were able to determine the level of specificity used by schools to assess student performance. Variables for identifying unit(s) of analysis fell along a continuum of disaggregation, from campus-wide achievement levels, to team achievement levels (i.e., aggregated at the grade level or subject area), and finally classroom achievement levels (i.e., individual teacher performance). Evaluators also identified growth-based measures of student performance, when used by schools.

Among the 80 GEEG schools using student assessments, most measured performance with achievement levels (i.e., passing rates), while others used measures of student growth (i.e., value added). Of the 66 schools using achievement levels, 18 (27.3%) indicated the use of solely aggregate measures of campus achievement, such as school-wide passing rates on state standardized tests (e.g., TAKS). The majority of schools using achievement levels measured student achievement at the

[24] See the Texas Education Agency *2006 Accountability Manual* at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/account/2006/manual/index.html for a review of performance requirements for each of the three campus ratings (i.e., Acceptable, Recognized, Exemplary).

classroom level. In fact, 43 (65.2%) of the 66 schools used classroom achievement levels to determine the distribution of Criterion 1 awards for teachers.

Among the 27 schools (27.3%) using measures of student growth, there was noticeable variation in approaches. The following are examples from individual schools' applications.

- Student growth was measured as 1% or 1 grade-level growth for 80% of students in a teacher's class for assessments applicable to Grades PK-5 and special education.
- Measures of student growth depended upon grade level. Upper-grade teachers earned an award if they achieved 10% growth for those students passing benchmark assessments during the year, or a 10% increase for students attaining "Commended Performance" on TAKS. Lower-grade teachers earned an award if their classroom achievement levels were 70% passing mid-year and 80% passing at the end of the year (i.e., increase of 10% passing rate).
- Awards were based upon a district-generated Classroom Effectiveness Index (CEI)[25] that was used to determine how many students achieved value-added gains.

## Unit of Accountability

While the existing literature on performance incentive policy does not provide definitive guidance as to the preferable "unit(s) of accountability" (i.e., the entity whose performance determines the distribution of an award), it does highlight the importance that this program feature has for program quality and outcomes.

Evaluators identified several units of accountability, namely teachers, teams, and an entire campus. If awards were determined by the performance of individual teachers, then teachers were considered to be the unit of accountability. A team unit of accountability resulted from awards being determined by the collective performance of a group of teachers, such as those in an entire grade level or subject area. Finally, the campus was considered the unit of accountability when campus-wide performance was used to determine award eligibility.

Table 3.5 below provides an overview of the units of accountability used by schools for each of the four GEEG criteria. It is evident that schools tended to hold individual teachers accountable for performance, especially for Criteria 2, 3, and 4. In fact, 94 (94.9%) of all GEEG schools used teachers as the unit of accountability for Criterion 2. Of the GEEG schools that actually used Criterion 3, all use teachers as the unit of accountability. The same is true for Criterion 4. Fourteen of the 15 schools using Criterion 4 held teachers accountable; the remaining one was missing information necessary to determine the unit of accountability.

[25] The Classroom Effectiveness Index (CEI) is a value-added accountability model for computing classroom teachers' effectiveness. The system uses a combination of regression and hierarchical linear modeling to control for pre-existing student differences and school-level variables to compare teachers across different circumstances by accounting for the school and student-level characteristics such as mobility, % English Language Learners, % free lunch, % minority, prior achievement level, etc. For further information, visit the following website at: http://www.dallasisd.org/inside_disd/depts/evalacct/incentive/meetings/200702/DISD_021207_Value_Added_Feb.ppt#260,3,Measuring School Effectiveness

**Table 3.5: Units of Accountability for GEEG Criteria**

| Unit of Accountability | Campus | Team (i.e., Grade, Subject) | Teacher | Not Applicable | Missing |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Criterion 1 | 48 (48.5%) | 4 (4.0%) | 64 (64.6%) | 0 (0.0%) | 2 (2.0%) |
| Criterion 2 | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 94 (94.9%) | 3 (3.0%) | 1 (1.0%) |
| Criterion 3 | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 53 (53.5%) | 46 (46.5%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Criterion 4 | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 14 (14.1%) | 84 (84.8%) | 1 (1.0%) |

N=99

*Note:* "Not applicable" denotes a case in which a school has not included a given criterion as part of its performance incentive program.

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

Criterion 1 displays greater variability for the entities held accountable for performance. As with the other criteria, GEEG schools tended to hold teachers as the unit of accountability when measuring student performance; in fact, 64 schools (64.6%) do so. However, nearly half (48.5%) of all GEEG schools also used their campus as a unit of accountability. Very few – only four – used a team unit of accountability, two at the grade level and two for a subject area.

## Rigor of Award Distribution

Identifying the rigor of GEEG programs is an important concept for understanding the nature of a performance pay program. In theory, the rigor of an award distribution model influences the amount of effort that a teacher must exert to achieve a Part 1 award. The greater the rigor, the harder a teacher or group of teachers must work to achieve an award, or the more selective the bonus mechanism is in rewarding top-performing teachers.

Performance incentive programs are grounded in expectancy theory on motivation – that is, individuals will be motivated by the prospect of an award to fulfill a particular goal or enact a given behavior if they believe that the effort will actually result in achieving the award. Moreover, performance incentive programs have the potential for creating a selection effect; that is, the programs might attract and retain teachers with the ability to meet established criteria to earn bonus awards (Lazear, 2003). With this in mind, it is of interest to know how rigorous schools' expectations are for performance, and what those implications are for teacher behavior.

GEEG applications did not provide a ready indicator of rigor; it was difficult to decipher from the submitted plans how rigorous various criteria indicators might be when implemented. Therefore, evaluators have devised several proxies that allow for an initial review of program rigor: (1) structure of performance-level benchmarks and (2) ease of award distribution.

## Structure of Performance-Level Benchmarks

GEEG schools developed performance benchmarks – or thresholds – for their criterion measures. That is, they determined the performance-level thresholds that a campus, teacher, and/or team would have to achieve in order to receive an award. Schools commonly used one of two structures for setting these performance benchmarks: one-level and tiered structures. One-level structures were those for which there was only one benchmark, and additional awards could not be earned for performing above that threshold. Tiered structures were those in which there were multiple thresholds, with higher awards being associated with achieving higher thresholds of performance.

Theoretically, a tiered structure incites more motivation for teachers to attain greater levels of performance, as it requires teachers to do more to get higher amounts of money. A one-level structure does not provide as strong an impetus because teachers would receive the same award amount whether or not they met or surpassed a single threshold. A tiered structure assumes that once a teacher achieves an initial threshold and earns the associated award, that teacher then has a chance – and desire – to do more to gain even greater amounts of money.

This tiered strategy embodies an element of labor market selection, as described by Lazear (2003). In an effective performance incentive program, employers should be able to tell workers what they need to do in order to become more effective. If ineffective teachers do not know what to do in order to raise their performance, and supervisors cannot provide such guidance, then the motivational effects of incentive will be negligible. However, tying pay to various levels of desired performance may significantly raise teacher quality by reinforcing effective behaviors and outcomes.

Admittedly, this does not yet capture the rigor associated with the established thresholds; such information was not readily available in applications. However, it does capture one component related to the motivational impetus of a program design.

Table 3.6 below provides an overview of the performance-level structure associated with each of the four GEEG criteria. GEEG schools tended toward a one-level benchmark structure for all criteria. Only 21 schools (21.2%) used a tiered structure for Criterion 1; only nine (9.1%) did so for Criterion 2. Of the 53 schools that used Criterion 3, 47 employed a one-level structure; 14 of the 15 schools using Criterion 4 did so. Additionally, 74 schools (74.7%) used a one-level structure for both required criteria (i.e., measures of student performance and teacher collaboration); conversely, only four GEEG schools used a tiered approach for both required criteria.

**Table 3.6: Structure of Performance Benchmarks for GEEG Criteria**

| Structure of Performance Benchmarks | One-Level | Tiered | Not Applicable | Missing |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Criterion 1 | 86 (86.9%) | 21 (21.2%) | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (1.0%) |
| Criterion 2 | 90 (90.9%) | 9 (9.1%) | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (1.0%) |
| Criterion 3 | 47 (47.5%) | 9 (9.1%) | 46 (46.5%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Criterion 4 | 14 (14.1%) | 0 (0.0%) | 84 (84.8%) | 1 (1.0%) |

N=99

*Note:* "Not applicable" denotes a case in which a school has not included a given criterion as part of its performance incentive program.

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

## Nature of Award Distribution

Another proxy for the rigor of GEEG programs is the nature of teacher award distribution within a school. More specifically, this concept considers the percentage of eligible teachers who actually receive bonus awards. Such information can offer an initial glimpse at the ease by which teachers were achieving established award criteria. If the underlying range of teacher effectiveness is great (and evidence on teacher effects literature suggests that this is the case), then it would be assumed that meaningful performance thresholds would not be equally attained by all teachers. Rather, meaningful thresholds would result in a variable distribution of performance incentive awards among teaching staff.

At this time, evaluators do not have the necessary data to present the complete nature of award distribution within each GEEG school during the 2006-07 school year. Efforts had been taken to gather such information through an online data upload system administered to schools, but results are incomplete. This system intended to match teacher award records with personnel data from TEA's Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) and would have facilitated the determination of the percentage of teachers from the previous school year who received a GEEG award during the 2006-07 school year.

As of now, data on teacher awards has been provided for 75 of the 99 campuses, allowing for preliminary analyses of the actual distribution of teacher awards as compared to the amounts proposed in GEEG applications. Analyses of the actual dispersion of GEEG awards is based on the individual award spreadsheets provided by 75 GEEG schools, which describe the awards granted to a total of 4,078 individuals. Most of those individuals have been matched by scrambled social security numbers to the PEIMS files for 2006-07. Nineteen individuals were matched to the PEIMS files for the 2004-05 school year, and not for any subsequent year; 121 individuals were matched to the 2005-06 PEIMS files. However, 153 scrambled social security numbers from the GEEG spreadsheets could not be found in the PEIMS records for any of the last three school years. Based on the job titles reported on the spreadsheets, at least 64 of the 153 unmatched individuals were teachers.

Efforts will continue to clean up this data set in order to determine the nature of award distribution in GEEG schools. Until that time, it is possible to review the average, minimum, and maximum teacher awards as actually distributed by schools. While not a complete review on the nature of award distribution within schools, the following information provides a description of teacher awards as proposed in GEEG applications and as actually dispersed, according to data upload results.

**Proposed teacher awards.** Analyses of GEEG applications revealed that the majority of GEEG schools – at least those for which information is available – proposed minimum and maximum awards within a limited range of money. Fifty-eight schools indicated intentions to distribute minimum awards between $1,000 and $2,999, while 54 indicated maximum awards between $2,000 and $3,999. Moreover, analyses of GEEG applications discovered that 22 (22.2%) of GEEG schools proposed the same minimum and maximum awards for their teachers; that is, all eligible teachers would earn the same award amount. Table 3.2 (on page 34) provides a more detailed breakdown of these minimum and maximum award amounts as proposed in GEEG applications.

**Actual teacher awards.** GEEG schools could begin distributing Part 1 awards to teachers as early as the fall 2006 semester. Therefore, it was of interest to learn the extent to which schools' implementation of Part 1 funding actually mirrored the plans stated in schools' applications. As part of an online survey administered to principals/site coordinators at GEEG schools, respondents were asked to describe how Part 1 award distribution may have changed – specifically, if their original plans for the use of each GEEG criterion had changed in any of the following ways upon implementation.[26]

- Different award amounts were distributed to teachers
- Teachers were held accountable to more stringent performance thresholds
- Teachers were held accountable to less stringent performance thresholds
- Different indicators were used to measure teachers' performance on a given criterion

Table 3.7 provides an overview of these findings. Overall, the majority of schools reported no change in their Part 1 funding plans. Among the ways in which plans may have changed, the most frequently reported response was that different award amounts were distributed to teachers. A minimal number of schools reported changes to the performance standards (i.e., thresholds) or the actual indicators being used to measure a given criterion.

[26] Further details about this online survey instrument and the methodology used to administer it can be found in Chapter 4.

**Table 3.7: Overview of Changes to GEEG Schools' Use of Part 1 Funds**

| | No Difference | Different Award Amounts | More Stringent Performance Standards | Less Stringent Performance Standards | Different Criterion Measures | Not Applicable |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Success in improving student achievement | 85.9% (73) | 10.6% (9) | 1.2% (1) | 0% (0) | 0% (0) | 2.4% (2) |
| Collaboration that contributes to improved overall student performance | 87.1% (74) | 8.2% (7) | 1.2% (1) | 0% (0) | 1.2% (1) | 2.4% (2) |
| Demonstration of ongoing initiative, commitment, personalization, professionalism, and involvement that directly result in improved student achievement | 76.5% (65) | 10.6% (9) | 1.2% (1) | 1.2% (1) | 0% (0) | 10.6% (9) |
| Assignment in an area that is hard to staff or has had high turnover | 61.2% (52) | 7.1% (6) | 0% (0) | 0% (0) | 0% (0) | 31.8% (27) |

N=85

*Source:* Data comes from an online survey administered to GEEG principals/site coordinators during the fall of 2006 and the summer of 2007.

As described in Table 3.8 below, the actual distribution of minimum and maximum teacher awards by schools did not diverge all that noticeably from the proposed award distribution in GEEG applications. Among those schools for which data upload information was available, fifty schools distributed minimum awards between $1,000 and $2,999, while 41 distributed maximum awards between $2,000 and $3,999, similar to patterns emerging from GEEG applications.

**Table 3.8: Range of Minimum and Maximum Teacher Awards as Actually Distributed by GEEG Schools**

| Minimum Award Amounts | GEEG Schools | | Maximum Award Amounts | GEEG Schools | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Proposed | Actual | | Proposed | Actual |
| Missing/Invalid | 5 | 24 | Missing/Invalid | 4 | 24 |
| $0 to $999 | 17 | 9 | $0 to $999 | 1 | 0 |
| $1,000 to $1,999 | 41 | 38 | $1,000 to $1,999 | 7 | 6 |
| $2,000 to $2,999 | 17 | 12 | $2,000 to $2,999 | 36 | 24 |
| $3,000 to $3,999 | 7 | 6 | $3,000 to $3,999 | 18 | 17 |
| $4,000 to $4,999 | 5 | 2 | $4,000 to $4,999 | 11 | 11 |
| $5,000 to $5,999 | 3 | 3 | $5,000 to $5,999 | 12 | 4 |
| $6,000 to $6,999 | 1 | 0 | $6,000 to $6,999 | 2 | 2 |
| $7,000 to $7,999 | 2 | 2 | $7,000 to $7,999 | 6 | 5 |
| $8,000 to $8,999 | 0 | 1 | $8,000 to $8,999 | 0 | 2 |
| $9,000 to $9,999 | 1 | 1 | $9,000 to $9,999 | 1 | 2 |
| $10,000 or more | 0 | 1 | $10,000 or more | 1 | 2 |

GEEG applications n=99; GEEG data upload n=75

*Source:* "Proposed" award amounts come from evaluators' review of GEEG applications submitted in the fall of 2006. "Actual" award amounts were attained from the data upload system administered throughout the course of the 2006-07 school year.

Table 3.9 provides further information about the actual distribution of Part 1 teacher awards, as reported by GEEG schools. The majority (74.9%) of teachers received GEEG awards ranging from $1,000 to $2,999. The smallest award was $250 while the largest award was $15,000. Interestingly, this suggests that most teachers are receiving award amounts below the recommended minimum of $3,000 by statute.

**Table 3.9: Distribution of Part 1 Awards for Teachers**

| Teacher Award Amounts | Part 1 Award Distribution | |
|---|---|---|
| | Number of Teachers | Percent of Teachers |
| Missing/Invalid | n/a | n/a |
| $0 to $999 | 65 | 3.2% |
| $1,000 to $1,999 | 772 | 37.6% |
| $2,000 to $2,999 | 767 | 37.3% |
| $3,000 to $3,999 | 245 | 11.9% |
| $4,000 to $4,999 | 97 | 4.7% |
| $5,000 to $5,999 | 51 | 2.5% |
| $6,000 to $6,999 | 4 | 0.2% |
| $7,000 to $7,999 | 34 | 1.7% |
| $8,000 to $8,999 | 6 | 0.3% |
| $9,000 to $9,999 | 9 | 0.4% |
| $10,000 or more | 5 | 0.3% |

N=75

*Source:* Teacher award amounts were attained from the data upload system administered throughout the 2006-07 school year.

On average, the Part 1 awards represented 5.3% of a teacher's total pay for 2006-07.[27] However, the Part 1 award represented more than 20% of a teacher's annual salary for at least one teacher in nine GEEG schools. Moreover, many GEEG schools were very egalitarian in their distribution of Part 1 awards. Nineteen of the 75 reporting schools dispersed the same dollar amount to all teachers who received Part 1 funds. This finding closely mirrors the 22 schools proposing such a distribution model in the GEEG applications. The difference between the largest Part 1 award and the smallest Part 1 award was less than $1,000 for 40% of the schools. However, in 10 GEEG schools the largest Part 1 award was at least $3,500 more than the smallest award.

## *Intensity of Incentive* Index

Stemming from this review of key GEEG program components is the development of an *Intensity of Incentive* index. This index is an emerging tool that will permit evaluators to formulate a systematic classification of GEEG programs by their effectiveness. Its development is informed by the existing research literature on performance incentive pay, and will be useful for understanding how various program characteristics are related to outcomes of interest, namely, student achievement and teacher quality. For now, this index is theoretically driven, but provides a useful baseline from which to expand.

### Developing the *Intensity of Incentive* Index

As described previously, evaluators developed a detailed taxonomy to code GEEG program applications, which focuses on several Part 1 program components, including:

- Amount of total campus grant
- Proposed minimum and maximum amounts for individual teacher awards
- Indicators used to measure teacher performance on the four Part 1 criteria
- Strategies used to distribute teacher awards

Evaluators further identified key GEEG characteristics that were determined to be of most relevance for developing an *Intensity of Incentive* index. Admittedly, the extant body of research on performance incentive pay in public education does not provide definitive guidance on the attributes of effective performance incentive programs. However, it does speak to important considerations for crafting and implementing these programs within schools.

Drawing upon existing research and the objectives of the GEEG program, the following concepts were identified as important for determining the strength of each GEEG performance pay program.

- Focus on student performance
- Unit of accountability
- Rigor of award distribution

[27] Records indicating full-time equivalent annual salaries below $20,000 were treated as missing in the analysis of Part 1 awards.

Each of these concepts was discussed in the previous section, which detailed the frequency with which GEEG schools emulated various aspects of these concepts. These distinctions provide a preliminary approach for scoring programs from 0 to 10 along the *Intensity of Incentive* index. Table 3.10 explains this scoring system in greater detail.[28]

A school can earn anywhere from 0 to 4 points depending upon the extent to which its GEEG program is focused on students' academic performance. The school earns 0 points if it uses only a non-academic indicator of student performance (e.g., student attendance rate). More points are earned as a school uses more disaggregated approaches for analyzing students' academic performance – earning more points, for example, for using classroom academic performance measures (3 points) than measures of campus-wide performance (1 point). Similarly, a school can earn 0 to 2 points depending upon the unit of accountability used to determine the distribution of Part 1 teacher awards.

Points associated with the rigor of award distribution are determined by two concepts – structure of performance benchmarks which allocates points 0 to 1, and nature of award distribution which allocates points from 0 to 3 depending upon the percentage of eligible teachers receiving a Part 1 award at a given school.

Therefore, if a school earns the minimum point for each concept it would have an index score of 0. Conversely, if a school earns the maximum point for each concept it would have an index score of 10.

**Table 3.10: *Intensity of Incentive* Index**

| Index Score | Focus on Students' Academic Performance | Unit of Accountability | Rigor of Award Distribution | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Structure of performance benchmarks | Nature of award distribution |
| 0 | Non-academic indicator | Campus | One-level | >75% receiving award |
| 1 | Campus academic performance | Team | Tiered | 51%-75% receiving award |
| 2 | Team academic performance | Teacher | ___ | 26%-50% receiving award |
| 3 | Classroom academic performance | ___ | ___ | ≤25% receiving award |
| 4 | Measure of growth (value-added) | ___ | ___ | ___ |

[28] For the *Intensity of Incentive* index, a higher score does not imply a better program approach. The scoring system is a way of classifying relevant program components, but is not meant to deem one approach as being more effective than another.

## Focus on Students' Academic Performance

This first concept allows GEEG schools to be classified by the extent to which their program is focused on students' academic performance. The range of scores – 0 to 4 – represents the continuum by which the GEEG program focuses on measures of academic performance.

- Non-academic indicator (0) – a school uses a measure of student performance other than academic performance (e.g., student attendance).
- Campus academic performance (1) – a school uses either a campus rating or student assessments with a unit of analysis capturing the campus achievement level.
- Team academic performance (2) – a school uses student assessments with a unit of analysis capturing a team achievement level.
- Classroom academic performance (3) – a school uses student assessments with a unit of analysis capturing a classroom achievement level.
- Measure of growth (4) – a school uses student assessments with a value-added approach to capture the extent to which students' academic performance has changed over time.

## Unit of Accountability

This second concept allows GEEG schools to be classified by the entities they hold accountable for performance in order to distribute teacher awards. Specifically, it focuses on the unit of accountability for Criterion 1 (student performance). As discussed previously, most GEEG schools tended to use a teacher unit of accountability, especially for Criteria 2, 3, and 4 (see Table 3.5) Criterion 1, while still tending toward a teacher unit of accountability, did display greater variation, which is more useful for classifying schools. The range of possible scores – 0 to 2 – represents several different approaches.

- Campus (0) – a school determines awards by the performance of the entire campus, rather than considering more disaggregated levels of performance.
- Team (1) – a school determines awards by the performance of a team of teachers.
- Teacher (2) – a school determines awards by the performance of individual teachers.

## Structure of Performance Benchmarks

This is one of two subparts comprising the larger concept of rigor of award distribution. This subpart allows GEEG schools to be classified by the structure of their performance benchmarks. Again, high percentages of schools used a one-level structure for each of the GEEG criterion (see Table 3.6). Focusing on the structure used for Criterion 1 provides a little more variation by which to classify schools' approaches. The range of scores from 0 to 1 represents two distinct strategies.

- One-level (0) – a school establishes one performance threshold which must be met in order to receive an award; however, exceeding this minimum expectation does not result in a higher award amount.
- Tiered (1) – a school establishes a tiered performance benchmark structure; higher award amounts are associated with achieving higher benchmarks.

**Nature of Award Distribution**

The second subpart for rigor of award distribution classifies schools by the nature of award distribution among eligible teachers. The range of possible scores – 0 to 3 – represents percentages of eligible teachers that receive awards in the school.

- Greater than 75% (0) – a school distributes awards to over 75% of all eligible teachers.
- Between 51% and 74% (1) – a school distributes awards to more than 50% but less than 75% of teachers.
- Between 26% and 50% (2) – a school distributes awards to more than 25% but less than 50% of teachers.
- Less than 25% (3) – a school distributes awards to less than 25% of all eligible teachers.

## Implications for Future Evaluation Initiatives

Over the next three years, evaluation initiatives will continue to monitor how schools implement their GEEG plans, with particular attention to the key program characteristics comprising the emerging *Intensity of Incentive* index. Evaluators plan to conduct outcome analyses in latter years, such as those focused on student achievement and teacher workforce trends. These will provide research-based evidence to identify program characteristics most highly associated with desired outcomes for teaching and learning.

Additionally, future evaluations will monitor how GEEG plans adapt over time as schools adjust to the realities of program implementation. At this time it is not possible to draw very many conclusions. However, Chapter 5 does begin to address this issue, reporting on ways in which schools' implementation of Part 1 funding differed from their submitted plans.

## Chapter Summary

This chapter provides an overview of Part 1 funding components of GEEG schools' performance incentive programs. It primarily considers those characteristics thought to be related to an *Intensity of Incentive* index, more specifically, on programs' (1) focus on student performance, (2) unit(s) of accountability, and (3) rigor of award distribution. Based on a systematic review of GEEG applications, it appears that schools' plans share some characteristics. Overall, the chapter concluded the following.

- While GEEG schools had a tendency to use only the required program criteria of student performance and teacher collaboration, there was a good deal of variation in the specific indicators used to measure teacher performance along those criteria.
- The majority of GEEG schools both proposed, and actually distributed, teacher awards that fall within the range of $1,000 to $2,999 – lower than the recommended minimum award amount of $3,000.

- GEEG schools had similar approaches to the design of performance thresholds and units of accountability; that is, they tended to use one-level performance structures and primarily held teachers accountable for performance for the purpose of determining award amounts.

# CHAPTER 4
# PART 2 FUNDING

This chapter provides a descriptive analysis of GEEG schools' use of Part 2 funding, the purposes of which are to provide additional incentives to school staff that are ineligible for Part 1 funding[29] or to implement specific strategies (i.e., professional development, mentoring, new teacher induction) that directly contribute to improving student achievement.

## Key Policy Points

This chapter highlights and expands upon the following key policy points.

- GEEG schools overwhelmingly used Part 2 funds to distribute additional incentive awards to school personnel who were ineligible for Part 1 awards (i.e., school personnel other than classroom teachers).
- These additional incentive awards were distributed to a wide array of school personnel, including administrators, instructional specialists, instructional support staff, campus support staff, and health support staff, among others.
- School administrators tended to receive, on average, the highest Part 2 award amounts.
- Few GEEG schools used Part 2 awards to implement professional growth activities for staff and faculty, such as professional development, mentoring programs, new teacher induction, and recruitment and retention activities.

## Overview

This chapter addresses the following questions.

- Did GEEG schools use Part 2 funds for professional development, teacher mentoring, and teacher induction programs? If so, how?
- Did schools use Part 2 funds for bonuses or stipends? If so, how and for whom?
- Did schools use Part 2 funds to reward additional school personnel with incentives? If so, how much and to whom?
- In what other ways did schools invest Part 2 funds?

[29] Part I funds are used to reward full-time teachers for improving student achievement, collaborating with colleagues, and participating in other professional activities that contribute to student achievement.

# Review of GEEG Part 2 Funding

This chapter provides an overview of key features of GEEG schools' use of Part 2 funds. Part 2 funds are intended to provide additional awards to school staff who were ineligible to receive Part 1 awards, or to implement strategies that directly improve student achievement (i.e., professional development, mentoring, new teacher induction). To identify these key features, evaluators conducted a detailed analysis of schools' responses to an online progress report. This chapter presents a preliminary overview of schools' responses pertaining to the use of Part 2 funds during this first year of GEEG implementation.

## Overview of GEEG, Part 2 Funding

GEEG schools must divide their total grant funds into two distinct parts: Part 1 (at least 75% of total campus grant) and Part 2 (no more than 25% of total campus grant). As explained previously in Chapter 3, Part 1 funds must be used to provide incentive awards to full-time teachers based upon improving student achievement, collaborating with colleagues, and participating in other professional activities that contribute to student achievement.

Part 2 funds may be used for incentives to additional school personnel who are ineligible for Part 1 awards. The funds may also be used for implementing professional growth activities with the intention that they contribute to student achievement at the school; funding may not be spent on athletics. More specifically, GEEG schools can use Part 2 funds for any of the following purposes.

- **Additional incentives for school personnel** who were not eligible to receive awards created from Part 1 funds, including principals, assistant principals, teachers, counselors, speech therapists, instructional coaches, teacher aides, nurses, librarians, custodians, and other campus personnel who contributed to increased student achievement
- **Professional development** for classroom teachers who did not receive incentives and who require professional development, and reimbursement or funding for professional development that directly contributes to improved teaching and student achievement
- **Teacher mentoring programs** that include specific components listed in grant guidelines, such as formative assessments to identify teachers' needs and assistance with lesson planning
- **New teacher induction programs** that include specific components listed in grant guidelines, such as common planning time and standards-based evaluation
- **Common planning time and curriculum development** to create opportunities for teacher collaboration
- **Recruitment and retention efforts** focused on highly qualified, effective teachers
- **Activities to further the goals of incentive systems** designed to improve student achievement, such as value-added assessment
- **Signing bonuses** for full-time classroom teachers who are new to the campus and/or are teaching in high-needs subject areas
- **Stipends** for teachers to participate in after-school or Saturday programs that directly contribute to improved teaching and student achievement
- **Other programs** proven to directly contribute to improved teaching

Additionally, campuses are permitted to extend Part 2 funding to feeder campuses that did not qualify for the GEEG grant because they do not receive state accountability ratings (such as a kindergarten through third-grade campus).[30]

## Methodology for Studying the Use of GEEG Part 2 Funds

During the fall of 2006 – and again in the summer of 2007 for those who had not yet reported – principals (or site coordinators) at GEEG schools were asked to complete an online progress report focused on two key topics: (1) the use of Part 2 GEEG funds and (2) processes for developing, implementing, and monitoring school GEEG plans.[31] Information on the intended use of Part 2 funds was not clearly provided in most GEEG applications; therefore, an online survey instrument was developed to gain a better understanding of Part 2 program components.

Progress reports were first administered in the fall of 2006 to the 74 GEEG schools that were approved at that time (i.e., had received their Notice of Grant Award [NOGA]). Seventy-one schools completed the online instrument. The progress report was again administered in the summer of 2007 to gather responses from the 25 GEEG schools that were NOGA'd after the initial survey administration. It was also sent to the GEEG schools from the earlier NOGA'd group for which responses were not received during the first online administration. In total, evaluators received responses from 15 of the late NOGA'd schools and two of the earlier NOGA'd schools during the second survey administration. Evaluators plan to follow up with the remaining 14 schools in the fall of 2007.

While 85 of the total 99 GEEG schools responded to the progress report, the response rate more heavily favors those in the original NOGA'd group. Seventy of the original 74 GEEG schools responded, resulting in a favorable response rate of 94.6%. But fewer of the late NOGA'd schools participated – only 60.0% of the 25 schools in that group.

The resulting analyses of progress report responses should be tempered by the understanding that they are not representative of the entire population of GEEG schools, especially of those schools who received a later NOGA. However, with a total of 85.9% of all 99 GEEG schools responding, it is valuable to report on findings related to Part 2 funding and program implementation. Additionally, it should be noted that results are based upon the responses of one individual (principal/site coordinator) at each GEEG school; therefore, it cannot be assumed that results are representative of the entirety of schools' faculty and staff.

Findings from the progress report items focused on Part 2 GEEG funding are detailed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. Results focused on the development, implementation, and monitoring of GEEG are presented in Chapter 5.

[30] Based upon progress report results, evaluators did not find that any GEEG schools were using Part 2 funds for feeder campuses.

[31] See Appendix D to review the progress report administered to GEEG schools.

## Schools' Use of Part 2 Funding

As previously described, GEEG schools could use Part 2 funds in a variety of ways, including incentives for additional school personnel (other than classroom teachers) or the implementation of activities to improve teaching. Table 4.1 describes the percentage of schools that used Part 2 funds for each of the possible options. Overall, 74 (87.1%) of responding GEEG schools indicated using Part 2 funds to allocate additional personnel incentives, while much smaller percentages of schools indicated doing so to implement other strategies such as professional development and teacher mentoring.[32] These findings suggest that the majority of GEEG schools decided to use the additional GEEG money provided by Part 2 funds to distribute incentive awards to a broader spectrum of school staff and faculty, rather than using such money to implement professional growth activities.

**Table 4.1: Overview of Schools' Use of Part 2 Funding**

| Reason for Using Part II Funds | Number (%) of Schools |
|---|---|
| Additional personnel incentives | 74 (87.1%) |
| Professional development | 12 (14.1%) |
| Teacher mentoring | 4 (4.7%) |
| Teacher induction | 1 (1.2%) |
| Bonuses and/or stipends for teachers | 29 (34.1%) |
| †Other programs and activities | 25 (29.4%) |

N=85

† Of the 25 schools reporting other programs and activities, most (19 schools, 76.0%) were actually referring to the use of Part 2 funds for additional personnel incentives. Only four (16.0%) of the schools actually described activities/programs that were distinct from the other options coded above (e.g., attendance rate), and two schools (8.0%) described activities/programs that partly reflected the use of funds for additional personnel incentives.

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school program may be described by more than one response category).

*Source:* Data results come from the fall 2006/summer 2007 online progress report administered to GEEG school principals/site coordinators.

### Additional Personnel Incentives

Providing additional personnel incentives was the most favored way for schools to invest Part 2 funds; in fact, nearly 90% of responding GEEG schools reported doing so. GEEG schools had significant latitude in determining which additional personnel could receive incentives under Part 2 and the amount for which they would be eligible. Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of the type of

[32] Three of the responding GEEG schools reported not using Part 2 funds for any of the reasons identified above in Table 4.1.

personnel that most frequently received Part 2 incentives and the maximum award amounts for which they were eligible.[33]

Overall, during the 2006-07 school year, 74 GEEG schools distributed additional incentives for a large number of school personnel. The most frequent recipients included principals, instructional support staff, and campus support staff who were eligible for incentives in 67.6%, 66.2%, and 64.9% of GEEG schools respectively. The least preferred personnel position to be eligible for additional incentives was part-time teachers, only eligible in 33.8% of GEEG schools.

Overall, principals and assistant principals were eligible to receive the highest award amounts, with averages of $2,398 and $2,043 respectively. However, assistant principals were less likely to receive a Part 2 incentive, as less than half of the GEEG schools reporting doing so. Instructional specialists, full-time teachers, and part-time teachers were eligible for the next highest average award amounts.

Schools reported maximum award amounts ranging from $50 to $10,000 annually. While the range of these incentives is quite large, the highest reported maximum awards tend to align with the maximum award recommended by statute. However, the lowest and average reported maximum amounts remain lower than the advised minimum of $3,000.[34] While such recommendations were related to Part 1 awards and not as explicitly stated for Part 2 awards, those parameters provide a useful benchmark by which to measure the value of an award.

[33] School respondents reported the maximum award amount for which a given personnel type was eligible. Based upon these reported amounts, we were able to compute the following for each personnel type: (1) lowest reported maximum amount; (2) highest reported maximum amount, and (3) average of all reported maximum amounts.
[34] GEEG guidelines recommended awards ranging from a minimum of $3,000 to a maximum of $10,000 per teacher.

**Table 4.2: Breakdown of Additional Personnel Incentives**

| School Personnel | Number (%) of Schools | Range of Reported Maximum Award Amounts | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Lowest Maximum Award | Highest Maximum Award | Average Maximum Award |
| Principal | 50 (67.6%) | $511.00 | $10,000.00 | $2,398.07 |
| Assistant Principal | 36 (48.6%) | $300.00 | $10,000.00 | $2,043.04 |
| Full-time teachers | 34 (45.9%) | $281.25 | $10,000.00 | $1,834.66 |
| Part-time teachers[35] | 25 (33.8%) | $456.00 | $10,000.00 | $1,798.24 |
| Instructional specialists[36] | 38 (51.4%) | $483.00 | $10,000.00 | $1,873.83 |
| Instructional support staff[37] | 49 (66.2%) | $100.00 | $4,850.00 | $816.69 |
| Librarian | 45 (60.8%) | $206.25 | $10,000.00 | $1,395.99 |
| Health support staff[38] | 46 (62.2%) | $200.00 | $10,000.00 | $1,489.25 |
| Campus support staff[39] | 48 (64.9%) | $50.00 | $5,000.00 | $636.35 |
| Other[40] | 39 (52.7%) | $125.00 | $10,050.00 | $1,356.30 |

N=74

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school program may be described by more than one response category).

*Source:* Data results come from the fall 2006/summer 2007 online progress report administered to GEEG school principals/site coordinators.

These findings are supplemented by results from the data upload system introduced in Chapter 3. Preliminary analyses of the actual distribution of Part 2 funds suggest that the allocation of awards was much more diverse than the distribution of Part 1 awards. The average Part 2 award was $765 (compared to the average Part 1 award of $2,452). The smallest Part 2 award was only $25, while the largest award was $5,000; for Part 1, those figures were $250 and $15,000 respectively.

[35] An educator who teaches in an academic setting or a career and technology instructional setting no less than an average of four hours each day.

[36] Examples include instructional coaches and reading or math specialists.

[37] A teacher's aide is an example of instructional support.

[38] Examples include nurses, counselors, and therapists.

[39] Examples include custodians and cafeteria workers.

[40] In the classification identified as "Other," campuses reported incentives for a variety of personnel, including diagnosticians, facilitators, registrars, data clerks, computer analysts, secretaries, grant coordinators, instructional deans, physical education coaches, community aides, parent educators, assessment specialists, music teachers, oral language teachers, clinical assistants, head custodians, crossing guards, technology directors, PEIMS coordinators, and special education teachers.

On average, administrators received the largest Part 2 awards, the average award being $1,962. In contrast, the average auxiliary worker (e.g., custodians, cafeteria workers, etc.) received less than $500. Teachers who received Part 2 awards earned $1,030 on average. In fact, 59 of the 75 reporting GEEG schools granted a Part 2 award to at least one teacher.

GEEG schools also reported the criteria used to determine distribution of additional Part 2 incentives to these school personnel, as shown in Table 4.3 below. When asked about the same four criteria that guided distribution of Part 1 awards (i.e., student performance, collaboration, initiative and commitment, and hard-to-staff areas), the most commonly reported criterion was professional collaboration, cited by 54 (73.0%) schools. The use of student achievement and the demonstration of initiative were also common among schools, with nearly 65% of GEEG schools indicating the use of each for determining the Part 2 incentives. As is further described in Table 4.3, fewer GEEG schools (31.1 %) used placement in hard-to-staff and/or high turnover areas as a criterion for incentives.

**Table 4.3: Criteria for Determining Distribution of Additional Part 2 Incentives**

| Criteria for Part 2 Incentives | Number (%) of Schools |
|---|---|
| Success in improving student achievement | 48 (64.9%) |
| Collaboration that contributes to improving overall student achievement | 54 (73.0%) |
| Demonstration of ongoing initiative, commitment, personalization, professionalism, and involvement that directly result in improved student achievement | 48 (64.9%) |
| Assignment in an area that is hard to staff or has had high turnover | 23 (31.1%) |

N=74

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school program may be described by more than one response category).

*Source:* Data results come from the fall 2006/summer 2007 online Progress Report administered to GEEG school principals/site coordinators.

Interestingly, this mirrors a similar pattern reflected in schools' use of Part 1 incentive awards. Among the 99 GEEG schools, the most infrequently used criterion was also Criterion 4 (i.e., assignment in hard-to-staff or high turnover areas), used in only 15 schools.

## Professional Growth Activities

As previously presented in Table 4.1, GEEG schools were much less inclined to use Part 2 funds to implement professional growth activities for faculty and staff on their campus. In fact, less than 15% of reporting schools – and sometimes much fewer – used these funds to initiate professional development, mentoring, or induction programs. Interestingly, the activities that were more popular (i.e., providing bonuses or stipends to teachers, other programs and activities) were still only implemented by less than half of GEEG schools; and they tended to resemble opportunities to provide additional money directly to teachers, faculty, and staff rather than truly implementing professional growth activities.

**Professional Development.** Only 12 (14.1%) of the GEEG schools reported using Part 2 funds to provide professional development in their schools. Of the six different ways that schools could use Part 2 funds (see Table 2), professional development ranked fourth among preferred campus activities.

When asked about the nature of these professional development activities, only three of these 12 schools reported providing professional development for teachers who were eligible for – but did not earn – a Part 1 award. All 12 indicated that they were using funds to reimburse or fund professional development activities designed to directly contribute to improved teaching and student achievement.

**Teacher Mentoring.** Only four (4.7%) of the responding GEEG schools indicated using Part 2 funds to provide mentoring for teachers. In fact, after teacher induction programs – used by only one school – teacher mentoring was the least preferred alternative for schools' use of Part 2 funds.

Each of the four schools reported mentoring that included the following components.

- Formative assessments to identify needs, assess practice, and create steps for improvement
- Demonstrations of effective teaching practices
- Assistance with analysis of student work and achievement data

Three of the schools also reported using mentoring activities that include the following.

- Conducting classroom observations and offering feedback
- Providing assistance with lesson plans
- Providing mentors on the same campus, grade and/or subject

Less frequently used mentoring activities were those that selected mentors with at least 3 years of teaching experience and proven records of improving student achievement, and those that provided training for mentors in research-based training programs. Both of these activities were reported by two of the four schools.

**New Teacher Induction.** One GEEG school invested Part 2 funds in teacher induction programs. Teacher induction was the least favored option for using these GEEG funds. This GEEG school implemented a new teacher induction program that included the following components: mentoring for new teachers, common planning time among teacher colleagues, professional development, and standards-based evaluation.

**Bonuses and/or Stipends.** Twenty-nine (34.1%) of the GEEG schools reported using Part 2 funds to provide bonuses and/or stipends to school personnel. The award of bonuses and/or stipends was the second-most favored option for allocating Part 2 funds, behind the provision of additional incentives for school personnel.

Of the schools that provided further information about the nature of these bonuses and stipends:

- Sixteen (55.2%) of the 29 schools reported the use of bonuses or stipends for personnel who participated in after-school or Saturday programs focused on improving teaching and student achievement; and
- Eight (27.6%) of the 29 schools reported the use of bonuses or stipends for new teachers assigned to high-needs subject areas.

**Other Programs and Activities.** Of the 25 schools (29.4%) reporting other programs and activities, it was evident that most were actually reporting the use of Part 2 funds for additional personnel incentives. In fact, 19 of these schools – over three-quarters – explained these other programs/activities as incentives for non-teaching personnel (e.g., cafeteria workers, custodians, administrators, counselors, instructional assistants, etc.).

Only four (16.0%) of these schools actually described activities or programs that were distinct from the other activities already discussed in this section; and two schools (8.0%) described activities that were only partly distinct from the previously discussed alternatives. Examples of these other activities include:

- Additional incentives for teachers based upon teacher attendance rates, collaboration, and other professional activities that support campus-wide achievement
- Literacy development of students
- Staff attendance for extra hours
- Funds for student activities

## Implications for Future Evaluation Initiatives

This chapter offers an early glimpse at GEEG schools' use of Part 2 funds, and the extent to which schools apply those funds to the development of professional growth activities or to the provision of additional incentive for school personnel other than classroom teachers who could earn awards from Part 1 funding. Evaluators discovered that GEEG schools had a noticeable tendency to use these Part 2 funds to distribute additional awards directly to school staff and faculty rather than use them to implement activities such as professional development, mentoring, or induction.

Over time, evaluation efforts will continue to monitor the use of Part 2 funds with particular attention to changes and the reasons for these changes. It will be of interest to learn why schools so often decided not to implement professional growth activities on their campus and what specific activities they expect staff and faculty to fulfill in order to receive an award.

Additionally, as schools move along with the implementation of their GEEG plans and become more attuned to the needs of teachers and staff, it is reasonable that schools might adopt new investment strategies for Part 2 funds. Finally, evaluators hope to gain a better understanding as to the role Part 2 activities play in explaining key outcomes such as student achievement and teacher quality and workforce trends.

These findings related to schools' use of Part 2 funding raise several important questions for future consideration.

- What resources can be developed to help schools design measures that directly contribute to improved teaching and student achievement, as outlined in GEEG guidelines?
- What percentage, if any, of state incentive funds should be invested in campus efforts to improve recruitment and retention, professional development, mentoring, induction, planning time, curriculum development, and capacity-building for campus incentive systems?
- Should a minimum financial value (either absolute or percentage of salary) be set for individual Part 2 awards?

## Chapter Summary

Findings from our Year 1 progress report indicate that GEEG schools had primarily used Part 2 funds to provide incentives for additional personnel who were ineligible for incentives funded by Part 1 of the grant. Among those additional personnel, administrators were most likely to receive the highest award amounts. Additionally, GEEG schools had a greater tendency to use measures of collaboration than measures of student performance when determining the distribution of Part 2 awards.

Schools reported a relatively small investment of Part 2 funds in professional development, mentoring, and induction programs, while more frequently (but still among less than half of GEEG schools) using funds to provide stipends or bonuses to teachers for participating in after-school tutoring or serving in high-need subject areas. This finding again reinforces the tendency of GEEG schools to use Part 2 funds to filter additional awards to school personnel as opposed to investing funds in the development and implementation of professional growth activities.

# CHAPTER 5
# IMPLEMENTATION OF GEEG AND TEACHER EXPERIENCES

This chapter provides an overview of GEEG schools' experiences during the first year of implementation. Specifically, it describes mechanisms used by schools to develop and monitor the progress of their programs and the ways in which schools modified their programs from the original plans submitted to TEA in GEEG applications. The chapter also provides a thorough analysis of teacher experiences during the 2006-07 school year, detailing their attitudes toward the program and the ways in which it has influenced their professional behavior. Overall, the chapter offers a glimpse into the internal dynamics of schools participating in this statewide performance incentive program.

## Key Policy Points

This chapter highlights and expands upon the following key policy points.

- A wide representation of school staff and faculty were involved in the development and approval of GEEG schools' performance incentive programs.
- Both mid-year and end-of-year survey findings suggest that teachers felt favorably toward their schools' GEEG programs; moreover, they tended to disagree that the performance incentive programs were deteriorating collaboration among teaching staff.
- Teachers reported changing their professional practice in desirable ways since the inception of GEEG.
- Teachers receiving GEEG awards had a greater tendency to use those desirable instructional practices than their non-recipient peers; however, some of these differences could be explained by recipients' having more years of teaching experience.

## Overview

This chapter addresses the following questions.

- What were schools' experiences with developing, approving, and managing the implementation of their GEEG programs?
- In what ways did teachers believe GEEG programs impacted the organizational dynamics at their schools?
- Did teachers in GEEG schools adapt their professional practice? If so, in what ways, and did award recipients behave differently than their non-recipient counterparts?

## Implementation of GEEG Programs

As the first year of GEEG schools' performance incentive programs comes to a close, it is of interest to learn about the experiences they and their teachers encountered. This chapter sheds light on these first-year experiences as it explores the methods used by schools to develop and monitor programs, and the ways in which programs may have changed from original plans submitted to TEA in GEEG applications. It also provides a thorough analysis of teacher experiences during the 2006-07 school year, detailing attitudes toward the program and ways in which it has influenced teachers' professional behavior. Overall, the chapter offers a glimpse into the internal dynamics of schools participating in this new, statewide performance incentive program.

### Development and Management of GEEG Programs

As GEEG schools faced the new task of developing and implementing a locally developed performance incentive program, evaluators endeavored to learn about the strategies employed by schools. Chapter 4 provided an overview of an annual progress report administered to school principals/site coordinators. As mentioned previously, that instrument dealt with two primary issues: (1) schools' use of Part 2 funds and (2) schools' experiences developing and implementing their GEEG programs. This section addresses the latter issue and explains the strategies used by schools to implement their programs, along with ways in which programs may have changed during the implementation process.[41] It should be noted that these findings are based upon the responses of one individual at each GEEG school; therefore, it cannot be assumed that results represent the responses that would be given by other school faculty and staff.

**Development and Management of GEEG.** The first component of the progress report asked respondents to describe how their individual school went about developing its GEEG program. While GEEG guidelines established parameters for the design of each program (i.e., required focus on student achievement and teacher collaboration, split of Part 1 funds and Part 2 funds), each school had considerable flexibility to determine the nature of its program. For example, schools could decide which indicators would be used to measure each award criteria; they could determine the amounts for each teacher award; and they could choose whether or not to use Part 2 funds to pay additional incentives or to implement activities geared toward professional improvement (e.g., professional development, teacher mentoring, new teacher induction).

With such flexibility, the Texas Education Agency encouraged each GEEG school to include a broad array of school personnel in the development of the program's design. As seen in Table 5.1 below, schools tended to include a variety of personnel and other representatives in that decision-making process. In fact, eight different personnel positions were involved in approximately 50% of GEEG schools. Principals and full-time teachers were the most popular participants in the development process, with over 90% of schools including them.

[41] Chapter 4 provides a thorough overview of the methodology employed when administering those progress reports. Approximately 86% of GEEG schools responded, 95% of schools approved in the fall of 2006 and 60% of GEEG schools approved later in 2007.

**Table 5.1: School Personnel Involved in the Design and Approval of GEEG Program**

| | Plan Development (N=85 schools) | Plan Vote (N=69 schools) |
|---|---|---|
| Principal | 92.9% (79) | 88.4% (61) |
| Assistant principal | 47.1% (40) | 53.6% (37) |
| Full-time classroom teachers | 94.1% (80) | 94.2% (65) |
| Part-time classroom teachers | 16.5% (14) | 21.7% (15) |
| Instructional specialists | 60.0% (51) | 62.3% (43) |
| Instructional support staff | 51.8% (44) | 66.7% (46) |
| Librarian(s) | 49.4% (42) | 62.3% (43) |
| Health support staff | 49.4% (42) | 59.4% (41) |
| Campus support staff | 21.2% (18) | 30.4% (21) |
| District officials | 58.8% (50) | 30.4% (21) |
| Local school board members | 14.1% (12) | 18.8% (13) |
| Parents | 32.9% (28) | 37.7% (26) |
| Community and business leaders | 15.3% (13) | 21.7% (15) |
| Students | 4.7% (4) | 7.2% (5) |

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school program may be described by more than one response category.)
*Source:* Data results come from the fall 2006/summer 2007 online progress report administered to GEEG school principals/site coordinators.

Table 5.1 also shows which school personnel and other representatives were involved in the voting process used to locally approve the design of a GEEG performance incentive program. Overall, only 69 (81.2%) of the responding schools reported that their school actually voted to approve the GEEG program design. Of those, it was again principals and full-time teachers that were most frequently involved. However, over 50% of schools reported the involvement of a number of other representatives, such as assistant principals, instructional specialists, librarians, and health support staff.

The progress report also asked respondents to describe the strategies employed by schools to monitor and manage the implementation of GEEG programs. Interestingly, 15 (17.6%) of responding schools reported that they were not using any such strategies at all. However, among the 70 schools that were undertaking such efforts, the majority reported using a variety of mechanisms.

- 94.3% said that schools provided regular feedback to faculty and staff regarding the progress of the school GEEG program.
- 88.6% reported that schools conducted meetings to gather feedback from faculty and staff related to the progress of GEEG.
- 77.1% conducted formal evaluations of their school's GEEG program.
- 67.1% also compiled annual reports of GEEG's progress.

The following sections provide a detailed analysis of two teacher surveys, both focusing on teachers' perceptions toward GEEG and their reactions to their school programs. These surveys provide a

clearer understanding of teachers' experiences during the first year of GEEG implementation and enable evaluators to identify ways in which teachers' attitudes and professional behaviors may have changed over time. This is particularly important because previous research alludes to the phenomenon that teachers tend to change their perceptions of performance incentive programs over the course of their participation in them (Burgess et al., 2003).

## Early Teacher Experiences with GEEG

### Survey Methodology and Sample

GEEG teachers were given an online survey mid-school year (January 2007) during the first year of GEEG program implementation to evaluate their initial attitudes about and reactions to GEEG. The survey was administered to full-time instructional personnel at the 74 GEEG schools that were approved at that time. Teachers were given four weeks to respond, and all responses were anonymous.

This survey addressed several key concepts related to performance incentive programs in general and GEEG specifically. A sample survey is provided in Appendix E, and is comprised of four key concepts.

- Teachers' attitudes about performance incentive programs and specifically about GEEG
- Teachers' professional behavior in response to their schools' GEEG programs
- The implementation process of GEEG school programs
- Teacher background characteristics (i.e., professional experience, educational background)

The survey contained quantitative and qualitative items in order to gather both standardized and open-ended responses. The evaluation team plans to continue administration of a mid-school year survey that will monitor trends in teachers' attitudes and behavior over the course of the three-year GEEG program.

Admittedly, this online survey is not without its limitations. Primarily, it cannot ensure a sample of respondents that are representative of all GEEG teachers. The online survey was administered to teachers in all GEEG schools, but teacher participation was voluntary and, therefore, self-selection ensued. The bias introduced by self-selection questions whether the survey respondents might be systematically different from non-respondents, which could result in survey findings that are not representative of the greater population of GEEG teachers.

Despite this limitation, analyses of survey respondents' characteristics suggest that participating teachers are quite similar to the population of teachers in all 99 GEEG schools. Tables 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 below compare the years of teaching experience, level of education, and annual salary between teacher survey respondents and teachers in all GEEG schools. These tables reveal similar distributions along all variables (i.e., years of experience, level of education, annual salary). As is further detailed below, the survey response rate and the similarity of respondents' characteristics to the greater population of GEEG teachers temper the limitations prompted by self-selection.

The survey was administered to full-time instructional personnel at 74 GEEG schools. We restricted responses to a total of 52 schools because the other 12 had responses that made up either fewer than five teachers or less than 10% of their teaching staffs. These schools were excluded to ensure anonymity and to protect respondents from identification. The final response rate of 62% represented a total of 1,571 teachers at 52 GEEG schools.

As shown in Table 5.2 below, average response rates varied by the size of GEEG-eligible teaching staff at the 52 schools. The average school responding to our survey had 30.2 respondents and 48.4 GEEG-eligible teachers.

**Table 5.2: Average Response Rates by Eligible Teachers, Mid-Year Teacher Survey**

| Eligible Teachers | Number of Schools | Average Response Rate |
|---|---|---|
| 6-20 | 7 | 76% |
| 21-40 | 17 | 69% |
| 41-60 | 13 | 68% |
| 61-80 | 7 | 48% |
| 81+ | 8 | 58% |
| **Total Teachers** | | 1,571 |
| **Total Schools** | | 52 |
| **Total Response Rate** | | 62.4% |

*Note:* The eligible teacher count for schools is an estimate based on reported full-time equivalent teachers in 2006.

Teacher respondents had many years of full-time teaching experience, with over half in the profession 10 years or more. It is worth noting, however, that the vast majority of respondents (72%) had taught nine years or less in their current school, and 30% had only been in their current school between one and three years. Similarly, nearly half (43.5%) of all teachers in the 99 GEEG schools had been in the teaching profession 10 or more years, while 79.7% had been in their current school nine years or less. Table 5.3 provides an overview of teachers' professional experience.

**Table 5.3: Respondents' Years of Teaching Experience, Mid-Year Teacher Survey**

| Response Category | Overall Years Teaching | | Years Teaching at School | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Respondents | All GEEG Teachers | Respondents | All GEEG Teachers |
| Missing/Undefined | 1.8% | 8.4% | 2.0% | --- |
| 1 to 3 years | 16.2% | 18.9% | 30.0% | 40.5% |
| 4 to 9 years | 30.2% | 29.3% | 41.9% | 39.2% |
| 10 to 14 years | 15.2% | 13.0% | 12.0% | 10.3% |
| 15 to 19 years | 12.8% | 9.3% | 7.7% | 10.1% |
| 20 or more years | 23.4% | 21.2% | 6.3% | |

Respondents' N=1,571; all GEEG teachers' N=3,972

*Note:* PEIMS does not provide information on teacher tenure at current campus. Therefore, that variable was constructed by evaluators using an 18-year panel of data; there was not sufficient information to distinguish between ranges 15 to 19 years and 20 or more years.

*Source*: Information on respondents comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007. Information on teachers in all 99 GEEG schools comes from PEIMS 2006-07.

As seen in Table 5.4 below, roughly two-thirds (67.1%) of respondents held a bachelor's degree and 26.4% held a master's degree. The education levels of teachers in all 99 GEEG schools reflect similar patterns, while slightly more held a bachelor's degree (79.3%) and slightly fewer held a master's degree (19.2%).

**Table 5.4: Respondent's Level of Education, Mid-Year Survey**

| Highest Degree | Percent of Respondents | Percent of All GEEG Teachers |
|---|---|---|
| Associate | 0.9% | 0.9% |
| Bachelor's | 67.1% | 79.3% |
| Master's | 26.4% | 19.2% |
| Doctorate | 0.7% | 0.6% |
| Other | 3.5% | --- |

Respondents' N=1,571; all GEEG teachers' N=3,972
*Source*: Information on respondents comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007. Information on teachers in all 99 GEEG schools comes from PEIMS 2006-07.

Additionally, Table 5.5 indicates that the vast majority of teacher respondents (86.3%) and all GEEG teachers (90.8%) earned between $30,000 and $59,999 for their current annual salary, with the bulk of those earning between $40,000 and $49,999.

**Table 5.5: Respondents' Annual Salary, Mid-Year Teacher Survey**

| Response Category | Percent of Respondents | Percent of All GEEG Teachers |
|---|---|---|
| Missing/Undefined | 2.4% | 0.3% |
| $20,000 to $29,999 | 4.0% | 1.1% |
| $30,000 to $39,999 | 25.3% | 17.3% |
| $40,000 to $49,999 | 43.2% | 51.4% |
| $50,000 to $59,999 | 17.8% | 22.1% |
| $60,000 to $69,999 | 6.1% | 6.9% |
| $70,000 or more | 1.3% | 1.0% |

Respondents' N=1,571; all GEEG teachers' N=3,972
*Source*: Information on respondents comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007. Information on teachers in all 99 GEEG schools comes from PEIMS 2006-07.

## Early Attitudes About Incentive Pay Design

Teachers were asked to explain how much importance they would give to 17 different measures of performance when designing an incentive pay program. Rating these measures on their level of importance (1=None, 2=Low, 3=Moderate, 4=High), teachers identified a number of measures as being of greatest and least importance for designing an incentive pay program.

Table 5.6 provides an overview of the top five ranked performance measures (i.e., those with the highest overall mean scores). Teachers believed that improvements in students' test scores (mean=3.49) and collaboration with faculty and staff (mean=3.29) were the most important measures of performance to be incorporated into incentive pay programs. Interestingly, these were the two measures that were required of schools when distributing awards to GEEG-eligible teachers (i.e., Criterion 1: student performance, and Criterion 2: teacher collaboration).

Additionally, teachers also identified teaching in hard-to-staff fields and time spent on professional development as high-ranking performance measures. The former, while a potential criterion for GEEG programs, was rarely used by schools (only 13 of 74 schools used it). Professional development, however, was commonly used by schools as a measure of teacher collaboration (i.e., Criterion 2 of GEEG).

**Table 5.6: Most Important Performance Measures for Incentive Pay**

| Performance Measures (in descending rank order) | None (1) | Low (2) | Moderate (3) | High (4) | Mean (avg.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Improvements in students' test scores | 2.2% | 4.7% | 34.8% | 58.3% | 3.49 |
| Collaboration with faculty and staff | 3.1% | 10.4% | 40.9% | 45.6% | 3.29 |
| Teaching in hard-to-staff school | 6.4% | 10.8% | 38.3% | 44.6% | 3.21 |
| Teaching in hard-to-staff fields | 6.7% | 11.5% | 40.5% | 41.2% | 3.16 |
| Time spent in professional development | 3.5% | 12.2% | 50.2% | 34.1% | 3.15 |

N=1,571
*Note:* Total number of respondents varies by item.
*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

The least important measures identified by teachers are detailed in Table 5.7. Teachers believed that students' evaluation of teaching performance (mean=2.55) and independent evaluations of teacher portfolios (mean=2.60) were the least important measures to include in an incentive pay program. This implies that teachers might be less inclined to view subjective measures as important for the design of an incentive pay program.[42]

[42] A more detailed discussion of findings related to teachers' attitudes about objective and subjective measures for incentive pay can be found in Chapter 6.

**Table 5.7: Least Important Performance Measures for Incentive Pay**

| Performance Measures (in descending rank order) | None (1) | Low (2) | Moderate (3) | High (4) | Mean (avg.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| National Board of Professional Teaching Standards certification | 14.8% | 24.3% | 36.4% | 24.5% | 2.71 |
| Parent satisfaction with teacher | 12.8% | 25.6% | 41.6% | 20.1% | 2.69 |
| Performance evaluation by peers | 13.8% | 24.2% | 44.9% | 17.0% | 2.65 |
| Independent evaluation of teaching portfolios | 13.6% | 27.3% | 44.6% | 14.5% | 2.60 |
| Student evaluations of teaching performance | 17.2% | 28.3% | 37.2% | 17.3% | 2.55 |

N=1,571

*Note*: Total number of respondents varies by item.

*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

A small percentage (10%) of teachers also provided open-ended responses to this question, explaining what they thought to be other important performance measures for consideration, including:

- A need for holistic evaluation
- Rewards for specialized teachers
- Preparation and development beyond mandates
- Length of teacher service
- Teacher and student attendance

Teachers' responses varied somewhat when asked to rate the importance of each performance measure for determining awards to teachers as part of their schools' GEEG plans. Table 5.8 below provides an overview of the top ten performance measures that teachers identified for (1) what is most important for an incentive pay plan versus (2) what is most important for their schools' GEEG plans. Of these top ten responses, four of the measures were perfectly aligned in rank order.

- "Improvements in students' test scores" was ranked as the most important measure in response to both questions.
- "Mentoring other teachers" was ranked as the least important of measures for both.
- "Time spent on professional development" and "efforts to involve parents in students' education" were both aligned as mid-ranking measures.

**Table 5.8: Comparing Importance of Performance Measures, General Incentive Pay v. GEEG Incentive Plan**

| Performance Measures | Teachers' Rank Order of Important Incentive Pay Measures | Teachers' Rank Order of Important GEEG Plan Measures |
|---|---|---|
| **Improvements in students' test scores** | **1 (mean = 3.49)** | **1 (mean = 3.46)** |
| Collaboration with faculty and staff | 2 (mean = 3.29) | 3 (mean = 2.89) |
| Teaching in hard-to-staff school | 3 (mean = 3.21) | 9 (mean = 2.57) |
| Teaching in hard-to-staff fields | 4 (mean = 3.16) | 8 (mean = 2.58) |
| **Time spent in professional development** | **5 (mean = 3.15)** | **5 (mean = 2.78)** |
| Working with students outside of class time | 6 (mean = 3.14) | 4 (mean = 2.83) |
| **Efforts to involve parents in students' education** | **7 (mean = 3.13)** | **7 (mean = 2.62)** |
| High average test scores by students | 8 (mean = 3.05) | 2 (mean = 3.37) |
| Performance evaluations by supervisors | 9 (mean = 3.04) | 6 (mean = 2.76) |
| **Mentoring other teachers** | **10 (mean = 2.94)** | **10 (mean = 2.40)** |

N=1,571

*Note:* Performance measures are ranked from 1 to 10, with 1 being the most preferred and 10 being the least preferred. Measures with equal ranks are in bold type. Respondents rated items' importance as None (1), Low (2), Moderate (3), or High (4). Total number of respondents varies by item.

*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

Not all measures were well aligned with one another. Specifically, teachers believed "high average test scores by students" to be of lower importance for incentive pay, but recognized that it was an important feature in their schools' GEEG plans. Additionally, "teaching in hard-to-staff school/fields" was identified as being of high importance for incentive pay, but was less important for schools' GEEG plans.

Finally, teachers were again given the opportunity to provide open-ended responses to explain other performance measures important in their schools' GEEG plans, which included:

- Teacher and student attendance
- Length of teacher experience
- Assignment to TAKS grades

It is worth noting that the first two responses mirror the open-ended responses teachers provided when asked what measures they considered important for incentive pay plans.

## Early Perceptions about GEEG Campus Plans

The survey also gauged teachers' perceptions about the level of school staff involvement in the development of GEEG plans, as well as the fairness and impact of GEEG plans. Evaluators used a series of survey items to measure these issues, as outlined in Table 5.9 below. Teachers were in consistent agreement that school staff participated in the development of GEEG plans. They were convinced that administrators, teachers, and then non-teaching staff – in that order – took part in development processes.

These results align with earlier discussions in this chapter on findings from the online progress report survey administered to school principals/site coordinators. The majority of those respondents reported that a wide variety of school personnel and other community representatives were involved in program design and approval. For example:

- 92.9% of respondents stated that principals were involved in program development.
- 94.1% identified full-time teachers as being involved in program development, but only 16.5% responded so for part-time teachers.
- Approximately 50% or more of respondents stated that other staff members – such as instructional specialists (60.0%), instructional support staff (51.8%), librarians (49.4%), and health support staff (49.4%) – were involved in development efforts.
- Among school staff, campus support staff (e.g., custodians, cafeteria workers) were reported as least likely to have been involved; only 21.2% of schools reported their involvement.

This is noteworthy, as guidelines for GEEG call for school-wide involvement in the development process. Additionally, teachers, on average, agreed that GEEG plans were both fair and had beneficial effects at their schools, as evidenced by responses to questions under the "Fairness and Impact" index in Table 5.9 below.

**Table 5.9: Teachers' Perceptions of Involvement, Fairness, and Impact of GEEG**

| "Involvement" Index | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| "Administrators at my school were involved in the development of this program." | 3.0% | 3.0% | 34.7% | 48.1% | 11.2% |
| "Teachers at my school were involved in the development of this program." | 5.1% | 7.6% | 40.8% | 35.4% | 11.1% |
| "Other non-teaching staff at my school were involved in the development of this program." | 7.4% | 12.2% | 32.4% | 23.8% | 24.3% |
| **"Fairness and Impact" Index** | **Strongly Disagree** | **Disagree** | **Agree** | **Strongly Agree** | **Don't Know** |
| "The GEEG incentive system developed by my school is fair to teachers." | 10.0% | 14.7% | 34.7% | 31.3% | 9.2% |
| "The GEEG incentive system is having beneficial effects on my school." | 7.1% | 10.5% | 35.9% | 30.9% | 15.5% |
| "The GEEG incentive system is having negative effects on my school." | 29.0% | 29.7% | 14.4% | 8.7% | 18.3% |

N=1,571

*Note*: Total number of respondents varies by item.

*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

Teachers were further asked whether they agreed with various approaches to measuring educator performance for the purpose of changing pay practices. As described in Table 5.10, teachers tended to agree with using measures of school-wide performance, individual teacher performance, and the state's performance appraisal system (PDAS) as part of changing educator pay practices.

**Table 5.10: Teachers' Perceptions of Measuring Educator Performance**

| Strategies for Designing Incentive Pay | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| "Incentive pay for teachers based on overall performance at the school is a positive change to teacher pay practices." | 7.9% | 14.2% | 44.4% | 28.4% | 5.1% |
| "Incentive pay for teachers based on individual teaching performance is a positive change to teacher pay practices." | 11.3% | 17.1% | 41.2% | 24.2% | 6.2% |
| "Incentive pay for administrators based on overall performance at the schools is a positive change to administrator pay practices." | 9.6% | 15.8% | 43.3% | 21.6% | 9.7% |
| "The state performance appraisal system (PDAS) provides an objective and fair means of determining individual teaching performance for use in a performance incentive system." | 12.2% | 21.4% | 44.5% | 14.9% | 7.1% |

N=1,571
*Note*: Total number of respondents varies by item.
*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

## Early Teacher Reactions to Incentive Pay

This survey also provides a platform to learn whether and how teachers adapted their teaching practices and behaviors during the early implementation months of GEEG. Using a series of open-ended response questions, we asked teachers to explain how they might be changing the following practices.

- Classroom instruction
- Data-driven decision making
- Collaborative activities with colleagues
- Professional development
- Parent involvement

For each of these categories, evaluators coded teachers' open-ended responses to determine any noteworthy trends among respondents. The following tables provide an overview of teachers' most frequently reported answers. Each table provides the percentage of teachers whose responses either agreed or disagreed with the categories describing professional practice.[43]

[43] Invalid responses are those that were indecipherable or entirely unrelated to the question at hand.

**Classroom Instruction.** The majority of teachers indicated making conscious efforts to adapt their classroom instruction in light of GEEG. As is evident in Table 5.11, only 22.6% of teachers explicitly indicated that they were not changing their instructional practice. Over 53% described specific ways in which they were making adaptations; the most frequently occurring were adaptations to pedagogy, such as using more hands-on activities and group work.

**Table 5.11: Most Frequently Occurring Responses to GEEG, Classroom Instruction**

| Teacher reports … | Agree | Disagree | Invalid Response | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No change in classroom instruction | 22.6% | 51.6% | 25.9% | 1,645 |
| Increase in either the amount of assessments conducted in classroom or that instruction is geared more toward preparing students for the state year-end test (TAKS) | 8.6% | 65.5% | 25.9% | 1,645 |
| Classroom instruction is more focused on the state standards (TEKS) | 4.6% | 69.5% | 25.9% | 1,645 |
| Change in their pedagogy in response to the incentive, e.g., using more hands-on activities, using more group work, using technology differently, etc. | 26.5% | 47.4% | 25.9% | 1,645 |
| Increase in effort in response to the incentive | 4.9% | 69.2% | 25.9% | 1,645 |
| Response does not fit into one of the above categories. | 8.6% | 65.4% | 25.9% | 1,645 |

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because results are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a single teacher may have reported an answer that falls within more than one response category).
*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

One teacher's explanation of his/her changes to instruction represented the essence of these findings:

> I have grouped my students by areas of strengths and weaknesses. It has helped me to target those that are below expectations. I have also used manipulative games to emphasize learning and reinforce new concepts. The neediest group is with me all the time. I target the ones who are having difficulty understanding the skill. I work with them on a one-to-one basis during recess, my conference time, migrant tutorial, Saturday tutorial, or intervention time.

Not all teachers adapted their classroom instruction in response to GEEG. Some teachers believed that they were already inclined to teach to the best of their ability, and therefore, would be advancing their classroom instruction with or without GEEG. As one teacher explained,

> My primary focus is, and always will be, the academic advancement of my students. The incentive is a nice thought, but it does not motivate me; my kids motivate me.

**Data-Driven Decision Making.** The majority of teachers (64.6%) described evolving their practices related to data-driven decision making, while less than 13% indicated no change due to GEEG implementation. Of those changing their practices related to data-driven decision making, the most commonly reported strategy was using data to make changes to their classroom subject matter.

**Table 5.12: Most Frequently Occurring Responses to GEEG, Data-Driven Decision Making**

| Teacher reports … | Agree | Disagree | Invalid Response | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No change in data-driven decision making | 12.8% | 62.6% | 24.6% | 1,645 |
| Use of achievement data in order to make changes in classroom subject matter, e.g., identifying class strengths and weaknesses, re-teaching certain topics, choosing future lessons, etc. | 22.2% | 53.3% | 24.6% | 1,645 |
| Use of achievement data to change the way they addressed individuals in their classroom, e.g., identifying students for additional help, arranging student in groups, etc. | 11.2% | 64.3% | 24.6% | 1,645 |
| Response does not fit into one of the above categories. | 31.2% | 44.3% | 24.6% | 1,645 |

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because results are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a single teacher may have reported an answer that falls within more than one response category).
*Note:* Due to the high percentage of teacher responses falling within the final category, evaluators plan to revisit the open-ended responses to identify any other trends that may exist.
*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

One teacher explained, "I more closely review past performance by students on TAKS to identify those in need of one-on-one assistance"; another mentioned incorporating more assessments that are closely aligned with classroom instruction and provide more immediate feedback on levels of student mastery.

Other teachers (12.8%) explained that they were not consciously changing their practices in light of GEEG; rather, they continued the use of data-driven decision making strategies that they always enact. As one respondent wrote,

> I was already doing this prior to the grant and am continuing to do this. It is just what we do here. We base our teaching on [student] master learning. We continue to address weaknesses or areas that need improvement on a daily basis.

**Collaborative Activities With Colleagues.** Only slightly more than 10% of teachers reported no change to their collaborative activities with colleagues in response to GEEG. Over two-thirds (67.6%) indicated that they are making adaptations, the most frequently occurring practices being informally and formally meeting with colleagues, whether to share resources or meet as grade- or department-level teams. Table 5.13 provides a breakdown of these responses.

**Table 5.13: Most Frequently Occurring Responses to GEEG, Collaborative Activities with Colleagues**

| Teacher reports … | Agree | Disagree | Invalid Response | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No change in collaborative activities | 11.6% | 63.1% | 25.4% | 1,645 |
| Involvement in curricular alignment and/or planning with colleagues | 6.0% | 68.6% | 25.4% | 1,645 |
| Attending meetings with colleagues, including team, grade, and department level | 18.0% | 56.7% | 25.4% | 1,645 |
| More collaboration within the classroom, e.g., observations, walk-throughs, and team teaching | 1.8% | 72.8% | 25.4% | 1,645 |
| Informally collaborating with other individuals through discussions or sharing of resources and/or materials | 21.4% | 53.3% | 25.4% | 1,645 |
| Response does not fit into one of the above categories | 20.4% | 54.3% | 25.4% | 1,645 |

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because results are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a single teacher may have reported an answer that falls within more than one response category).
*Note:* Due to the high percentage of teacher responses falling within the final category, evaluators plan to revisit the open-ended responses to identify any other trends that may exist.
*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

One teacher summed up the nature of these activities, saying,

> We observe each other to share our best practices and gain ideas to incorporate into our classroom. We plan lessons and attend professional development together to help improve our classroom practices and student achievement.

Still other teachers (11.6%) expressed the recurring theme that their practices are not changing. They explained that collaborative practices were already the norm in their schools, with some even attributing their GEEG awards to their colleagues' pre-existing commitment to collaboration. As one teacher noted,

> We worked as a grade level very extensively. Hence, the reason why my grade level received roughly the same bonus as opposed to other grades where there were great differences in the amount received.

**Professional Development.** Nearly two-thirds of teachers (64.4%) indicated some change in their participation in professional development. The most common response was that teachers were attending more professional development opportunities; however, there was little clarity in regard to the nature of these professional development experiences and how they might be evolving in light of GEEG. Some teachers emphasized their intention to attend requisite numbers of professional development hours, including training in specific subject areas. Unfortunately, few other details could be garnered from teacher responses to understand how the quality of professional development might be changing.

**Table 5.14: Most Frequently Occurring Responses to GEEG, Professional Development**

| Teacher reports … | Agree | Disagree | Invalid Response | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No change in professional development attendance | 9.0% | 64.5% | 26.5% | 1,645 |
| Attending professional development more frequently | 15.3% | 58.3% | 26.5% | 1,645 |
| Seeking specific types of professional development to attend | 8.8% | 65.1% | 26.5% | 1,645 |
| Response does not fit into one of the above categories | 40.3% | 33.4% | 26.5% | 1,645 |

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because results are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a single teacher may have reported an answer that falls within more than one response category).
*Note:* Due to the high percentage of teacher responses falling within the final category, evaluators plan to revisit the open-ended responses to identify any other trends that may exist.
*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

As expected, a number of teachers (9.0%) insisted that they are not changing their involvement in professional development due to GEEG. As one said, "Before the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant, I attended professional development sessions; as long as I [am a] teacher I will attend such sessions."

**Working with Parents.** Although some teachers explained changing practices to involve parents in student learning, others expressed doubt about the usefulness of such efforts. Of the 61% of teachers who indicated an adaptation to their practice, the most frequent response mentioned by 16.8% of teachers was communicating with parents more often.

**Table 5.15: Most Frequently Occurring Responses to GEEG, Working With Parents**

| Teacher reports … | Agree | Disagree | Invalid Response | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| No change in the way they work with parents | 13.4% | 60.1% | 26.6% | 1,645 |
| More frequently bringing parents into school for conferences, activities, etc. | 5.9% | 67.5% | 26.6% | 1,645 |
| Communicating with parents more frequently through phone calls, notes, e-mails, etc. | 16.8% | 56.6% | 26.6% | 1,645 |
| Assigning projects and activities to students that require them to interact with their parents at home | 2.3% | 71.1% | 26.6% | 1,645 |
| Response does not fit into one of the above categories | 36.0% | 37.4% | 26.6% | 1,645 |

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because results are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a single teacher may have reported an answer that falls within more than one response category).
*Note:* Due to the high percentage of teacher responses falling within the final category, evaluators plan to revisit the open-ended responses to identify any other trends that may exist.
*Source*: Results come from a survey administered to full-time instructional personnel in 74 GEEG schools during January 2007.

As one teacher explained,

> Our campus has made a great effort to involve the parents. We have meet the teacher night, parent meetings, parent phone calls, and home visits made to keep our parents informed of what is occurring at the school. I have called parents and sent letters home to explain progress or lack of progress. I have also called parents to inform them of the need to attend TAKS tutorials on Saturday.

Just over 13% of teachers indicated not changing parent involvement strategies – some because they already practiced such efforts regardless of GEEG, others because they doubted the usefulness of parent involvement as a worthwhile activity. For example, one teacher commented,

> For the type of students we have, I would venture to say that the majority of them have attained a higher level of academic achievement than their parents. Consequently, it does not do much good to try to work with the parents to help the students.

Overall, this teacher survey suggests that GEEG was inciting variable changes in teachers' professional practice early in the first year of program implementation. Some teachers appeared motivated to adapt their strategies in light of the grant, while others were not making such changes. However, of that latter group, it is evident that some upheld the opinion that any change in practice was the result of self-motivation and the usual adaptations made in the field of teaching, regardless of the grant's existence.

## Teacher Reactions to GEEG, Year 1

### Survey Methodology and Sample

GEEG teachers were given an online survey in the spring of 2007 to again evaluate their attitudes about and reactions to GEEG programs. The survey was administered to full-time instructional personnel at 99 GEEG schools that were approved at that time.[44] Teachers were given four weeks to respond, and all responses were anonymous.

Again, this online survey is not without its limitations. As discussed previously in regard to the mid-year teacher survey, this survey approach cannot ensure a sample of respondents that are representative of all GEEG teachers. The online survey was administered to teachers in all GEEG schools, but teacher participation was voluntary and, therefore, self-selection ensued. The bias introduced by self-selection questions whether the survey respondents might be systematically different from non-respondents, which could result in survey findings that are not representative of the greater population of GEEG teachers.

Teachers at 92 schools responded, yielding an overall response rate of 80%.[45] The number of teacher responses overall was 3,099. Some of these responses were incomplete and therefore not

[44] We determined the overall teacher count at all 99 GEEG schools using the 2006 full-time equivalent teacher count. This provided an estimated eligible teacher count of 4,590.
[45] The teacher response rate when we consider only those schools that responded to the survey was nearly 85%.

used, reducing the effective number of responses to 3,032. As shown in Table 5.16 below, average response rates varied by the size of GEEG-eligible teaching staff at the 92 schools.

**Table 5.16: Average Response Rates by Eligible Teachers, End-of-Year Teacher Survey**

| Eligible Teachers | Number of Schools | Average Response Rate |
|---|---|---|
| 6-20 | 19 | 94% |
| 21-40 | 37 | 99% |
| 41-60 | 24 | 70% |
| 61-80 | 13 | 70% |
| 81+ | 6 | 61% |
| **Total teachers responding** | | 3,099 |
| **Total schools responding** | | 92 |
| †**Total response rate** | | 79.3% |

*Note:* The eligible teacher count for schools is an estimate based on reported full-time equivalent teachers in 2006.

† This teacher response rate was calculated using the total full-time equivalent teacher count for all 99 GEEG schools as the denominator.

This spring survey provided 3,032 usable teacher responses to the survey. Of these, 2,295 teachers (75.7%) reported receiving an individual GEEG bonus and 737 (24.3%) said they did not. Tables 5.17, 5.19, and 5.21 provide a more detailed breakdown of teacher respondent characteristics, including their teaching experience, level of education, and salary.

Despite this limitation, analyses of survey respondents' characteristics suggest that participating teachers were quite similar to the greater population of teachers in all 99 GEEG schools. As is further described in the tables below, the similarity of respondents' characteristics to the greater population of GEEG teachers, in addition to the high survey response rate of nearly 80%, tempers the limitations prompted by self-selection.

Table 5.17 compares the years of teaching experience between teacher survey respondents and teachers in all 99 GEEG schools. The distribution of overall years teaching and years in their current school is similar. Nearly half of respondents (48.5%) and all GEEG teachers (48.2%) had been in the profession for nine years or less; while just under one-quarter of respondents (24.2%) had been in the profession for 20 or more years compared with 21.2% of all GEEG teachers.

**Table 5.17: Respondents' Years of Teaching Experience, End-of-Year Teacher Survey**

| Response Category | Overall Years Teaching | | Years Teaching at School | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Respondents | All GEEG Teachers | Respondents | All GEEG Teachers |
| Missing/Undefined | --- | 8.4% | --- | --- |
| 1 to 3 years | 18.4% | 18.9% | 35.6% | 40.5% |
| 4 to 9 years | 30.1% | 29.3% | 38.0% | 39.2% |
| 10 to 14 years | 15.6% | 13.0% | 11.5% | 10.3% |
| 15 to 19 years | 11.6% | 9.3% | 7.0% | 10.1% |
| 20 or more years | 24.2% | 21.2% | 7.9% | |

Respondents' N=3,032; all GEEG teachers' N=3,972

*Note:* PEIMS does not provide information on teacher tenure at current campus. Therefore, that variable was constructed by evaluators using an 18-year panel of data; there was not sufficient information to distinguish between ranges 15 to 19 years and 20 or more years.

*Source*: Information on respondents comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007. Information on teachers in all 99 GEEG schools comes from PEIMS 2006-07.

Table 5.18 provides an overview of respondents' teaching experience disaggregated by those teachers who received a GEEG award versus those who did not. A much larger percentage of non-recipient teachers had three or fewer years of teaching experience versus award recipients – 79% versus 22% teaching at their current school; 42% versus 11% teaching in the profession. Not surprisingly, this is mirrored in lower levels of education and pay for non-recipients, as shown in Tables 5.20 and 5.22.

**Table 5.18: Recipients' v. Non-recipients' Years of Teaching Experience, End-of-Year Teacher Survey**

| Teaching Experience | Overall Years Teaching | | Years Teaching at School | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Recipients | Non-recipients | Recipients | Non-recipients |
| Missing/Undefined | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| 1 to 3 years | 10.7% | 42.3% | 21.5% | 79.2% |
| 4 to 9 years | 32.1% | 24.1% | 46.6% | 11.4% |
| 10 to 14 years | 17.5% | 9.8% | 13.9% | 4.2% |
| 15 to 19 years | 12.8% | 7.7% | 8.6% | 2.2% |
| 20 or more years | 26.9% | 15.7% | 9.5% | 3.0% |

*Note:* Recipients' N=2,295; Non-recipients' N=737

*Source*: Information on respondents' comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007.

The distribution of education levels between survey respondents and the greater population of teachers in all 99 GEEG schools is similar, as shown in Table 5.19. The majority of respondents and all GEEG teachers held a bachelor's degree, with slightly more in the overall population doing so (79.3% versus 67.6%). The next most frequently reported level of education by respondents was a master's degree, held by nearly one-quarter of respondents (23.5%); this is similar to the 19.2% of teachers in all GEEG schools who held a master's degree.

**Table 5.19: Respondents' Level of Education, End-of-Year Survey**

| Highest Degree | Percent of Respondents | Percent of All GEEG Teachers |
|---|---|---|
| Associate | 3.5% | 0.9% |
| Bachelor's | 67.6% | 79.3% |
| Master's | 23.5% | 19.2% |
| Doctorate | 0.9% | 0.6% |
| Other | 4.6% | --- |

Respondents' N=3,032; all GEEG teachers' N=3,972

*Source*: Information on respondents comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007. Information on teachers in all 99 GEEG schools comes from PEIMS 2006-07.

When comparing the levels of education for award recipients versus non-recipients in Table 5.20, it appears that roughly two-thirds of respondents, both recipients (67%) and non-recipients (69%), held a bachelor's degree. However, slightly more non-recipients than recipients held an associate's degree, while slightly more recipients than non-recipients held a master's degree or higher.

**Table 5.20: Recipients' v. Non-recipients Level of Education, End-of-Year Teacher Survey**

| Highest Degree | Recipients | Non-recipients |
|---|---|---|
| Associate | 2.8% | 5.4% |
| Bachelor's | 67.1% | 69.1% |
| Master's | 24.5% | 20.3% |
| Doctorate | 0.7% | 1.4% |
| Other | 4.8% | 3.8% |

Recipients: N=2,295; Non-recipients: N=737

*Source*: Information on respondents comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007.

Finally, it is not surprising that with similar years of teaching experience and similar levels of education, the annual salary of teacher survey respondents closely mirrors that of teachers in all GEEG schools. As detailed in Table 5.21, the vast majority of teachers in both groups earned annual salaries ranging between $30,000 and $59,999 – 84.9% of teacher respondents and 90.8% of teachers in all GEEG schools – the most commonly reported range being $40,000 to $49,999. However, a slightly greater percentage of respondents earned salaries between $30,000 and $39,999, while a slightly greater percentage of all GEEG teachers earned between $50,000 and $59,999.

**Table 5.21: Respondents' Annual Salary, End-of-Year Teacher Survey**

| Response Category | Percent of Respondents | Percent of All GEEG Teachers |
|---|---|---|
| Missing/Undefined | --- | 0.3% |
| $20,000 to $29,999 | 9.4% | 1.1% |
| $30,000 to $39,999 | 24.6% | 17.3% |
| $40,000 to $49,999 | 43.1% | 51.4% |
| $50,000 to $59,999 | 17.2% | 22.1% |
| $60,000 to $69,999 | 5.1% | 6.9% |
| $70,000 or more | 0.6% | 1.0% |

Respondents' N=3,032; all GEEG teachers' N=3,972

*Source*: Information on respondents comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007.

Additionally, the vast majority of teachers, both recipients (86%) and non-recipients (92%), earned between $30,000 and $59,999 for their current annual salary. Table 5.22 provides an overview of teachers' current annual salaries. Recipients were less likely to earn salaries in the lowest bracket ($20,000 to $29,999), and more likely to earn salaries in the highest reported salary bracket ($60,000 to $69,999).

**Table 5.22: Recipients' v. Non-recipients' Annual Salary, End-of-Year Teacher Survey**

| Annual Salary | Recipients | Non-recipients |
|---|---|---|
| Missing/Undefined | n/a | n/a |
| $20,000 to $29,999 | 8.4% | 12.7% |
| $30,000 to $39,999 | 22.2% | 32.0% |
| $40,000 to $49,999 | 44.7% | 38.1% |
| $50,000 to $59,999 | 18.7% | 22.0% |
| $60,000 to $69,999 | 5.6% | 3.7% |
| $70,000 or more | 0.0% | 0.0% |

Recipients: N=2,295; non-recipients: N=737

*Source*: Information on respondents comes from results of GEEG teacher survey administered in January 2007.

Finally, teacher respondents reported the value of their individual GEEG award, if received at all. Table 5.23 provides a breakdown of those teacher survey responses compared to individual teacher award amounts reported, thus far, in the data upload system (as described in Chapter 3). Overall survey results indicate that 63% of recipients reported individual GEEG awards of $2,000 or less; this was less than the suggested minimum award amount of $3,000 in GEEG guidelines. Negligible percentages of recipients actually received awards approaching the suggested maximum of $10,000.

**Table 5.23: Value of Teachers' GEEG Awards**

| Value of GEEG Award | % Recipients (Reported in Survey) | % Recipients (Reported in Data Upload) |
|---|---|---|
| Missing/Undefined | n/a | n/a |
| $0 to $999 | 26.8% | 3.2% |
| $1,000 to $1,999 | 36.2% | 37.6% |
| $2,000 to $2,999 | 23.8% | 37.3% |
| $3,000 to $3,999 | 7.9% | 11.9% |
| $4,000 to $4,999 | 2.4% | 4.7% |
| $5,000 to $5,999 | 1.0% | 2.5% |
| $6,000 to $6,999 | 0.6% | 0.2% |
| $7,000 to $7,999 | 0.8% | 1.7% |
| $8,000 to $8,999 | 0.1% | 0.3% |
| $9,000 to $9,999 | 0.2% | 0.4% |
| $10,000 or more | 0.2% | 0.3% |

Survey N=2,295; data upload N=4,078

*Source:* Survey results identified in the second column come from the GEEG teacher survey administered in the spring of 2007. Results from the third column come from a data upload system administered throughout the 2006-07 school year.

Figure 5.1 provides another overview of the comparisons between teacher responses on the spring survey and the information provided by schools in the data upload system. These findings suggest that the most frequently reported teacher award amount fell in the range of $1,000 to $1,999 in both the survey results (36.2%) and data upload results (37.6%). Moreover, award amounts reported in the survey tend to be more evenly distributed around that range, with 26.8% of teachers reporting awards from $0 to $999 and 23.8% reporting awards from $2,000 to $2,999. However, data upload results more heavily favor the award range from $2,000 to $2,999 (37.3%); only 3.2% reported awards ranging from $0 to $999.[46]

**Figure 5.1: Value of Teachers' GEEG Awards, Survey v. Data Upload Results**




Survey N=2,295; data upload N=4,078
*Source:* Data come from teacher responses on a spring 2007 survey and information provided by schools in the data upload system.

Finally, respondents also reported the percentage of their time spent teaching in an out-of-field area. While the majority of recipients (72%) and non-recipients (66%) reported spending between 0 and 20% of their time teaching out of field, non-recipients reported being slightly more likely to do so.

This survey addressed several key concepts related to performance incentive programs in general and GEEG, specifically. A sample survey is provided in Appendix F and is comprised of four key components.

- The fairness and efficacy of criteria used for GEEG awards in respondent's school
- Behavior and attitudes of respondent's colleagues
- The effects of GEEG on respondent's approach to teaching and relationships with colleagues
- Parent engagement

[46] The findings from the data upload are still incomplete, as previously described in Chapter 3. Once that database is finalized, evaluators will re-run comparisons of teacher award amounts described above and in Figure 5.1.

The subsequent sections provide an overview of survey findings related to the survey's core concepts. A series of illustrative tables throughout this section describe survey results and compare responses of award recipients and non-recipients. Each table focuses on a single survey item and reports the frequency distribution for all survey respondents, those who received an individual GEEG bonus ("Recipients") and those who did not ("Non-recipients").

All of the survey responses fall within Likert scales. The mean value of the Likert scale is also reported for each survey item. Finally, evaluators conducted a chi-square test comparing the response frequencies of bonus recipients to non-recipients. If this test resulted in a "p-value" less than .05, it is assumed that the difference between the responses of recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant.[47]

Additionally, as noted previously in Table 5.18, award recipients tended to have more years of teaching experience than their counterparts who did not receive a GEEG award. Tests of significant differences between recipients and non-recipients were conducted prior to controlling for teachers' years of experience; however, evaluators do provide explanations for how controlling for that variable influences differences between these two groups of GEEG teachers.

## Teacher Attitudes Toward GEEG and Effects on the School Environment

The first set of survey items asked teacher respondents about their attitudes toward GEEG and its effects on the school environment. While opinions were by no means unanimous, an overview of these responses suggests that a majority of teachers felt favorably toward the program.

Table 5.24 displays responses to a question asking teachers the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with a series of statements about their school's GEEG program. Overall, more than half of teachers (61%) agreed with the statement that the GEEG program effectively identifies good teachers, while 77% rejected the proposition that GEEG discourages staff collaboration. Similarly, teachers soundly rejected the notion that resentment is increased due to the program. A slim majority – 56%– thought that the size of the bonus was adequate to motivate change. On the other hand, 75% indicated a strong desire to earn the bonus. Finally, 79% of teachers reported that they understand what they need to do to earn a bonus.

[47] The researchers computed a chi-square statistic to test whether the distribution of responses by category (e.g., much less than last year, much more than last year) differ between individual bonus recipients and non-recipients. An asterisk indicates that the null hypothesis of equality can be rejected at a 5 percent level of significance. The latter implies a p-value less than .05. A five percent level of significance (p-value ≤ .05) is standard in statistical evaluation or quality-control studies. Please note that results of significance tests were conducted before controlling for the influence of years of teaching experience.

**Table 5.24: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about our school's GEEG program?**

| Variable | Group | N | 1 % | 2 % | 3 % | 4 % | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Our GEEG program does a good job of distinguishing effective from ineffective teachers at the school. | All respondents | 3032 | 10.7 | 28.8 | 48.3 | 12.3 | 2.62 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 11.8 | 30.2 | 45.4 | 12.5 | 2.59 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 7.1 | 24.3 | 57.0 | 11.7 | 2.73 |
| b. The prospect that teachers at my school can earn a bonus discourages staff in the school from working together | All respondents | 3032 | 27.5 | 49.9 | 16.0 | 6.6 | 2.02 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 28.1 | 49.3 | 15.5 | 7.1 | 2.02 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 25.8 | 51.7 | 17.4 | 5.2 | 2.02 |
| c. I have noticed increased resentment among teachers since the start of our GEEG program. | All respondents | 3032 | 25.0 | 45.0 | 20.8 | 9.2 | 2.14 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 25.5 | 43.4 | 21.7 | 9.4 | 2.15 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 23.5 | 49.9 | 17.8 | 8.8 | 2.12 |
| d. I was already working as effectively as I could before the implementation of GEEG, so the program does not affect my work. | All respondents | 3032 | 3.0 | 11.8 | 44.1 | 41.2 | 3.23 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 3.2 | 11.0 | 42.8 | 43.0 | 3.26 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 2.3 | 14.2 | 47.9 | 35.5 | 3.17 |
| e. I have altered my instructional practices as a result of our GEEG program. | All respondents | 3032 | 21.5 | 51.0 | 23.1 | 4.4 | 2.10 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 23.0 | 50.2 | 22.3 | 4.6 | 2.09 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 17.1 | 53.5 | 25.6 | 3.8 | 2.16 |
| f. The size of the top GEEG bonus award at my school is large enough to motivate me to try to earn the top award | All respondents | 3032 | 13.4 | 30.6 | 41.7 | 14.3 | 2.57 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 14.6 | 30.2 | 41.0 | 14.1 | 2.55 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 9.6 | 32.0 | 43.6 | 14.8 | 2.64 |
| g. I have a strong desire to earn a GEEG bonus. | All respondents | 3032 | 5.8 | 18.8 | 48.7 | 26.6 | 2.96 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 6.2 | 18.9 | 48.2 | 26.7 | 2.95 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 4.7 | 18.7 | 50.1 | 26.5 | 2.98 |
| h. Our GEEG program does not measure important aspects of my teaching performance. | All respondents | 3032 | 7.9 | 36.6 | 39.6 | 15.9 | 2.63 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 8.4 | 35.6 | 39.3 | 16.7 | 2.64 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 6.5 | 39.6 | 40.6 | 13.3 | 2.61 |
| i. I have a clear understanding of the criteria I need to meet in order to achieve a bonus. | All respondents | 3032 | 5.1 | 15.5 | 58.6 | 20.9 | 2.95 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 4.4 | 12.8 | 60.3 | 22.5 | 3.01 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 7.2 | 23.7 | 53.2 | 15.9 | 2.78 |
| 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly Agree | | | | | | | |

*Note:* "*" indicates a p-value of < .05; that is, the difference between recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant.
*Source:* Results from the survey administered to GEEG teachers during the spring of 2007.

Interestingly, the results suggest that, on the whole, bonus non-recipients were at least as supportive of the program as recipients. For example, on the first item in Table 5.24, concerning the overall efficacy of the program, slightly more non-recipients than recipients agreed that their school's GEEG program does a good job of distinguishing between effective and ineffective teachers. Slightly more non-recipients than recipients also evaluated the program favorably. Additionally,

slightly fewer non-recipients than recipients reported that they were already working as effectively as they could. Finally, significantly more recipients than non-recipients had a clear idea of what they needed to do to earn a bonus (83% versus 69%).

The next survey question asked teachers about changes in the attitudes and behavior of their school colleagues. As shown in Table 5.25, these responses provide little evidence that GEEG has deteriorated collegiality among teachers. More than two-thirds of recipients and non-recipients rejected the idea that their colleagues were becoming more competitive since the introduction of GEEG. Nor is there any indication that they viewed their colleagues as being increasingly slack in their responsibilities toward their students. This pattern holds for bonus recipients and non-recipients.

**Table 5.25: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about teachers in your school this year (2006-07) compared to last school year (2005-06)?**

| Variable | Group | N | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | % | % | % | % | |
| a. Seem more competitive than cooperative. | All respondents | 3032 | 17.8 | 55.2 | 20.0 | 7.1 | 2.16 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 18.7 | 54.9 | 19.1 | 7.3 | 2.15 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 14.9 | 56.2 | 22.7 | 6.2 | 2.20 |
| b. The prospect that teachers at my school can earn a bonus discourages staff in the school from working together. | All respondents | 3032 | 21.0 | 58.0 | 15.7 | 5.3 | 2.05 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 22.0 | 57.5 | 15.0 | 5.6 | 2.04 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 17.9 | 59.7 | 17.8 | 4.6 | 2.09 |
| c. Feel more responsible to help each other do their best. | All respondents | 3032 | 6.0 | 26.2 | 52.8 | 15.0 | 2.77 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 6.3 | 26.7 | 51.7 | 15.3 | 2.76 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 4.9 | 24.8 | 56.4 | 13.8 | 2.79 |
| d. More often expect students to complete every assignment. | All respondents | 3032 | 3.8 | 22.9 | 57.9 | 15.4 | 2.85 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 3.7 | 24.2 | 56.5 | 15.6 | 2.84 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 3.8 | 18.9 | 62.4 | 14.9 | 2.88 |
| e. More often encourage students to keep trying even when the work is challenging. | All respondents | 3032 | 2.9 | 14.9 | 58.5 | 23.6 | 3.03 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 3.1 | 16.0 | 57.2 | 23.7 | 3.01 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 2.3 | 11.5 | 62.8 | 23.3 | 3.07 |
| f. Less often think it is important that all of their students do well in class. | All respondents | 3032 | 21.9 | 60.2 | 14.8 | 3.1 | 1.99 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 23.1 | 59.6 | 14.2 | 3.2 | 1.97 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 18.2 | 62.1 | 17.0 | 2.7 | 2.04 |
| g. Can be counted on more often to help out anywhere or anytime, even though it may not be part of their official assignment. | All respondents | 3032 | 6.8 | 23.4 | 51.9 | 18.0 | 2.81 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 7.3 | 23.9 | 51.2 | 17.6 | 2.79 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 5.0 | 21.7 | 54.1 | 19.1 | 2.87 |
| 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly Agree | | | | | | | |

*Note:* "*" indicates a p-value of < .05; that is, the difference between recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant.

*Source:* Results from the survey administered to GEEG teachers during the spring of 2007.

A third survey item, explained further in Table 5.26, asked teachers to compare the current school year (2006-07) to the prior, pre-GEEG year (2005-06). There is no indication of worsening (or improving) conditions concerning collegiality or school management.

- A slight majority (52%) felt that teachers were more satisfied.
- 61% rejected the notion that the stress levels were higher.
- 53% believed that the work environment was improving.
- Over three-quarters (78%) of teachers rejected the notion that they were increasingly considering moving to another school or district.

Interestingly, for this survey item the responses of recipient and non-recipient teachers were significantly different, with non-recipients indicating greater improvement in the work environment.

**Table 5.26: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your satisfaction with teaching this year (2006-07) compared to last year (2005-06)?**

| Variable | Group | N | 1 % | 2 % | 3 % | 4 % | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. I would describe teachers at this school as a more satisfied group than we were last school year. | All respondents | 3032 | 10.8 | 37.4 | 42.9 | 8.9 | 2.50 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 11.5 | 38.8 | 40.9 | 8.8 | 2.47 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 8.4 | 33.0 | 49.3 | 9.4 | 2.60 |
| b. The stress and disappointments involved in teaching at this school are much greater than last school year. | All respondents | 3032 | 11.8 | 49.5 | 28.2 | 10.5 | 2.37 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 11.7 | 48.5 | 28.9 | 10.9 | 2.39 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 12.2 | 52.8 | 25.9 | 9.1 | 2.32 |
| c. This year I like the way things are run at the school more than I did last year. | All respondents | 3032 | 9.2 | 37.1 | 44.7 | 9.0 | 2.54 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 10.1 | 38.0 | 43.4 | 8.5 | 2.50 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 6.2 | 34.3 | 49.0 | 10.4 | 2.64 |
| d. This year I think about transferring to another school/district more than I did last year. | All respondents | 3032 | 32.4 | 45.2 | 14.3 | 8.1 | 1.98 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 34.1 | 43.7 | 13.9 | 8.2 | 1.96 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 27.1 | 49.7 | 15.5 | 7.7 | 2.04 |
| 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, 4 = Strongly Agree | | | | | | | |

*Note:* "*" indicates a p-value of < .05; that is, the difference between recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant.
*Source:* Results from the survey administered to GEEG teachers during the spring of 2007.

## GEEG and Teacher Instructional Practices

The spring survey also probed the instructional practices of teachers, focusing on some practices that may be important in helping students meet state educational standards. For each practice identified in Table 5.27, bonus recipients were more likely to report that they engaged in the behavior, although the differences were not always statistically significant. Individual bonus recipients were significantly more likely than non-recipients to respond that they tailor classroom lessons to meet specific curricular standards and differentiate assignments or lessons based on student performance levels.

**Table 5.27: How often do you engage in the following activities as part of your classroom instruction?**

| Variable | Group | N | 1 % | 2 % | 3 % | 4 % | 5 % | 6 % | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. I analyze students' work to identify the curricular standards that students have or have not met | All respondents | 3032 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 4.5 | 14.1 | 33.4 | 44.6 | 5.09 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 2.2 | 1.2 | 4.6 | 13.7 | 32.3 | 46.0 | 5.11 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 2.4 | 0.7 | 4.2 | 15.3 | 36.9 | 40.4 | 5.05 |
| b. I follow a "pacing plan" provided by the school or district to schedule my instructional content. | All respondents | 3032 | 6.6 | 1.5 | 2.4 | 7.6 | 22.3 | 59.6 | 5.16 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 6.4 | 1.6 | 2.1 | 7.4 | 21.2 | 61.3 | 5.19 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 7.1 | 1.1 | 3.3 | 8.4 | 25.8 | 54.4 | 5.08 |
| c. I design my classroom lessons to be aligned with specific curricular standards. | All respondents | 3032 | 2.3 | 0.6 | 1.3 | 3.7 | 20.4 | 71.7 | 5.54 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 3.4 | 19.6 | 73.2 | 5.57 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 2.4 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 4.9 | 23.1 | 67.0 | 5.46 |
| d. I plan different assignments or lessons for groups of students based on their performance. | All respondents | 3032 | 3.8 | 0.7 | 1.8 | 7.2 | 34.1 | 52.3 | 5.24 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 3.6 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 7.1 | 33.0 | 54.2 | 5.28 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 4.5 | 0.9 | 2.7 | 7.6 | 37.7 | 46.5 | 5.13 |
| e. I have students help other students learn class content (e.g., peer tutoring). | All respondents | 3032 | 3.1 | 0.6 | 1.5 | 6.8 | 29.1 | 58.9 | 5.35 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 3.2 | 0.5 | 1.4 | 6.7 | 28.9 | 59.3 | 5.35 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 2.8 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 7.2 | 29.7 | 57.7 | 5.33 |
| 1=Never, 2=Once or twice a year, 3=Once or twice a semester, 4=Once or twice a month, 5=Once or twice a week, 6=Almost daily | | | | | | | | | |

*Note:* "*" indicates a p-value of < .05; that is, the difference between recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant.
*Source:* Results from the survey administered to GEEG teachers during the spring of 2007.

It was previously noted that individual bonus recipients were much less likely to be new teachers (i.e., teachers with three or fewer years of full-time teaching experience). It may be the case that the differences in teaching practices identified in Table 5.27 are more a reflection of teaching experience than an effect of the GEEG program. Evaluators used regression models to account for teachers' years of experience, and after controlling for that variable, statistically significant differences between recipients and non-recipients persisted on those items. In other words, the differences in teaching practices were not due to differences in teaching experience.

In order to learn even more about the nature of teachers' instructional practice in GEEG schools, another set of survey items asked about changes in the respondent's instructional practice after GEEG implementation. Table 5.28 illustrates two interesting patterns. First, sizable percentages of teachers were changing their instructional practice along many of the dimensions identified. For example:

- 52% reported greater effort aligning classroom instruction to curricular standards.
- Nearly 40% reported attending more professional development workshops.
- 42% reported spending more time reviewing test results with other teachers.

**Table 5.28: How have you changed your teaching practices this year (2006-07) compared to last year (2005-06)?**

| Variable | Group | N | 1 % | 2 % | 3 % | 4 % | 5 % | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Aligning my classroom instruction with curricular standard. | All respondents | 3032 | 1.3 | 1.3 | 45.5 | 29.0 | 23.0 | 3.71 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 47.5 | 29.6 | 20.6 | 3.67 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 39.3 | 27.0 | 30.4 | 3.83 |
| b. Focusing on the classroom content covered by standardized achievement tests. | All respondents | 3032 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 48.5 | 28.2 | 20.1 | 3.64 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 50.2 | 28.7 | 18.3 | 3.61 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 1.6 | 2.6 | 43.3 | 26.7 | 25.8 | 3.72 |
| c. Administering benchmark assessments or quizzes. | All respondents | 3032 | 1.7 | 2.5 | 50.8 | 23.8 | 21.1 | 3.60 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 52.9 | 23.4 | 19.6 | 3.57 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 1.5 | 3.0 | 44.4 | 25.2 | 25.9 | 3.71 |
| d. Re-teaching topics or skills based on students' performance on classroom tests. | All respondents | 3032 | 1.2 | 1.2 | 44.4 | 32.0 | 21.2 | 3.71 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 45.8 | 32.2 | 19.7 | 3.68 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 1.1 | 1.6 | 39.8 | 31.5 | 26.1 | 3.80 |
| e. Reviewing student test results with other teachers. | All respondents | 3032 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 52.1 | 25.2 | 16.6 | 3.49 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 53.7 | 25.5 | 15.2 | 3.48 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 3.9 | 3.7 | 47.2 | 24.3 | 20.9 | 3.55 |
| f. Seeking help from/providing help to other teachers informally. | All respondents | 3032 | 1.8 | 2.6 | 46.1 | 30.3 | 19.1 | 3.62 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 48.1 | 30.0 | 17.8 | 3.60 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 1.9 | 3.5 | 40.0 | 31.3 | 23.2 | 3.70 |
| g. Attending district- or school-sponsored professional development workshops. | All respondents | 3032 | 3.5 | 5.3 | 52.3 | 21.9 | 17.0 | 3.44 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 3.4 | 5.3 | 54.9 | 21.3 | 15.2 | 3.40 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 3.9 | 5.3 | 44.4 | 23.9 | 22.5 | 3.56 |
| h. Engaging in informal self-directed learning (e.g., reading subject-specific education research, using the Internet to enrich knowledge and skills). | All respondents | 3032 | 1.5 | 2.4 | 46.3 | 29.9 | 19.9 | 3.64 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 48.8 | 29.4 | 18.1 | 3.60 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 2.0 | 2.0 | 38.8 | 31.5 | 25.6 | 3.77 |
| i. Tutoring individuals or small groups of students outside of class time. | All respondents | 3032 | 2.8 | 2.5 | 44.7 | 25.9 | 24.0 | 3.66 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 46.4 | 26.0 | 22.3 | 3.63 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 3.4 | 2.3 | 39.3 | 25.5 | 29.4 | 3.75 |
| 1 = Much less than last year, 2 = A little less than last year, 3 = The same as last year, 4 = A little more than last year, 5 = Much more than last year | | | | | | | | |

*Note:* "*" indicates a p-value of < .05; that is, the difference between recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant.
*Source:* Results from the survey administered to GEEG teachers during the spring of 2007.

The second noteworthy finding evident in Table 5.28 is that these shifts in effort tend to be more pronounced among the non-recipients. To take a single example, 30% of non-recipients reported much more effort to align classroom instruction to a curricular standard during the 2006-07 school year compared to the previous school year; just 21% of recipients reported so. Most of these

differences remained statistically significant even after controlling for whether the teacher was new to the profession.

## Teacher Use of Assessment Results and Parent Engagement Practices

The next survey item probed teachers' use of test score data in their instructional strategies. A clear pattern emerges in Table 5.29. Individual bonus recipients seemed to make much greater use of test data when making instructional decisions than do non-recipients. Teachers who received individual bonuses were significantly more likely to report that they use test score data to do the following.

- Identify students needing remedial help
- Set learning goals for students
- Tailor instruction to student needs
- Develop recommendations for tutoring
- Reassign students
- Adjust curriculum

However, much of this appears to be associated with teaching experience. When controlling for whether the teacher was new to the profession, none of these recipient versus non-recipient differences retained statistical significance at conventional levels. That is, differences in teacher practice can be explained by differences in levels of teacher experience.

**Table 5.29: To what extent do you use student test score data for each of the following purposes?**

| Variable | Group | N | 1 % | 2 % | 3 % | 4 % | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Identify individual students who need remedial assistance. | All respondents | 3032 | 2.4 | 10.4 | 41.0 | 46.2 | 3.31 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 2.2 | 10.2 | 39.5 | 48.1 | 3.34 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 3.1 | 10.9 | 45.9 | 40.2 | 3.23 |
| b. Set learning goals for individual students | All respondents | 3032 | 2.3 | 13.1 | 41.6 | 43.0 | 3.25 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 2.3 | 12.3 | 40.7 | 44.7 | 3.28 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 2.3 | 15.7 | 44.5 | 37.4 | 3.17 |
| c. Tailor instruction to individual students' needs. | All respondents | 3032 | 2.0 | 11.7 | 40.5 | 45.8 | 3.30 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 2.0 | 11.5 | 39.3 | 47.1 | 3.32 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 1.9 | 12.5 | 44.0 | 41.7 | 3.25 |
| d. Develop recommendations for tutoring or other educational services for students. | All respondents | 3032 | 3.9 | 14.4 | 39.6 | 42.1 | 3.20 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 3.7 | 13.6 | 39.3 | 43.5 | 3.23 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 4.5 | 17.0 | 40.8 | 37.7 | 3.12 |
| e. Assign or reassign students to groups. | All respondents | 3032 | 4.5 | 16.1 | 40.4 | 39.0 | 3.14 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 4.5 | 15.9 | 39.2 | 40.4 | 3.15 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 4.2 | 16.8 | 44.2 | 34.7 | 3.10 |
| f. Identify and correct gaps in the curriculum for all students. | All respondents | 3032 | 3.9 | 15.0 | 45.0 | 36.1 | 3.13 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 3.8 | 14.6 | 44.4 | 37.3 | 3.15 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 4.1 | 16.3 | 47.1 | 32.6 | 3.08 |
| g. Target parent involvement in student learning. | All respondents | 3032 | 7.5 | 26.7 | 37.1 | 28.7 | 2.87 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 7.6 | 25.8 | 37.0 | 29.5 | 2.88 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 6.9 | 29.4 | 37.4 | 26.2 | 2.83 |
| h. Identify areas where I need to strengthen my content knowledge or teaching skills. | All respondents | 3032 | 2.4 | 12.0 | 44.7 | 40.9 | 3.24 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 2.1 | 12.8 | 44.1 | 41.0 | 3.24 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 3.1 | 9.4 | 46.8 | 40.7 | 3.25 |
| i. Determine areas where I need professional development. | All respondents | 3032 | 3.1 | 18.5 | 42.5 | 35.9 | 3.11 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 3.1 | 19.2 | 41.8 | 35.9 | 3.11 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 3.3 | 16.3 | 44.8 | 35.7 | 3.13 |
| 1 = Never or almost never, 2 = Occasionally, 3 = Frequently, 4 = Always or almost always | | | | | | | |

*Note:* "*" indicates a p-value of < .05; that is, the difference between recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant.
*Source:* Results from the survey administered to GEEG teachers during the spring of 2007.

The final survey item, explained in more detail in Table 5.30, focused on parental engagement. It shows that individual bonus recipients tend to encourage parental involvement more than non-recipients. This includes strategies such as:

- Having parents sign off on homework

- Engaging parents in the homework
- Sending home models of student work
- Contacting parents when students have difficulties
- Inviting parents to the school and classroom

When controlling for teachers' years in the profession, a few items – namely engaging parents in homework and contacting parents when students have difficulties – remained statistically significant favoring bonus recipients.

**Table 5.30: How often do you engage in each of the following activities involving students' parents (or guardians)?**

| Variable | Group | N | 1 % | 2 % | 3 % | 4 % | Mean |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. I require students to have their parents sign off on homework. | All respondents | 3032 | 29.0 | 29.7 | 20.2 | 21.1 | 2.33 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 27.8 | 29.9 | 20.4 | 21.9 | 2.37 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 32.7 | 29.3 | 19.4 | 18.6 | 2.24 |
| b. I assign homework that requires direct parent involvement or participation. | All respondents | 3032 | 27.0 | 35.8 | 22.5 | 14.7 | 2.25 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 26.3 | 35.5 | 22.7 | 15.5 | 2.27 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 29.3 | 36.9 | 21.7 | 12.1 | 2.17 |
| c. I send home examples of excellent student work to serve as models. | All respondents | 3032 | 31.6 | 31.2 | 24.0 | 13.3 | 2.19 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 31.1 | 31.0 | 24.1 | 13.8 | 2.21 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 33.1 | 31.8 | 23.6 | 11.5 | 2.14 |
| d. For those students who are having academic problems, I try to make direct contact with their parents. | All respondents | 3032 | 4.0 | 16.6 | 36.5 | 42.9 | 3.18 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 3.6 | 15.9 | 36.1 | 44.4 | 3.21 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 5.3 | 18.7 | 38.0 | 38.0 | 3.09 |
| e. For those students whose academic performance improves, I send messages home to parents. | All respondents | 3032 | 9.0 | 28.2 | 35.5 | 27.3 | 2.81 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 8.9 | 28.1 | 35.5 | 27.5 | 2.82 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 9.5 | 28.4 | 35.4 | 26.7 | 2.79 |
| f. I invite parents to visit or observe my classroom. | All respondents | 3032 | 15.4 | 34.7 | 27.5 | 22.4 | 2.57 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 14.7 | 34.6 | 27.8 | 22.9 | 2.59 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 17.6 | 35.1 | 26.3 | 20.9 | 2.50 |
| g. I encourage parents to volunteer in the school. | All respondents | 3032 | 19.9 | 31.5 | 27.9 | 20.7 | 2.50 |
| | *Recipients | 2295 | 19.1 | 31.5 | 27.6 | 21.8 | 2.52 |
| | *Non-recipients | 737 | 22.3 | 31.6 | 28.9 | 17.2 | 2.41 |
| h. I help engage parents in site-based decision-making and advisory groups. | All respondents | 3032 | 37.3 | 31.5 | 19.9 | 11.3 | 2.05 |
| | Recipients | 2295 | 37.1 | 31.6 | 19.7 | 11.5 | 2.06 |
| | Non-recipients | 737 | 37.7 | 31.2 | 20.5 | 10.6 | 2.04 |
| 1 = Much less than last year, 2 = A little less than last year, 3 = The same as last year, 4 = A little more than last year, 5 = Much more than last year | | | | | | | |

*Note:* "*" indicates a p-value of < .05; that is, the difference between recipients and non-recipients is statistically significant.

*Source:* Results from the survey administered to GEEG teachers during the spring of 2007.

## Discussion of Teacher Survey Results

Overall findings from both teacher surveys suggest that the GEEG program was working as intended during its first year of implementation (2006-07). In the spring 2007 survey, the majority of teachers viewed GEEG favorably. This holds for both bonus recipients and non-recipients. In fact, non-recipients were slightly more supportive of GEEG. Additionally, roughly three-quarters of both bonus recipients and non-recipients indicated a strong desire to earn the bonuses.

These findings coincide with results from the GEEG teacher survey administered earlier in the school year (January 2007). Specifically, teachers were in agreement that GEEG was fair to teachers (66.0%) and was having a beneficial effect at the school (66.8%). Moreover, 58.7 % disagreed that the GEEG program was having detrimental effects at the school.

Additionally, the GEEG program seemed to be influencing instructional practice during its first year. In both the mid-year and spring teacher surveys, it was evident that a significant percentage of teachers were adapting their professional practice. Additionally, according to the findings from the spring survey, teachers who received GEEG bonuses tended to make greater use of instructional methods that are considered more effective, and to more often employ data-driven practices as compared to non-recipients. However, non-recipients appeared to be making greater changes to their instructional practice during the 2006-07 school year, as compared to the previous school year (2005-06).

Overall, large percentages of bonus recipients and non-recipients were shifting toward instructional practices considered more effective. Some of these findings may be attributable to the fact that the non-recipients were more likely to be inexperienced teachers. However, the same general patterns between recipients and non-recipients of GEEG awards were often observed after controlling for teachers' years of experience in the profession, although the differences frequently became statistically insignificant.

Interestingly, results from the January 2007 teacher survey also suggested that some teachers had been changing their practices related to classroom instruction, data-driven decision making, collegial collaboration, professional development, and parent engagement. However, a notable percentage of teacher respondents (at least 10% for each category of practice stated above) indicated that they had made no change in their behavior. Similar findings did not seem evident in the later teacher survey administered in the spring of 2007, perhaps suggesting that teachers took some time in adjusting to the incentive programs at their respective schools.

Thus far, there seemed to be no discernable negative effects on morale or teamwork, and teachers appeared to be maintaining a positive view of the GEEG program and its impact on teacher morale. Additionally, survey findings suggested that teachers' professional practice had changed in positive ways since the inception of GEEG. It is too soon to attribute these changes in organizational dynamics and teacher behavior to the GEEG program; however, it certainly raises interest in uncovering the explanations for these trends. These new questions will inform future evaluative efforts.

## Implications for Future Evaluation Initiatives

Over the next two years, evaluation initiatives will continue to refine an understanding of GEEG programs' impact on organizational dynamics and teacher behavior. Such discoveries are highly relevant to other outcomes of teacher quality and student achievement, which will become a greater focus during future evaluation efforts.

Specifically, evaluators will address the following questions as they move forward in the study of GEEG's impact on schools.

- Does the impact of schools' GEEG programs change over time; that is, are there differential effects on organizational dynamics and teacher behavior over time?
- Similarly, does the impact of performance incentive programs on award recipients versus non-recipients change over the course of the three-year GEEG program?
- Are different program components (i.e., program focus on student performance, unit of accountability, and rigor of award distribution) related to various outcomes for organizational dynamics and teacher behavior?

## Chapter Summary

This chapter provides an overview of first-year findings of the impact that GEEG programs were having on organizational dynamics and teacher behavior. Overall, it appeared that teachers felt favorably toward their schools' programs and performance incentive programs were not deteriorating collaboration among teaching staff.

Additionally, it was clear from both survey results that many teachers were changing their instructional practices in desirable ways since the inception of GEEG. All teachers, especially award recipients, tended to use practices that are considered to have a positive influence on student achievement. These survey findings, while not yet conclusive about the impact of GEEG on teacher behavior, do suggest that the programs are, at the very least, not having a detrimental impact on instructional quality in schools.

# CHAPTER 6
# DISCUSSION AND NEXT STEPS FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the findings gleaned from the first year evaluation of the GEEG program. Moreover, it synthesizes the noteworthy trends to better identify the impact GEEG has had on participating schools and teachers during its first year of implementation. This discussion is nested within a body of scholarly work that explicates the traditional camps that speak for and against performance incentive pay policy. Overall, this chapter informs policymakers, the research community, and educators about the ways in which the GEEG program appears to be confirming – or refuting – those traditional arguments.

## Key Policy Points

This chapter highlights and expands upon the following key policy points.

- Traditional arguments against performance incentives are nested within critiques that programs will use unreliable measures of teacher performance, deteriorate collaboration among teaching staff, and encourage teachers to limit the use of quality instructional practice.
- Proponents of performance incentives typically argue that programs will provide an impetus to motivate high-quality teacher practices, improve the overall productivity of teaching staff through a selection effect, and better align teacher remuneration with an outcomes-based approach.
- Overall, findings from the first-year evaluation of GEEG abate the traditional critiques raised against performance incentive programs; specifically, teachers seemed to feel favorably toward the programs, collaboration among teaching staff was not dwindling, and desirable instructional practices were common among recipients and non-recipients of GEEG awards.

## Overview

This chapter addresses the following questions.

- What are the theoretical arguments for and against performance incentive programs, and how do the first-year evaluation findings of GEEG inform that debate?
- What can be learned about the design of GEEG programs from the first-year evaluation findings?
- What can be gleaned from the first-year evaluation about the impact of GEEG on organizational dynamics and teacher behavior?

## Discussion of Findings from Year 1 Evaluation of GEEG

As noted earlier, following the influential *A Nation at Risk* report in 1983, a number of school districts experimented with performance incentive pay programs as a means to improve student outcomes and reform the single salary schedule. Research on these programs highlighted the difficulty inherent in creating a reliable process for identifying teachers, measuring a teacher's value-added contribution, eliminating unprofessional preferential treatment during evaluation processes, and standardizing assessment systems across schools (for example, Hatry, Greiner, & Ashford, 1994; Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Criticisms stemming from these generally short-lived programs have since stigmatized more recent attempts to devise and implement performance-related pay programs, claiming further that teachers do not support performance-based pay policy (Darling-Hammond & Barnett, 1988; Murnane & Cohen, 1986).

Such critiques undoubtedly shadow the performance-related pay programs comprising the Governor's Educator Excellence Grants. Policymakers, the research community, and educators will be interested in knowing how the GEEG program holds up against these well-known arguments. It is, therefore, imperative to understand the first-year evaluation findings in light of these traditional theoretical positions. This section provides a more comprehensive overview of the theoretical arguments for and against performance-related pay policy, before proceeding with a comprehensive review of evaluation findings for the first GEEG program year.

### Theoretical Arguments Against Performance Incentive Pay Programs

Murnane and Cohen (1986) offer one of the more influential critiques of performance-based pay policy. Drawing on personnel economics literature, they argued that performance-base pay plans of recent decades failed because teaching is not a field that lends itself to performance-related compensation, a perspective that Goldhaber, Hyung, DeArmond, and Player (2005) recently termed the "nature of teaching" hypothesis.

**Performance Monitoring.** A major argument against performance-based pay programs concerns the difficulty in monitoring teacher performance. According to Murnane and Cohen, teacher performance is more difficult to monitor than performance in many other professions because output is not readily measured in a reliable, valid, and fair manner. Unlike, say, the sales of a salesman or the billable hours of a doctor or lawyer, the output of a teacher is not marketed. Thus, it is argued that the education sector cannot readily measure the value of the services provided by an individual teacher or group of teachers, since achievement is influenced by many factors beyond the instructor's control.

While this argument no doubt had merit at the time, its relevance may be waning given the major advances in data systems being put in place in states and districts. States and districts are rapidly developing massive longitudinal student-level databases that permit more precise estimation of value-added contribution at the building, grade, and, in a growing number of states, teacher level. Furthermore, the U.S. Department of Education recently created a competitive grant program to encourage states to develop longitudinal data systems that support value-added measurement. As data and measurement systems grow in sophistication, the measurement of teacher and school performance will likely become considerably more reliable.

In spite of these technological advances, to the extent that these new performance-based pay programs rely on estimates of teacher value added, it is important to note that there are still concerns about the statistical reliability and robustness of these value-added estimates, as well as the ability of schools to employ such sophisticated analyses. Some researchers express caution in interpreting teacher effects purely as an attribute of the teacher without consideration of the school context and the stability of these measures over time (Ballou, 2005; Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; Koedel & Betts, 2005; McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, & Hamilton, 2003; McCaffrey et al, 2004).

**Team Production.** To a considerable extent, teachers work as members of a team. Introduction of performance-based rewards at the individual teacher level might reduce incentives for teachers to cooperate and, as a consequence, reduce rather than increase school performance. Some scholarship argues that the team dynamic can be destroyed between teachers as well as between teachers and administrators, especially if administrators are put in a position of rewarding individual teacher performance (Murnane & Cohen, 1986).

Of course, this is a criticism of individual performance-based pay programs. A performance bonus given to an entire team of teachers would, theoretically, not undermine team morale. This is especially germane considering most teachers work in relatively small teams, and economic literature suggests team incentives may work quite well in small teams because there is mutual monitoring coupled with an easy information flow among team members and options for subjects to reciprocate among each other within the team (Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Vyrastekova, Onderstal, & Koning, 2006).

**The Multitasking Problem.** Another theoretical criticism of performance-based pay programs is the literature on the issue of multitasking when relying on tests or other quantitative measures of teacher performance (for example, Dixit, 2002; Hannaway, 1992; Holmstrom & Migrom, 1991). This problem arises when the performance of a worker has multiple dimensions, only some of which are measured and incentivized. When there is structural misalignment between an organization's overall mission and the activity to which incentives are attached, not surprisingly, employees tend to shift work toward the metered, rewarded activity, and away from other important activities.

An important concern in this regard is "teaching to the test" – an education catch phrase used to describe narrowing of curriculum in an effort to evaluate student test scores that was first used to critique performance contracting in education during the 1960s. Teachers' contributions to student learning are multifaceted; however, if an inordinate amount of weight is placed on student assessments, then other valuable activities might be slighted. In the general personnel literature, the solution to the multitasking problem is to diversify the measures used to evaluate performance, such as supervisor evaluations or other broad-based assessments to complement quantitative measures.

## Theoretical Arguments for Performance-Related Pay Programs

Edward Lazear, a major contributor to the "new personnel economics" literature, provides a useful conceptualization of the performance-based pay problem in K-12 education, and assesses the economics of alternative teacher compensation strategies, which he terms payment for input and payment for output (Lazear, 2003). In the absence of externalities or information problems, payment for output always trumps payment for input in terms of raising overall productivity. Two principle reasons – hiring practices and labor market selection – are discussed below.

**Hiring Practices.** District and building administrators are restricted by informational deficiencies when hiring teachers and other instructional staff. This necessitates that principals use noisy signals of "true" teacher effectiveness (e.g., years of experience, highest degree held, past employer recommendations). Informational deficiencies in the hiring process are ameliorated in most professions by subsequent employee performance assessments and as pay raises become more closely tied to actual productivity, thereby lessening dependence on input-based indicators for employees (Altonji & Pierret, 1996).

Of course, the single salary schedule, along with teacher tenure, makes it difficult for pay and performance to align after hire. For example, if only effective teachers have their contracts renewed, then pay on the basis of seniority would tend to align pay and performance. While such a mechanism may work in the first probationary years of teacher employment, after teachers earn tenure, contract non-renewal can only be triggered by severe malfeasance on the part of the employee.

**Labor Market Selection.** Lazear also discerned a more subtle, but important, factor in the gains from a performance-based, or output-related, pay system that arise from labor market selection. A performance-based pay program will tend to attract and retain individuals who are particularly good at the activity to which incentives are attached, and repel those who are not. He noted that this effect on the workforce can be very important in explaining productivity gains. For instance, in one of his own case studies outside of teaching, Lazear (2000) found that sorting effects were both substantial and roughly equal in magnitude to motivation effects. In other words, while the incentive system raised the productivity of the typical worker employed, it also raised the overall quality of the workforce.

Some researchers speculate that this selection effect will be a significant factor in teacher labor markets. Studies of teacher turnover, for example, consistently find that high-ability teachers are more likely to leave teaching than low-ability teachers, where ability is defined by a teacher's performance on the ACT (Podgursky, Monroe, & Watson, 2004) or National Teacher Exam (Murnane & Olsen, 1990). This trend may be due to constraints on wages rather than the attraction of other market opportunities.

A recent provocative study by Hoxby and Leigh (2004) found evidence that the migration of high-ability women out of teaching between 1960 and the present was primarily the result of the "push" of teacher pay compensation – which took away relatively higher earning opportunities for teachers – as opposed to the pull of greater non-teaching opportunities. Although the remunerative opportunities for teachers of high and low ability grew outside of teaching, it was pay compression within the education system that accelerated the exit of higher-ability teachers.

Lazear's selection arguments also undermine one other critique of teacher performance-based pay by Murnane and Cohen. These authors argue that in any effective performance-based pay system, employers should be able to tell workers what they need to do in order to become more effective. In other words, if ineffective teachers do not know what to do in order to raise their performance, and supervisors cannot provide such guidance, then the motivational effect of incentives will be nil. However, if the underlying range of teacher effectiveness is great (and evidence considered in the earlier review of literature on teacher effects suggests that this is the case), then simply tying pay to

performance may significantly raise performance even if no individual teacher's productivity rises, simply through differential recruitment and retention of high-performing, high-paid teachers.

## Comprehensive Review of Year 1 Findings

The previous review of theoretical arguments for and against performance incentive pay programs provides a useful backdrop for analyzing the comprehensive findings emanating from the first-year evaluation of the GEEG program. Evaluators conducted a series of initiatives to learn more about the design of schools' GEEG programs, the nature of program implementation, and the evidence on teachers' attitudes toward and reactions to the performance incentive pay programs.

Overall, these findings come together to inform early understandings of the program's influence in 99 public schools throughout Texas. These first-year results suggest that many of the concerns stemming from the theoretical arguments against performance incentives (i.e., team production, multitasking) were not readily apparent. Of course, it is premature to evaluate the program's influence on desired outcomes for teacher labor market practices and teacher quality, as well as on student achievement.

**Design of GEEG Programs.** One of the more noteworthy discoveries stemming from the review of all GEEG applications was the variability of indicators used by schools to measure teacher performance for the distribution of awards. For example, nearly half of schools (45.5%) used measures of campus performance to determine teacher award distribution, and 81% used standardized student assessments. The scope of indicators was even greater for other criteria that measure teacher collaboration and evidence of teachers' initiative and commitment (i.e., Criterion 2 and Criterion 3, according to GEEG guidelines).

Along other program dimensions, however, schools tended toward similar approaches. For example, approximately 90% of GEEG schools established a one-level performance structure for measuring student performance (86.9%) and teacher collaboration (90.9%). This approach established one performance threshold that teachers had to achieve to earn an award; performance over and beyond that threshold did not result in a greater award amount.

Similarly, schools had a tendency to use teachers as the unit being held accountable for performance, as opposed to the performance of an entire campus or team of teachers. Nearly 65% of schools did so for measuring student performance, while 94.9% did so for measuring teacher collaboration. It should be noted that nearly half of schools (48.5%) also considered campus-wide performance when measuring student performance, but such was not the case for any other GEEG criteria.

These discoveries do warrant further consideration in future evaluation years, as the literature on performance monitoring speaks to the difficulty often surrounding the design and use of high-quality measures of teacher performance. It is imperative to get a better grasp on the nature of the performance measures being used in GEEG schools, especially as evaluation efforts begin to study the fidelity of the emerging *Intensity of Incentive* index and the effects of various program components on teacher workforce trends and student achievement.

**Implementation of GEEG Programs.** Evaluators also conducted a review of schools' efforts to implement GEEG during its first year of operation. Findings revealed that most schools did take steps to include a broad representation of school personnel in the design and approval stages of

program development. Principals and full-time teachers tended to be the most frequently included parties.

These analyses also revealed that the vast majority of GEEG schools had not changed the design of their plans from the way they were conceptualized in their initial applications. Of those that were making adaptations, the most common change was in the amount of teacher awards being distributed. However, preliminary analyses of data upload results indicated that – at least on the whole – actual teacher award amounts did not differ noticeably from the amounts stated in GEEG applications. The most frequently reported teacher award amount, in GEEG applications, teacher survey results, and data upload results, was in the range of $1,000 to $1,999. Moreover, the vast majority of awards fall between $0 and $2,999, all below the minimum award amount of $3,000 recommended by statute.

As evaluation efforts carry forward, it will be of interest to more closely analyze how the nature of award distribution at a school, and the award amount for individual teachers, influences the impact of performance incentive programs on teacher behavior and organizational dynamics.

**Teachers' Attitudes and Responses to GEEG.** Previous critiques of performance incentive pay programs often discuss the contrast between subjective and objective measures of teacher performance. Some scholars argue that performance incentive systems must include subjective teacher assessments since these evaluations may pick up desirable teacher behaviors that standardized assessments do not. Others contend that a performance incentive system should only include objective measures of performance since subjective measures can be highly susceptible to gender and racial discrimination, as well as nepotism (Murnane & Cohen, 1986) There are, of course, those who believe it is useful to have multiple indicators for performance systems, if for no other reason than the fact that not all indicators will be equally valid appraisals of teacher performance.

To assess GEEG teachers' opinions on methods used to identify high-performing teachers, evaluators used teacher responses from an item on the first GEEG teacher survey (administered in January 2007) to construct an *Objective Measure* index of teacher performance and four *Subjective Measure* indices of teacher performance.[48] As previously discussed, the January 2007 teacher survey asked teachers to explain how much importance they would give to 17 different measures of performance when designing an incentive pay program.

Teachers rated the following as the most important measures.

- Improvement in students' test scores
- Collaboration with faculty and staff
- Teaching in hard-to-staff schools
- Teaching in hard-to-staff fields
- Time spent in professional development

[48] See survey item #1 in Appendix E, Mid-year GEEG Teacher Survey Instrument.

Teachers rated the following as the least important measures.

- National Board of Professional Teaching Standards certification
- Parent satisfaction with teacher
- Performance evaluation by peers
- Independent evaluation of teaching portfolios
- Student evaluations of teaching performance

The *Objective Measure* index was designed to better understand a teacher's attitude toward objective measures of student performance when used to determine incentive pay for individual teachers. This measure is based on two items: (1) assessing a teacher's opinion toward using a measure of high test scores by students on a standardized test, and (2) assessing a teacher's opinion toward a measure of improvements in students' test scores.

Another set of measures were designed to gauge a teacher's attitude toward subjective measures of teacher performance when determining incentive pay for individual teachers. The first of these indices, *Subjective Measure_1*, is based on six items, including rating teachers' attitudes toward the following measures.

- Performance evaluations by supervisors
- Performance evaluations by peers
- Independent evaluations of teaching portfolios
- Independent evaluations of students' work
- Student evaluations of teaching performance
- Parent satisfaction with a teacher

A second subject index, *Subjective Measure_2*, is based on four items and rates teachers' attitudes toward the following measures.

- Performance evaluations by supervisors
- Performance evaluations by peers
- Independent evaluations of teaching portfolios
- Independent evaluations of students' work

The third subject index, *Subject Measure_3*, is based on only two items that rate teachers' attitudes toward (1) performance evaluations by supervisors and (2) performance evaluations by peers. Additionally, the fourth and final subject index, *Subjective Measure_4*, is also based on two items that rate teachers' attitudes toward (1) independent evaluations of teaching portfolios and (2) independent evaluations of students' work.

Comparisons between the five indices, detailed in Table 6.1, indicate that teachers preferred objective measures of performance for determining incentive pay for individual teachers, and tended to oppose the subjective measures.

**Table 6.1: Teachers' Attitudes Toward Objective and Subjective Measures of Teacher Performance**

| Index | Mean (avg.) | SD | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Objective Measure* | 3.27 | 0.66 | 1 | 4 |
| *Subjective Measure_1* | 2.72 | 0.67 | 1 | 4 |
| *Subjective Measure_2* | 2.78 | 0.69 | 1 | 4 |
| *Subjective Measure_3* | 2.84 | 0.74 | 1 | 4 |
| *Subjective Measure_4* | 2.73 | 0.82 | 1 | 4 |

N=1,642 teachers

*Note:* Average scores are computed using a Likert scale from 1 to 4, where 1=No importance, 2=Low importance, 3=Moderate importance, and 4=High importance

*Source*: Survey results collected from the GEEG teacher survey administered during January of 2007.

This discovery raises questions about how teachers might react to a performance incentive program that uses a number of subjective measures of performance to determine the distribution of teacher awards. Of note is the fact that three of the four GEEG criteria specified in program guidelines would be considered more subjective in nature – measures of teacher collaboration (Criterion 2), measures of teacher initiative and commitment (Criterion 3), and indicators of teaching in a hard-to-staff/high turnover area (Criterion 4).[49] Of these more subjective measures, only Criterion 2 is a required component for all 99 GEEG programs. Only 53 schools used Criterion 3, and even fewer (15) used Criterion 4 to determine the distribution of individual teacher awards.

Therefore, it can be inferred that all GEEG schools are, at least, employing one rather subjective measure of performance for the determination of teacher awards. According to the earlier review of GEEG applications, the indicators used by schools to measure teacher collaboration (Criterion 2) were not objectively defined and resulted in a good deal of variation from school to school – some used measures of professional development participation, while others evaluated the extent to which teachers participate in staff, grade-level, or departmental meetings. Still others have poorly defined expectations.

This raises some reservations about the impact that such a required measure might have on the long-term attitudes of teachers. For now, however, it appears that GEEG teachers – both recipients and non-recipients – viewed their GEEG programs favorably. This could stem from the common feature in GEEG schools that full-time teachers frequently participated in GEEG plan development. This means that, within each school, teachers had more input into the plan design, and that perhaps such involvement has an independent effect on teachers' attitudes.

All that aside, it is clear from both survey results that many teachers reported changes in their instructional practices, and evidence from the Spring 2007 survey suggests that such changes represent desirable professional practices. All teachers, especially award recipients, tended to use practices that are considered to have a positive influence on student achievement. These survey findings seem to abate theoretical criticisms that performance incentives encourage multitasking or

[49] While the Texas Education Agency does predetermine a list of teaching fields considered "hard-to-staff," GEEG schools could determine other areas that are specific to local needs, thereby creating a more subjective element to that criterion.

diminish collaboration among teacher colleagues (i.e., the team production argument). In fact, both surveys speak to the feeling among teachers that colleagues are not discouraged by GEEG to collaborate with one another.

Encouraging as these findings may be, it is not yet possible to conclude that the adaptations in teacher practice or the nature of school culture is attributable to the implementation of GEEG. For example, on the earlier of the two surveys, some teachers used open-ended responses to explain that any changes in their practice would have happened with or without GEEG; they attributed the change to the natural progression of a professional. Additionally, the latter survey administered in the spring of 2007 discovered that some of the differences in instructional practice between award recipients and non-recipients could be explained by the fact that recipients tend to have more years of teaching experience.

At this time, it is too early to determine the causes for such behavioral and organizational dynamics; what is evident is that interesting phenomena are arising in GEEG schools. Future evaluation initiatives will continue to bring about a better understanding as to the impetus for such changes and the influence it may have on student achievement and other outcomes of teacher quality.

## Next Steps for Policy and Research

The previous section provided a comprehensive overview of findings from the first-year evaluation of the GEEG program, nested in a body of literature that highlights the arguments for and against performance incentive pay policy. What emerged is evidence that, at least, subsides some of the theoretical concerns germane to performance incentive programs. More specifically, findings from the first year suggest that schools' GEEG programs were not having a detrimental effect on collegiality between teachers (i.e., team production) nor were they encouraging teachers to focus their behavior exclusively on "teaching to the test" instructional practices (i.e., multitasking).

What is not yet clear is the quality of performance measures being used by schools to determine teacher awards, or the impact that award distribution models might have on teacher behavior and organizational dynamics. It is premature to evaluate how GEEG programs might be impacting teacher workforce trends, such as hiring practices and labor market selection – both of which were identified by Lazear as promising mechanisms, stemming from performance incentive pay systems, to influence the quality of the teacher workforce. Additionally, it is too soon to attribute changes in student achievement to GEEG programs, which is an imperative focus for future evaluative work. These issues will guide research initiatives in the coming years and set the agenda for future initiatives, including:

- Refining the *Intensity of Incentive* index to better identify the quality of performance measures and distribution strategies employed by GEEG schools
- Conducting outcome analyses of GEEG's impact on teacher workforce trends and student achievement
- Identifying the influence of GEEG program characteristics on outcomes for teacher quality and student achievement
- Identifying school system preferences for various GEEG program characteristics

For the time being, it is advised that policymakers in Texas allow the GEEG program to continue its course, not only to permit the completion of evaluation efforts but to learn more about the nature and impact of performance incentive programs on teacher quality and student achievement. Currently, the GEEG program, and broader Texas landscape, provides a unique opportunity to learn about the differential effect of locally designed performance incentive programs and the outcomes of various approaches to implementing a performance incentive program. Additionally, these programs appear to be having a positive influence on teacher practice and organizational dynamics, which gives all the more reason to allow this unique policy environment to continue.

## Chapter Summary

This chapter concludes a comprehensive overview of findings from the first-year evaluation of the GEEG program. These evaluation initiatives have included:

- A descriptive analysis of key GEEG program components specified in schools' applications, specifically in relation to Part 1 funding
- A collection of teacher and staff GEEG award records (i.e., Part 1 and Part 2 awards) gathered using an online data upload system
- An online survey administered to GEEG schools to learn more about their use of Part 2 funds and strategies for program development, approval, and implementation
- A mid-year and end-of-year teacher survey to understand how GEEG programs are impacting organizational dynamics, teachers' attitudes, and teachers' instructional practice

Overall findings suggest that GEEG programs have had an encouraging impact on schools' organizational dynamics, teachers' perceptions of performance incentives, and teachers' professional practice. Nonetheless, it is too soon to conclude that these outcomes are attributable to the implementation of GEEG. Additionally, there is still much to be learned about the quality of schools' program designs and the impact of program components on outcomes of teacher behavior, school dynamics, teacher workforce trends, and student achievement. These issues will set the agenda for future evaluation initiatives and, eventually, inform policymakers, the research community, and educators about the impact of performance incentive programs on teaching and learning throughout Texas.

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# APPENDIX A: NAEP Analyses by Student Subgroups

## Table 1: Texas, Nation Scale Scores and Achievement Gaps on NAEP, 2000–2005 by Eligibility for Free and Reduced Price Lunch

| 4th Math | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **2000** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **National (Public)** | **Eligible** | 208 | 222 | 225 |
| | **Not eligible** | 235 | 244 | 248 |
| | **Gap** | 27 | 22 | 23 |
| **Texas** | **Eligible** | 222 | 229 | 233 |
| | **Not eligible** | 241 | 247 | 253 |
| | **Gap** | 19 | 18 | 20 |
| **8th Math** | | | | |
| | | **2000** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **National (Public)** | **Eligible** | 253 | 258 | 261 |
| | **Not eligible** | 283 | 287 | 288 |
| | **Gap** | 30 | 29 | 27 |
| **Texas** | **Eligible** | 260 | 264 | 268 |
| | **Not eligible** | 284 | 288 | 293 |
| | **Gap** | 24 | 24 | 25 |
| **4th Reading** | | | | |
| | | **2002** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **National (Public)** | **Eligible** | 202 | 201 | 203 |
| | **Not eligible** | 229 | 229 | 230 |
| | **Gap** | 27 | 28 | 27 |
| **Texas** | **Eligible** | 210 | 205 | 208 |
| | **Not eligible** | 228 | 226 | 232 |
| | **Gap** | 18 | 21 | 24 |
| **8th Reading** | | | | |
| | | **2002** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **National (Public)** | **Eligible** | 249 | 246 | 247 |
| | **Not eligible** | 271 | 271 | 270 |
| | **Gap** | 22 | 25 | 23 |
| **Texas** | **Eligible** | 248 | 246 | 247 |
| | **Not eligible** | 275 | 269 | 269 |
| | **Gap** | 27 | 23 | 22 |

*Source:* National Assessment of Educational Progress, National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education. NAEP Data Explorer, from http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/nde/criteria.asp.

## Table 2: Texas, Nation Scale Scores and Achievement Gaps on NAEP, 2000–2005 By Racial/Ethnic Subgroups

| 4th Math | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | **2000** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **National (Public)** | **Eligible** | 208 | 222 | 225 |
| | **Not eligible** | 235 | 244 | 248 |
| | **Gap** | 27 | 22 | 23 |
| **Texas** | **Eligible** | 222 | 229 | 233 |
| | **Not eligible** | 241 | 247 | 253 |
| | **Gap** | 19 | 18 | 20 |
| **8th Math** | | | | |
| | | **2000** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **National (Public)** | **Eligible** | 253 | 258 | 261 |
| | **Not eligible** | 283 | 287 | 288 |
| | **Gap** | 30 | 29 | 27 |
| **Texas** | **Eligible** | 260 | 264 | 268 |
| | **Not eligible** | 284 | 288 | 293 |
| | **Gap** | 24 | 24 | 25 |
| **4th Reading** | | | | |
| | | **2002** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **National (Public)** | **Eligible** | 202 | 201 | 203 |
| | **Not eligible** | 229 | 229 | 230 |
| | **Gap** | 27 | 28 | 27 |
| **Texas** | **Eligible** | 210 | 205 | 208 |
| | **Not eligible** | 228 | 226 | 232 |
| | **Gap** | 18 | 21 | 24 |
| **8th Reading** | | | | |
| | | **2002** | **2003** | **2005** |
| **National (Public)** | **Eligible** | 249 | 246 | 247 |
| | **Not eligible** | 271 | 271 | 270 |
| | **Gap** | 22 | 25 | 23 |
| **Texas** | **Eligible** | 248 | 246 | 247 |
| | **Not eligible** | 275 | 269 | 269 |
| | **Gap** | 27 | 23 | 22 |

*Source:* National Assessment of Educational Progress, National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education. NAEP Data Explorer, from http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/nde/criteria.asp.

# APPENDIX B: Glossary of GEEG Taxonomy Components

### Part 1 Funding Component

The Part 1 funding component of GEEG represents at least 75% of a school's total award. This award money must be used only for financial incentive payments to classroom teachers, and must be structured in such a way that teachers receiving payments demonstrate (1) success in improving student performance using objective, quantifiable measures, such as local benchmarking systems, portfolio assessment, end-of-course assessment, or value-added assessment; and (2) collaboration with faculty and staff that contributes to improving overall student performance on the campus.

Part 1 awards may also take into consideration the following two optional criteria: (1) a teacher's demonstration of ongoing initiative, commitment, personalization, professionalism, and involvement in other activities that directly result in improved student performance; and (2) a teacher's assignment in an area that is historically hard to staff or has had high turnover.

- **Amount $$**
  - **Total campus grant** – Total amount of Part 1 funding awarded to the school. This amount represents 75% of the total GEEG grant given to the school.
  - **Maximum $$ for teachers** – The maximum amount of money that an individual teacher could possibly earn from the Part 1 funding component.
  - **Minimum $$ for teachers** – The minimum amount of money that an individual teacher could possibly earn from the Part 1 funding component.
- **# Eligible teachers** – The number of teachers that could possibly earn money from the Part 1 funding component.

### Criterion 1: Student performance

- **Indicator of student performance** – The type(s) of indicator(s) that a school uses to evaluate academic performance. These indicators are broken down into three distinct categories: campus ratings, student assessment instrument, and other non-academic performance measures.

### Criterion 2: Teacher collaboration

- **Indicator of collaboration** – The type(s) of indicator(s) that a school uses to evaluate teacher collaboration.

### Criterion 3: Teacher initiative and commitment

- **Indicator of initiative and commitment** – The type(s) of indicator(s) that a school uses to evaluate teacher initiative and commitment.

### Criterion 4: Hard-to-staff areas

- **Indicator of hard-to-staff area** – The type(s) of indicator(s) that a school uses to define a hard-to-staff teacher.

**Performance level benchmarks** – For each criterion, the performance levels that must be met in order for a teacher or group of teachers to qualify for an award. These performance levels have two dimensions – structure and expectations.

- **Structure** – The way in which performance-level thresholds are organized. A school might establish one threshold that a teacher or group of teachers must meet or exceed in order to qualify for the award. Others might establish a tiered threshold whereby teachers earn more money as they advance from a lower threshold to a higher one.
- **Expectations** – The way in which the performance-level threshold(s) change(s) over time. Schools might set expectations whereby all thresholds decrease, remain constant, or increase over the duration of the three-year program. Others might set expectations whereby the minimum and/or maximum threshold decreases, remains constant, or increases over time.

**Distribution strategy** – For each criterion, a school's approach for distributing awards to eligible teachers. This approach can be described by two dimensions – unit of determination and method.

- **Unit of accountability** – The unit that is held accountable for the performance used to determine award distribution. Some schools distribute awards to teachers based upon the performance of an "individual teacher," while others distribute awards based on the performance of a "team" of teachers (i.e., grade-level, subject department). A third approach is distributing awards based on "campus-wide" performance.
- **Method** – Schools use varying methods, including "weighting," "flat amount," and a "prerequisite."

  **Weighting** – This method is used to assign differential importance to criterion measures required to earn performance incentives. Measures that are weighted more should be associated with higher pay amounts. This method is often, but not always, associated with a tiered performance level benchmark structure. Common strategies for weighting include:

  - (1) Qualitative – Base award is assigned for achieving performance criterion measure, and supplemental awards are assigned based upon meeting some other additional measures or classification.
  - (2) Points – Points are assigned in an increasing fashion to performance criterion measures.
  - (3) Percentages – Percentages are assigned in an increasing fashion to performance criterion measures; therefore, highly weighted measures are assigned to a higher percentage of the total award amount associated with that criterion.

  **Flat amount** – A school does not use a weighting scheme to distribute awards; instead, it allocates awards at one flat amount based on the required performance threshold for a criterion. This method is often associated with a one-level performance benchmark structure.

  **Prerequisite** – An award amount is not determined by the performance on a given criterion; rather, the criterion performance must be achieved in order to qualify as an award recipient. The actual award amount is then determined by performance on a different criterion.

# APPENDIX C: Overview of GEEG Taxonomy Findings

## Criterion 1: Indicators of Student Performance

| Type of Student Performance Measure | Number of Schools | Percent of Schools |
|---|---|---|
| TEA Campus Rating | 45 | 45.5% |
| Exemplary | 21 | 21.2% |
| Recognized | 28 | 28.3% |
| Acceptable | 23 | 23.2% |
| Comparable Improvement | 5 | 5.1% |
| Quartile 1 | 5 | 5.1% |
| Adequate Yearly Progress | 6 | 6.1% |
| Student Assessments | 80 | 80.8% |
| TAKS | 78 | 78.8% |
| SDAA | 37 | 37.4% |
| TPRI | 16 | 16.2% |
| Formative/benchmark tests | 23 | 23.2% |
| End-of-year/course tests | 3 | 3.0% |
| Student portfolios | 2 | 2.0% |
| Other | 37 | 37.4% |
| Other (Non-academic) Indicators | 20 | 20.2% |
| Student attendance | 7 | 7.1% |
| Drop-out rate | 5 | 5.1% |
| Teacher attendance† | 6 | 6.1% |
| Other | 16 | 16.2% |
| Not applicable | 0 | 0.0% |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0% |

N=99

† Teacher attendance, used by six (6.1%) of schools, is not an indicator of student performance.

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

## Criterion 2: Indicators of Teacher Collaboration

| Teacher Collaboration Activities | Number of Schools | Percent of Schools |
|---|---|---|
| Professional development | 31 | 31.3% |
| Teacher PDAS[50] rating | 12 | 12.1% |
| Instructional, curricular leadership activities | 25 | 25.3% |
| Staff meetings and committees | 56 | 56.6% |
| Collaborative lesson plan development and evaluation | 41 | 41.4% |
| Team teaching | 3 | 3.0% |
| Mentoring, induction, coaching activities | 6 | 6.1% |
| Sharing and analyzing student achievement data | 12 | 12.1% |
| Parent involvement activities | 10 | 10.1% |
| Teacher attendance | 8 | 8.1% |
| Not applicable | 1 | 1.0% |
| Missing | 1 | 1.0% |

N=99

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

## Criterion 3: Indicators of Teacher Initiative and Commitment

| Teacher Initiative Activities | Number of Schools | Percent of Schools |
|---|---|---|
| Professional development | 19 | 19.2% |
| Teacher PDAS rating | 8 | 8.1% |
| Tutoring students, after-school programs | 27 | 27.3% |
| Parent involvement activities | 9 | 9.1% |
| District leadership activities | 1 | 1.0% |
| Teacher attendance | 15 | 15.2% |
| Not applicable | 46 | 46.5% |
| Missing | 0 | 0.0% |

N=99

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

[50] PDAS, otherwise known as the Professional Development and Appraisal System, is the state-approved appraisal system for teachers. It consists of at least one 45-minute observation and the completion of a teacher self-report form. PDAS consists of eight domains focused on learner-centered instruction, a set of proficiencies adopted by the State Board for Educator Certification in 1967.

## Criterion 4: Indicators of Hard-to-Staff Areas

| Hard-to-Staff Areas | Number of Schools | Percent of Schools |
|---|---|---|
| Mathematics | 5 | 5.1% |
| Science | 3 | 3.0% |
| Foreign Language | 0 | 0.0% |
| Special Education | 7 | 7.1% |
| Bilingual Education | 5 | 5.1% |
| Technology Applications | 1 | 1.0% |
| English as Second Language | 1 | 1.0% |
| Other (Locally determined) | 11 | 11.1% |
| Not applicable | 84 | 84.8% |
| Missing | 1 | 1.0% |

N=99

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

## Performance-Level Benchmarks for GEEG Criteria

| Performance-level structure | Criterion 1 | Criterion 2 | Criterion 3 | Criterion 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| One-level | 86 (86.9%) | 90 (90.9%) | 47 (47.5%) | 14 (14.1%) |
| Tiered | 21 (21.2%) | 9 (9.1%) | 9 (9.1%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Not applicable | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 46 (46.5%) | 84 (84.8%) |
| Missing | 1 (1.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (1.0%) |
| **Expectations over time** | **Criterion 1** | **Criterion 2** | **Criterion 3** | **Criterion 4** |
| **One-level expectations** | | | | |
| Stable | 49 (49.5%) | 57 (57.6%) | 40 (40.4%) | 11 (11.1%) |
| Increase | 5 (5.1%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Decrease | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Not applicable | 44 (44.4%) | 41 (41.4%) | 59 (59.6%) | 84 (84.8%) |
| Missing | 1 (1.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 4 (4.0%) |
| **Tiered expectations** | | | | |
| All stable | 15 (15.2%) | 8 (8.1%) | 8 (8.1%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| All increase | 1 (1.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| All decrease | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Minimum increase | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Minimum decrease | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Maximum increase | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Maximum decrease | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Not applicable | 80 (80.8%) | 89 (89.9%) | 90 (90.9%) | 99 (100.0%) |
| Missing | 1 (1.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |

N=99

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

## Distribution Strategy for GEEG Criteria

| Unit of accountability | Criterion 1 | Criterion 2 | Criterion 3 | Criterion 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Campus | 48 (48.5%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Team (i.e., Grade, Subject) | 4 (4.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 0 (0.0%) |
| Teacher | 64 (64.6%) | 94 (94.9%) | 53 (53.5%) | 14 (14.1%) |
| Not applicable | 0 (0.0%) | 3 (3.0%) | 46 (46.5%) | 84 (84.8%) |
| Missing | 2 (2.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (1.0%) |
| **Distribution method** | **Criterion 1** | **Criterion 2** | **Criterion 3** | **Criterion 4** |
| Prerequisite | 6 (6.1%) | 40 (40.4%) | 11 (11.1%) | 2 (2.0%) |
| Flat amount | 41 (41.4%) | 34 (34.3%) | 19 (19.2%) | 9 (9.1%) |
| Weighting | 62 (62.6%) | 16 (16.2%) | 20 (20.2%) | 2 (2.0%) |
| Not applicable | 0 (0.0%) | 6 (6.1%) | 48 (48.5%) | 85 (85.9%) |
| Missing | 1 (1.0%) | 4 (4.0%) | 1 (1.0%) | 2 (2.0%) |

N=99

*Note:* Percentages may not add up to 100% because numbers are based upon duplicated counts (i.e., a school may use one or more of the program characteristics).

*Source:* Information based upon evaluators' analyses of 99 GEEG program applications during the 2006-07 year.

NATIONAL CENTER ON
Performance Incentives

# Governor's Educator Excellence Grants
# Online Year 1 Progress Report 2007

Please enter your school's name from the drop down list:

School: (Click here to choose)

Please enter your name and area code/phone number where we may reach you in case there is a question regarding your responses. (This information is required by the TEA and will be protected per FERPA guidelines.)

Name:

Phone:

**Note: For your phone number, please enter your area code in parentheses followed by your phone number, e.g., (555) 555-5555.**

---

**GEEG IMPLEMENTATION**

**Q1. In developing your school's plans for GEEG, which members of the following groups were involved? Please select all applicable responses.**

| | Check all that apply. |
|---|---|
| a. Principal | ☐ |
| b. Assistant Principal | ☐ |
| c. Full-time classroom teachers (i.e., an educator who teaches in an academic setting or a career and technology instructional setting for not less than an average of four hours each day.) | ☐ |
| d. Part-time classroom teachers (i.e., an educator who teaches in an academic instructional setting for less than an average of four hours each day). | ☐ |
| e. Instructional specialists (e.g., instructional coaches, reading/math specialists) | ☐ |
| f. Other school staff: | ☐ |
| _____Instructional support staff (e.g., teachers' aids) | ☐ |
| _____Librarian(s) | ☐ |
| _____Health support staff (e.g., nurses, counselors, therapists) | ☐ |
| _____Campus support staff (e.g., custodians, cafeteria workers) | ☐ |
| g. District officials | ☐ |
| h. Local school board members | ☐ |
| i. Parents | ☐ |
| j. Community and business leaders | ☐ |
| k. Students | ☐ |

**Please define below members of other groups not listed above.**

**Q2. Was the Site-based decision-making team involved in developing your school's plan for the GEEG?**

- Yes
- No

**Which of the following members comprised the Site-based decision-making team.**

| | Check all that apply. |
|---|---|
| a. Principal | ☐ |
| b. Assistant Principal | ☐ |
| c. Full-time classroom teachers (i.e., an educator who teaches in an academic setting or a career and technology instructional setting for not less than an average of four hours each day.) | ☐ |
| d. Part-time classroom teachers (i.e., an educator who teaches in an academic instructional setting for less than an average of four hours each day). | ☐ |
| e. Instructional specialists (e.g., instructional coaches, reading/math specialists) | ☐ |
| f. Other school staff: | ☐ |
| _____Instructional support staff (e.g., teachers' aids) | ☐ |
| _____Librarian(s) | ☐ |
| _____Health support staff (e.g., nurses, counselors, therapists) | ☐ |
| _____Campus support staff (e.g., custodians, cafeteria workers) | ☐ |
| g. District officials | ☐ |
| h. Local school board members | ☐ |
| i. Parents | ☐ |
| j. Community and business leaders | ☐ |
| k. Students | ☐ |

**Please define below members of other groups on your Site-based decision-making team not listed above, if applicable.**

**Q3. Did your school vote to approve its GEEG plan?**

- Yes
- No

**You indicated that your school voted to approve its GEEG plan. Please select all groups who participated.**

| | Check all that apply. |
|---|---|
| a. Principal | ☐ |
| b. Assistant Principal | ☐ |
| c. Full-time classroom teachers (i.e., an educator who teaches in an academic setting or a career and technology instructional setting for not less than an average of four hours each day.) | ☐ |
| d. Part-time classroom teachers (i.e., an educator who teaches in an academic instructional setting for less than an average of four hours each day). | ☐ |
| e. Instructional specialists (e.g., instructional coaches, reading/math specialists) | ☐ |
| f. Other school staff: | ☐ |
| _____Instructional support staff (e.g., teachers' aids) | ☐ |
| _____Librarian(s) | ☐ |
| _____Health support staff (e.g., nurses, counselors, therapists) | ☐ |
| _____Campus support staff (e.g., custodians, cafeteria workers) | ☐ |
| g. District officials | ☐ |
| h. Local school board members | ☐ |
| i. Parents | ☐ |
| j. Community and business leaders | ☐ |
| k. Students | ☐ |

**Please define below voting members from other groups not listed above, if applicable.**

---

**Q4. Has your school developed a formal process to monitor and manage GEEG implementation?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**You indicated that your school has developed a formal process to monitor and manage GEEG implementation. Does your plan include the use of an annual report on GEEG progress?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**Please check all parties listed below that are responsible for ensuring that an annual report on GEEG progress is used to monitor and manage GEEG implementation.**

- ☐ Principal
- ☐ Assistant Principal
- ☐ Site-based decision-making team
- ☐ Full-time teachers
- ☐ Part-time teachers
- ☐ Instructional specialists
- ☐ Other school staff
- ☐ District officials
- ☐ Local school board
- ☐ Parents
- ☐ Community and business leaders
- ☐ Students
- ☐ Other

---

**You indicated that your school has developed a formal process to monitor and manage GEEG implementation. Does your plan include meetings with faculty and staff to gather feedback on GEEG progress?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**Please check all parties listed below that are responsible for ensuring that meetings with faculty and staff to gather feedback on GEEG progress is used to monitor and manage GEEG implementation.**

- ☐ Principal
- ☐ Assistant Principal
- ☐ Site-based decision-making team
- ☐ Full-time teachers
- ☐ Part-time teachers
- ☐ Instructional specialists
- ☐ Other school staff
- ☐ District officials
- ☐ Local school board
- ☐ Parents
- ☐ Community and business leaders
- ☐ Students
- ☐ Other

---

**You indicated that your school has developed a formal process to monitor and manage GEEG implementation. Does your plan include feedback provided *to* faculty and staff on GEEG progress?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**Please check all parties listed below that are responsible for ensuring that feedback provided *to* faculty and staff on GEEG progress is used to monitor and manage GEEG implementation.**

- ☐ Principal
- ☐ Assistant Principal
- ☐ Site-based decision-making team
- ☐ Full-time teachers
- ☐ Part-time teachers
- ☐ Instructional specialists
- ☐ Other school staff
- ☐ District officials
- ☐ Local school board
- ☐ Parents
- ☐ Community and business leaders
- ☐ Students
- ☐ Other

---

**You indicated that your school has developed a formal process to monitor and manage GEEG implementation. Does your plan include evaluations of GEEG progess?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**Please check all parties listed below that are responsible for ensuring that evaluations of GEEG progress is used to monitor and manage GEEG implementation.**

- ☐ Principal
- ☐ Assistant Principal
- ☐ Site-based decision-making team
- ☐ Full-time teachers
- ☐ Part-time teachers
- ☐ Instructional specialists
- ☐ Other school staff
- ☐ District officials
- ☐ Local school board
- ☐ Parents
- ☐ Community and business leaders
- ☐ Students
- ☐ Other

---

**You indicated that your school has developed a formal process to monitor and manage GEEG implementation. Please define in the space below any other strategies not listed earlier to monitor and manage GEEG implementation. If none, please press "Next" to continue with the survey.**

**Please check all parties listed below that are responsible for your other strategy to monitor and manage GEEG implementation.**

- ☐ Principal
- ☐ Assistant Principal
- ☐ Site-based decision-making team
- ☐ Full-time teachers
- ☐ Part-time teachers
- ☐ Instructional specialists
- ☐ Other school staff
- ☐ District officials
- ☐ Local school board
- ☐ Parents
- ☐ Community and business leaders
- ☐ Students
- ☐ Other

---

**GEEG PART I FUNDING**

**(5) GEEG Part I funds (at least 75 percent of total campus award) must be distributed to classroom teachers based on performance. If the approach used to distribute Part I funds to teachers differed from what was included in your campus GEEG application, please indicate those changes for each performance criterion listed below. Please select the most appropriate response for each of the items below.**

| | No difference between application and implementation | Same criterion measures and performance standards used, but different award amounts given | Same criterion measures used, but more stringent performance standards required | Same criterion measures used, but less stringent performance standards required | Criterion measures used were different than in application | Not Applicable (Criterion was not considered in GEEG application) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Success in improving student performance | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. Collaboration that contributes to improved overall student performance | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Demonstration of ongoing initiative, commitment, personalization, professionalism, and involvement that directly result in improved student achievement | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. Assignment in an area that is hard to staff or has had high turnover | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**If any criteria included in your school's GEEG application plan were modified in ways not specified in the above table, please use the space below to describe those changes, if applicable.**

---

**GEEG PART II FUNDING**

**Q6. Please complete the questions below regarding your school's plan to use award money from Part II funding (no more than 25 percent of total campus award) during the 2006-2007 school year.**

**Is your school allocating Part II funds for professional development?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**You indicated that your school is allocating Part II funds for professional development. Please select the types of activities that apply.**

- ☐ Professional development for teachers who did not receive Part I awards.
- ☐ Other professional development activities that directly contribute to improved teaching and student achievement.

---

**Is your school allocating Part II funds for teacher mentoring programs?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**You indicated that your school is allocating Part II funds for teacher mentoring programs. Please select all program components that apply.**

- ☐ Formative assessments to identify needs, assess practice, and create steps for improvement
- ☐ Classroom observations and offering feedback
- ☐ Demonstrations of effective teaching practices
- ☐ Assistance with lesson plans
- ☐ Assistance with analysis of student work and achievement data
- ☐ Providing mentors on the same campus, grade, and/or subject
- ☐ Selecting mentors with at least 3 years teaching experience and proven records of improving student achievement
- ☐ Training for mentors in research-based training programs
- ☐ Other (Please define)

---

**Is your school allocating Part II funds for new teacher induction programs?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**You indicated that your school is allocating Part II funds for teacher induction programs. Please select all program components that apply.**

- ☐ Mentoring
- ☐ Common planning time
- ☐ Professional development
- ☐ Standards-based evaluation

---

**Is your school allocating Part II funds for bonuses or stipends for teachers?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**You indicated that your school is allocating Part II funds for bonuses or stipends for teachers. Please select all criteria that apply.**

- ☐ New teachers assigned to high needs subject areas
- ☐ Stipend for participation in after-school or Saturday programs that contribute to improved teaching and students achievement

---

**Is your school allocating Part II funds for other activities not listed earlier?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**You indicated that your school is allocating Part II funds for other activities not listed earlier. Please explain below.**

---

**Q7. GEEG Part II funds can be used to provide additional incentives to school personnel who have contributed to improved student achievement at your school, but were not included as recipients of Part I funds. Does your school use incentives for such purposes?**

- ○ Yes
- ○ No

---

**You indicated that Part II funds will be used to provide additional incentives to school personnel.**
**Please indicate which school faculty and/or staff members are eligible to receive Part II funds. and enter the maximum award amounts for which they are each eligible, if you checked the "Yes" response.**

| | No | Yes | If yes, enter maximum award amount (e.g., $3000) |
|---|---|---|---|
| a. Principal | ◉ | ○ | |
| b. Assistant Principal | ◉ | ○ | |
| c. Full-time classroom teachers (i.e., an educator who teaches in an academic setting or a career and technology instructional setting for not less than an average of four hours each day.) | ◉ | ○ | |
| d. Part-time classroom teachers (i.e., an educator who teaches in an academic instructional setting for less than an average of four hours each day). | ◉ | ○ | |
| e. Instructional specialists (e.g., instructional coaches, reading/math specialists) | ◉ | ○ | |
| f. Instructional support staff (e.g., teachers' aids) | ◉ | ○ | |
| g. Librarian(s) | ◉ | ○ | |
| h. Health support staff (e.g., nurses, counselors, therapists) | ◉ | ○ | |
| i. Campus support staff (e.g., custodians, cafeteria workers) | ◉ | ○ | |
| j. Other | ◉ | ○ | |

**If you answered yes to "Other" above, please define in the space below and the maximum award amount.**

**Please select the criteria your school uses to distribute additional incentives to school personnel not awarded Part I funds. For those applicable to your school plan, please describe the measurement indicator on which decisions are based. Select all that apply.**

| | No | Yes | If yes, list measurement indicators |
|---|---|---|---|
| a. Success in improving student performance | ◉ | ○ | |
| b. Collaboration that contributes to improved overall student performance | ◉ | ○ | |
| c. Demonstration of ongoing initiative, commitment, personalization, professionalism, and involvement that directly result in improved student achievement | ◉ | ○ | |
| d. Assignment in an area that is hard to staff or has had high turnover | ◉ | ○ | |
| e. Other | ◉ | ○ | |

**If you answered yes to "Other" above, please define in the space below and the measurement indicators.**

**Q8. Is your school allocating Part II funds for any purposes not identified in this progress report?**

- Yes
- No

---

**You indicated that your school is allocating Part II funds for other purposes not identified in this progress report. Please explain below.**

Submit Report

NATIONAL CENTER ON
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# Governor's Educator Excellence Grants
# Teacher Survey Fall 2006

**Welcome to the Governor's Educator Excellence Grants (GEEG) program teacher survey!**

**The Texas Education Agency has contracted with the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI), a research and development center funded by the U.S. Department of Education's Institute of Education Sciences, to conduct an evaluation of the GEEG program. The GEEG program, in which your school is participating, is in the beginning of the second year of implementation and therefore, policymakers and educators are highly interested in your experiences related to program development and implementation.**

**We appreciate your time to take this online survey. Our estimate for completing the survey is approximately 8 to 10 minutes.**

**To begin the survey, proceed by pressing the "Next" button shown below.**

---

Please enter your school's name from the drop down list:

School:

---

**I. WHAT SHOULD BE AWARDED WITH INCENTIVE PAY?**

**(1) The current teacher salary schedule rewards experience and education. Several additional factors have been suggested for determining incentive pay for *individual teachers*. If you were designing an incentive pay program for individual teachers, how much importance would you give to each of the following:**

| | Importance | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | None | Low | Moderate | High |
| a. Time spent in professional development | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. High average test scores by students | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Improvements in students' test scores | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. Performance evaluations by supervisors | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. Performance evaluations by peers | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| f. Independent evaluation of teaching portfolios | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| g. Independent evaluations of students' work (e.g., portfolios) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| h. Student evaluations of teaching performance | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| i. Collaboration with faculty and staff | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| j. Working with students outside of class time. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| k. Efforts to involve parents in students' education | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| l. Serving as a Master Teacher | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| m. Mentoring other teachers | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| n. National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) certification | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| o. Parent satisfaction with teacher | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| p. Teaching in hard-to-staff fields | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| q. Teaching in hard-to-staff school | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**If you identified another factor different than above, please describe in the space below and indicate its importance to you.**

**(2) Please indicate how important you believe each factor was in determining awards provided to teachers in your school from the Governor's Educational Excellence Grants (GEEG):**

| | Importance | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | None | Low | Moderate | High |
| a. Time spent in professional development | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. High average test scores by students | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Improvements in students' test scores | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. Performance evaluations by supervisors | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. Performance evaluations by peers | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| f. Independent evaluation of teaching portfolios | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| g. Independent evaluations of students' work (e.g., portfolios) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| h. Student evaluations of teaching performance | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| i. Collaboration with faculty and staff | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| j. Working with students outside of class time. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| k. Efforts to involve parents in students' education | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| l. Serving as a Master Teacher | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| m. Mentoring other teachers | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| n. National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) certification | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| o. Parent satisfaction with teacher | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| p. Teaching in hard-to-staff fields | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| q. Teaching in hard-to-staff school | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| r. Other (please see next survey question.) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**If you identified another factor different than above, please describe in the space below and indicate its importance to you:**

## II. EFFORTS TO EARN GEEG AWARDS

**(3) How have you changed your teaching practices to try to earn an incentive award in response to the Governor's Educator Excellence Grants (GEEG)?**

a. Classroom instruction:

b. Using student achievement data to make teaching decisions:

c. Collaborative activities with colleagues:

d. Professional development:

e. Working with parents:

f. Other:

---

**III. PROCESS OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION**

**(4) Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each statement about the GEEG awards program at your school.**

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Teachers at my school were involved in the development of this program. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. Other non-teaching staff at my school were involved in the development of this program. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Administrators at my school were involved in the development of this program. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. The GEEG incentive system developed by my school is fair to teachers. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. The GEEG incentive system is having beneficial effects on my school. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| f. The GEEG incentive system is having negative effects on my school. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**(5) Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each general statement about incentive pay for teachers and administrators in Texas.**

| | Strongly Disagree | Disagree | Agree | Strongly Agree | Don't Know |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| a. Incentive pay for teachers based on individual teaching performance is a positive change to teacher pay practices. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. Incentive pay for teachers based on overall performance at the school is a positive change to teacher pay practices. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Incentive pay for administrators based on overall performance at the school is a positive change to administrator pay practices. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. The state performance appraisal system (PDAS) provides an objective and fair means of determining individual teaching performance for use in a performance incentive system. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

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**IV. BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

**(6) Including this year, please enter the number of years you have taught on a full-time basis.**

- 1 - 3 years
- 4 - 9 years
- 10 - 14 years
- 15 - 19 years
- 20 or more years

**(7) Including this year, please enter the number of years you have taught on a full-time basis *at this school.***

- 1 - 3 years
- 4 - 9 years
- 10 - 14 years
- 15 - 19 years
- 20 or more years

**(8) What is the highest degree you hold?**

- Associate Degree
- Bachelor's Degree
- Master's Degree
- Doctorate or Professional Degree
- Other (specify) _____

---

**(9) Did you receive an award from the Governor's Educator Excellence Grants program during its first award distribution cycle (fall 2006 semester)?**

- Yes [Goto question IndividualAmt]
- No [Goto question SalAmt]

---

**(10) How much did you receive as an individual award?**

- $0 to $999
- $1,000 to $1,999
- $2,000 to $2,999
- $3,000 to $3,999
- $4,000 to $4,999
- $5,000 to $5,999
- $6,000 to $6,999
- $7,000 to $7,999
- $8,000 to $8,999
- $9,000 to $9,999
- $10,000 or more

**(11) How much did you receive as a group-based award?**

- $0 to $999
- $1,000 to $1,999
- $2,000 to $2,999
- $3,000 to $3,999
- $4,000 to $4,999
- $5,000 to $5,999
- $6,000 to $6,999
- $7,000 to $7,999
- $8,000 to $8,999
- $9,000 to $9,999
- $10,000 or more

**(12) What is your annual salary?**

- $20,000 to $24,999
- $25,000 to $29,999
- $30,000 to $34,999
- $35,000 to $39,999
- $40,000 to $44,999
- $45,000 to $49,999
- $50,000 to $54,999
- $55,000 to $59,999
- $60,000 to $64,999
- $65,000 to $69,999
- $70,000 to $74,999
- $75,000 or more

Submit Survey

NATIONAL CENTER ON
Performance Incentives

**April 2007**

## Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG)
## Teacher Survey

**Dear Teacher,**

**The National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI), under contract with the Texas Education Agency (TEA), is conducting an on-going evaluation of the Governor's Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG) program. This survey is intended to help us learn about teaching practices in schools, both at the classroom and school levels. For that purpose, we want to survey all staff who are directly involved in delivering instruction, including classroom teachers, instructional aides, instructional specialists, and coaches. Therefore, when we state that the surveys should be administered to all "full-time instructional personnel", we say so with the following definition in mind.**

**(1) A classroom teacher who teaches an average of at least four hours per day in an academic or career and technology instructional setting focusing on the delivery of the Texas Essential Knowledge and Skills (TEKS).**

**(2) The term also includes teachers' assistants/instructional aides, instructional coaches and specialists directly involved in delivering instruction.**

**(3) Permanent substitutes can be included as survey respondents if they meet the above requirements of at least four hours per day of instructional work.**

**All personnel who meet this definition should be included regardless of their eligibility for Part I or Part II awards or the amount of award for which they are eligible.**

**We encourage you to complete the survey, as your responses will inform policymakers' decision-making process. If you have any questions about the survey or the study please contact:**

**Dr. Omar Lopez**
**(512) 341-0351**
**geeg@cpse-k16.com**

***Our estimate for completing the survey is approximately 15 minutes.***

***To begin the survey, proceed by pressing the "Next" button shown below.***

---

Please enter your school's name from the drop down list:

School: (Click here to choose)

**Note**: ***To help you find your school, the list is alphabetized by district followed by your school's name.***

---

**SECTION A: PERFORMANCE-BASED INCENTIVES**

**(1) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your school's GEEG program?**

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Strongly Disagree** | **Disagree** | **Agree** | **Strongly Agree** |
| a. Our GEEG program does a good job of distinguishing effective from ineffective teachers at the school. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. The prospect that teachers at my school can earn a bonus discourages staff in the school from working together. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. I have noticed increased resentment among teachers since the start of our GEEG program. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. I was already working as effectively as I could before the implementation of GEEG, so the program does not affect my work. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. I have altered my instructional practices as a result of our GEEG program. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| f. The size of the top GEEG bonus award at my school is large enough to motivate me to try to earn the top award. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| g. I have a strong desire to earn a GEEG bonus. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| h. Our GEEG program does not measure important aspects of my teaching performance. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| i. I have a clear understanding of the criteria I need to meet in order to achieve a bonus. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**(2) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the teachers in your school this year (2006-07) compared to last school year (2005-06)?**

***Teachers in my school:***

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Strongly Disagree** | **Disagree** | **Agree** | **Strongly Agree** |
| a. Seem more competitive than cooperative. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. Trust each other less. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Feel more responsible to help each other do their best. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. More often expect students to complete every assignment. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. More often encourage students to keep trying even when the work is challenging. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| f. Less often think it is important that all of their students do well in class | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| g. Can be counted on more often to help out anywhere or anytime, even though it may not be part of their official assignment. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**(3) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about your satisfaction with teaching this year (2006-07) compared to last year (2005-06)?**

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Strongly Disagree** | **Disagree** | **Agree** | **Strongly Agree** |
| a. I would describe teachers at this school as a more satisfied group than we were last school year. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. The stress and disappointments involved in teaching at this school are much greater than last school year. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. This year I like the way things are run at the school more than I did last year. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. This year I think about transferring to another school/district more than I did last year. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

---

**SECTION B: CURRICULUM AND INSTRUCTION**

**(4) How often do you engage in the following activities as part of your classroom instruction?**

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Never** | **Once or twice a year** | **Once or twice a semester** | **Once or twice a month** | **Once or twice a week** | **Almost Daily** |
| a. I analyze students' work to identify the curricular standards that students have or have not yet mastered. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. I follow an "instructional calendar" or "pacing plan" provided by the school or district to schedule my instructional content. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. I design my classroom lessons to be aligned with specific curricular standards. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. I plan different assignments or lessons for groups of students based on their performance. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. I have students help other students learn class content (e.g., peer tutoring). | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

---

**(5) How have you changed your teaching practices this year (2006-07) compared to last year (2005-06)? For each of the activities listed below, please indicate whether you are spending more time, the same amount of time, or less time this year than you did last year.**

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Much less than last year** | **A little less than last year** | **The same as last year** | **A little more than last year** | **Much more than last year** |
| a. Aligning my classroom instruction with curricular standard. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. Focusing on the classroom content covered by standardized achievement tests. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Administering benchmark assessments or quizzes. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. Re-teaching topics or skills based on students' performance on classroom tests. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. Reviewing student test results with other Teachers. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| f. Seeking help from/providing help to other teachers informally. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| g. Attending district- or school-sponsored professional development workshops. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| h. Engaging in informal self-directed learning (e.g., reading subject-specific education research, using the Internet to enrich knowledge and skills). | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| i. Tutoring individuals or small groups of students outside of class time. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**(6) How much change has there been in the time your students spend on the following activities this year (2006-07) compared to last year (2005-06)? For each of the activities listed below, please indicate whether your students are spending more time, the same amount of time, or less time this year than they did last year.**

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Much less than last year** | **A little less than last year** | **The same as last year** | **A little more than last year** | **Much more than last year** |
| a. Engaging in hands-on learning activities (e.g., working with manipulative aids). | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. Working in groups. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Completing assignments at home (i.e., homework). | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. Participating in direct instruction. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. Engaging in inquiry-based learning (i.e., students seek out and construct knowledge for themselves.) | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**SECTION C: ASSESSMENT AND USE OF ASSESSMENT RESULTS**

**(7) Teachers sometimes focus their efforts on improving the performance of specific groups of students. Compared to last year (2005-06), how regularly do you focus extra effort on students at different performance levels in your class(es) this year?**

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Much less than last year** | **A little less than last year** | **The same as last year** | **A little more than last year** | **Much more than last year** |
| a. I focus the same amount of effort on students at all performance levels. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. I focus more effort on students at high levels of achievement. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. I focus more effort on students at average levels of achievement. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. I focus more effort on students at moderately low levels of achievement. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. I focus more effort on students at very low levels of achievement. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**(8) To what extent do you use student test score data for each of the following purposes?**

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Never or almost never** | **Occasionally** | **Frequently** | **Always or almost always** |
| a. Identify individual students who need remedial assistance. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. Set learning goals for individual students | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. Tailor instruction to individual students' needs. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. Develop recommendations for tutoring or other educational services for students. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. Assign or reassign students to groups. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| f. Identify and correct gaps in the curriculum for all students. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| g. Target parent involvement in student learning. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| h. Identify areas where I need to strengthen my content knowledge or teaching skills. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| i. Determine areas where I need professional development. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

**SECTION D: PARENT ENGAGEMENT**

**(9) How often do you engage in each of the following activities involving students' parents (or guardians)?**

| | (Click one response in each row.) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Never or almost never** | **Occasionally** | **Frequently** | **Always or almost always** |
| a. I require students to have their parents sign off on homework. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| b. I assign homework that requires direct parent involvement or participation. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| c. I send home examples of excellent student work to serve as models. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| d. For those students who are having academic problems, I try to make direct contact with their parents. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| e. For those students whose academic performance improves, I send messages home to parents. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| f. Invite parents to visit or observe my classroom. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| g. I encourage parents to volunteer in the school. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |
| h. I help engage parents in site-based decision-making and advisory groups. | ○ | ○ | ○ | ○ |

---

**SECTION E: BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

**(10) Including this year, please check the number of years you have taught on a full-time basis.**

- ○ 1 - 3 years
- ○ 4 - 9 years
- ○ 10 - 14 years
- ○ 15 - 19 years
- ○ 20 or more years

**(11) Including this year, please check the number of years you have taught on a full-time basis *at this school.***

- ○ 1 - 3 years
- ○ 4 - 9 years
- ○ 10 - 14 years
- ○ 15 - 19 years
- ○ 20 or more years

**(12) What is the highest degree you hold?**

- ○ Associate Degree
- ○ Bachelor's Degree
- ○ Master's Degree
- ○ Doctorate or Professional Degree
- ○ Other (specify) _____

---

**(13) What percentage of your time is spent teaching in an out-of-field area?**

- 0% to 10%
- 11% to 20%
- 21% to 30%
- 31% to 40%
- 41% to 50%
- 51% to 60%
- 61% to 70%
- 71% to 80%
- 81% to 90%
- 91% to 100%

**(14) What is your annual salary?**

- $20,000 to $24,999
- $25,000 to $29,999
- $30,000 to $34,999
- $35,000 to $39,999
- $40,000 to $44,999
- $45,000 to $49,999
- $50,000 to $54,999
- $55,000 to $59,999
- $60,000 to $64,999
- $65,000 to $69,999
- $70,000 to $74,999
- $75,000 or more

---

**(15) Did you receive an award from the Governor's Educator Excellence Grants program during its first award distribution cycle (fall 2006 semester)?**

- Yes (If you answer "Yes", you will continue on to questions 16 and 17 to complete the survey.) [Goto question IndividualAmt]
- No (If you answer "No", you will be done with the survey and your responses will be submitted to the system.)

---

**You indicated that you received an award from the GEEG program during its first award distribution cycle (fall 2006 semester).**

**(16) How much did you receive as an individual award?**

- $0 to $999
- $1,000 to $1,999
- $2,000 to $2,999
- $3,000 to $3,999
- $4,000 to $4,999
- $5,000 to $5,999
- $6,000 to $6,999
- $7,000 to $7,999
- $8,000 to $8,999
- $9,000 to $9,999
- $10,000 or more

**(17) How much did you receive as a group-based award?**

- $0 to $999
- $1,000 to $1,999
- $2,000 to $2,999
- $3,000 to $3,999
- $4,000 to $4,999
- $5,000 to $5,999
- $6,000 to $6,999
- $7,000 to $7,999
- $8,000 to $8,999
- $9,000 to $9,999
- $10,000 or more

---

**You have completed the survey.**

**Please click on the "Submit Survey" button below to submit your responses.**

Submit Survey

NATIONAL CENTER ON
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Examining Performance Incentives in Education

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